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ABSTRACT
The British image of Germany as England’s “poor relation,” a backward cluster of feudal
states, gave way during the nineteenth century to the stereotype of England’s archenemy and
imperial rival. This shift from innocuous Old Germany to menacing New Germany accelerated
after German unification in 1871 as German economic growth and imperial ambitions became
topics for commentary in British journals. But the stereotypical “German Michael,” or rustic
simpleton, and other images of self-effacing servile, loyal, honest and passive Old Germany
lingered on into the late nineteenth century as a “straw man” for alarmist Germanophobes to
dispel with new counter-stereotypes. These included fanatical nationalists, Anglophobic
militarists, overbearing officials, know-it-all professors, unscrupulous merchants and
indefatigable clerks. Some Germanophobes, however, and many Germanophiles, clung to older
stereotypes as a form of escapism or wishful thinking: the former believed that national character
deficiencies would foil German ambitions, the latter hoped that German idealism and good sense
would eventually triumph over Anglophobic nationalism.
The British entente with France in 1904, and Russia in 1907, marked an end to more than
a decade of Anglo-German alliance attempts. These supposed missed opportunities were
thwarted by mutual distrust, opposing strategic aims, diplomatic maneuvering and, ultimately,
naval rivalry. But the strength of public opinion and popular nationalism also limited official
moves toward cooperation. Stereotypes contributed to what has become known as the Anglovi

German antagonism through their power to encapsulate national differences. British journalists
could draw upon a rich heritage of demeaning German stereotypes in order to bolster national
self-image at the expense of the German nemesis. Stereotypes also gained unwarranted currency
in the public media through pseudoscientific racial theories and ethnological hierarchies that
constituted the nineteenth-century paradigm of innate national character differences. The record
of stereotypes in print therefore reveals the psychological underpinnings of pre-World War I
British attitudes toward Germany and provides a new perspective on the interface between public
opinion and national rivalry.

vii

I. INTRODUCTION
The destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989, symbolizing both an end to Cold War
tensions and the impending reunification of divided Germany, brought cheers throughout the free
world, but in the wake of initial celebrations dissenting voices could be heard in the press. In his
mildly alarmist “Uneasy About the Germans,” playwright Arthur Miller sensed “something
factitious about German society in the minds of Germans” and a less “transcendent” feeling
among Germans toward the Federal Republic than that shown by French, British or American
citizens toward their respective governments. For Miller, West Germany’s tolerant, democratic
government lacked “consecration by blood,” and the knowledge that many Germans had
sacrificed their lives actually fighting to prevent it, “keeps sucking the life out of German
protestations of a democratic faith and casts suspicion on the country’s reassurances that its
economic power is no menace to the world.”1 Miller’s warning sounds hauntingly reminiscent of
German author Thomas Mann’s post-World War II diatribe on undemocratic, antiEnlightenment, demonic Germans, ever willing to strike a Faustian bargain for world power at

1

Arthur Miller, “Uneasy About the Germans,” New York Times Magazine (6 May 1990) : 77,
84. Otto Friedrich, in “Germany: Toward Unity,” Time (6 July 1990) : 68, questions what Miller
would say if “any German were foolish enough to offer such a gory theory of ‘democratic faith’.”
1

the expense of liberty. Unlike Mann, however, Miller recognized the importance of discarding
old stereotypes and suspicions in hopes of accentuating the positive.2
Such timeworn post-Holocaust worries about German anti-western sentiments and
Machtpolitik failed to dissuade the appreciable majorities world-wide who favored reunification,
but even optimistic articles noted apprehensions among Germany’ s European neighbors, not to
mention Britain, Israel and the superpowers. In Time magazine’ s March twenty-eighth cover
story, entitled “ The Germans: Should the world be worried?” Bruce W. Nelan reported that “ fear
of Germany, in abeyance for more than 40 years while the country was divided in a bipolar
world, is on the rise,” backing up this statement with wary and unenthusiastic quotations from
such notables as former French Prime Minister Michael Debré, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze, and Israeli Prime Minister Ytzhak Shamir. More to the point, West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl’ s “ politically motivated equivocation” regarding the status of
Germany’ s post-war border with Poland provoked Polish demands, supported by Britain and
France, for a voice in the so-called “ two-plus-four” reunification talks taking place between the
two Germanies and the four World War II allies: the U.S., Britain, France and Soviet Union.3
Even though Kohl, once reelected, smoothed over fears of territorial ambition by calling for a
2

See Thomas Mann, Germany and the Germans, text of an address delivered in the Coolidge
Auditorium in the Library of Congress May 29, 1945 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1945), pp. 5, 11, 15-16.
3

“ Anything to Fear?” Time (26 March 1990) : 32-34. Not surprisingly, Poland was the only
country surveyed showing a majority opposed to a single Germany. The fact that the Federal
Republic had previously recognized under a 1970 treaty the inviolability of Poland’ s borders,
specifically the Oder-Neisse line separating East Germany from formerly Prussian Silesia,
underscores the seriousness of Kohl’ s foreign policy gaffe. On this earlier treaty as a prelude to
Chancellor Willy Brandt’ s Ostpolitik see Gordon A. Craig, The Germans (New York: G. P.
Putnam’ s Sons, 1982) p. 58.
2

quick settlement of the border question, the immediacy of West Germany’ s economic dominance
conjured up premonitions of a German commercial hegemony in Europe, particularly Eastern
Europe, which would jeopardize the political and economic integration of the European
Community.4
Similar misgivings resonated in historians’ prognostications of a German turn toward
isolationism, a new economic nationalism with ominous political overtones, or the possibility of
a Soviet-friendly Ostpolitik abetted by simmering disenchantment with U.S. policies and the
apparently popular appeal of neutrality.5 Additionally, intellectual currents in West Germany
during the 1980s aroused suspicions that Germany’ s ties to the West could prove more tenuous
than hoped. These “ straws in the wind” included an academic reaction against Enlightenmentcentered approaches to German history and revival of the nineteenth-century Mitteleuropa idea

4

Surprised not to find a “ bastion of chauvinism” amid the more than 600,000 Silesian ethnic
Germans, Peter Schneider, in “ Is Anyone German Here?” New York Times Magazine (15 April
1990) : 63, attributed the source of nationalist agitation, and Kohl’ s electioneering motive, to
West Germany’ s still influential right-wing hard-liners. Nelan, “ Anything to Fear?” pp. 41-42,
reported in 1990 that West Germany alone accounted for approximately one-fifth of the EC’ s
population and gross domestic product and 31% of its exports.
5

Gordon A. Craig, “ A New, New Reich?” New York Review of Books 33 (18 January 1990) :
30-33, cited a chapter entitled “ Uncertain Democracy” in David Marsh’ s The Germans: Rich,
Bothered and Divided, published as The Germans: A People at the Crossroads (New York: St.
Martin’ s Press, 1990), which begins with pessimistic epigraphs from Thomas Mann, historian
Ralf Dahrendorf and ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Craig also summarized the gloomy
isolation argument in Anne-Marie Le Gloannec’ s, La Nation Orpheline: Les Allemagnes en
Europe (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1989), a somewhat more optimistic view of economic nationalism
put forward in Harold James’ s A German Identity, 1770-1990 (New York: Routledge, 1989), and
West German differences with U.S. policies regarding nuclear strategy, economic issues and
relations with East Germany discussed in Wolfram F. Hanrieder’ s Germany, America, Europe:
Forty Years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). Hanrieder
blamed this divergence on the U.S. “ double containment” policy of keeping Germany and Europe
divided between the superpowers.
3

which, even aside from its history of propagandistic exploitation by imperialists and Nazis,
hinted at an anti-western protectionist bloc along the lines of a German-dominated Central
European customs union or Zollverein.6 Mitteleuropa also suggested the potential for an
enlarged neutral zone that could upset the paradigm of an East-West strategic balance in postCold War Europe. Moreover, the collapse of Soviet power and influence brought back into
vogue talk of a German Sonderweg, or special path, applied specifically to Germany’ s unique
geopolitical position and arguments for an increased leadership role in East Europe.7 But
Sonderweg, despite its limited nationalist appeal, also denotes a long-held historical view that
modern Germany’ s nineteenth-century bourgeois revolution from above constituted an
exceptional and “ abnormal” departure from western liberal models of democratic pluralism,
mainly through the survival of authoritarian, pre-industrial traditions which paved the way for the

6

Craig, “ A New, New Reich?” p. 33. German economist Friedrich List and others advocated
Mitteleuropa in the 1830'
s as a protectionist scheme to promote national unity and economic
expansion. Bismarck adopted the concept during the 1880s because it dove-tailed with German
colonial ambitions in its appeal to Pan-German nationalists and helped undermine Anglophilic
German liberalism. In concert with Franco-German colonial cooperation, Mitteleuropa would
provide a foundation for German Weltpolitik through both economic and political protectionism,
by isolating Britain and containing Russian expansionism. The Nazis perverted Mitteleuropa
into a German “ Monroe Doctrine” justifying territorial annexation and political domination in
East Europe. See Bascom Barry Hayes, Bismarck and Mitteleuropa (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh
Dickinson University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1994) pp. 18, 391-93.
7

Jorg Brechtefeld, in Mitteleuropa and German Politics: 1848 to the Present (New York: St.
Martin’ s Press, 1996) pp. 77, 88-89, 95-97, points out that the 1980s renaissance of
Mitteleuropa accompanied a shift from preoccupation with detente and defense issues to
questions about Germany’ s foreign policy role in East Europe. While acknowledging its darker
connotations, he uses Sonderweg in a positive sense, applauding the notion of Germany as a
“ bridge” between East and West, although not at the expense of Germany’ s western connections
and not without a consistent and concise policy.
4

rise of fascism in the twentieth century.8 Although revisionists since the mid-1980s have offered
correctives to the concept of German exceptionalism, or “ peculiarity,” and have questioned the
extent of manipulation by conservative elites and the idea of continuity from Bismarck to Hitler,
the negative implications of Sonderweg have by no means disappeared and the debate continues.9

8

In a concise overview of the historiography of German conservatism, editors Larry Eugene
Jones and James Retallack outline the stages through which the traditional view of “ backward”
German aristocrats’ failure to accommodate liberalism became a key component in the
Sonderweg thesis. Building upon earlier evidence that, unlike their western counterparts,
German aristocrats successfully adopted “ pseudo-democratic” techniques of mass-mobilization
and demagoguery in the reaction against loss of privilege, the “ new orthodoxy” of the 1970s,
following the work of Ralf Dahrendorf and historians from the University of Bielefeld, held that
the “ temporal disjunction” after 1871 of rapid economic modernization within an essentially
feudal system gave undue leverage to conservative agrarian and industrial elites and thus retarded
the social and political development of the German bourgeoisie. See “ German Conservatism
Reconsidered: Old Problems and New Directions,” in Between Reform, Reaction, and
Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945 (Providence, RI
and Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1993), pp. 3-17.
9

David Blackbourne and Geoff Eley’ s seminal work, The Peculiarities of German History:
Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-century Germany, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984) stood the Sonderweg thesis on its head by arguing instead for Anglo-American
exceptionalism. While crediting the revisionists for exposing the fallacy of monolithic German
conservatism, Roger Fletcher, in “ Social Historians and Wilhelmine Politics – Manipulation
From Above Or Self-mobilization From Below?” Australian Journal of Politics and History 32
(1986) : 86-104, countered that Germany indeed differed from western democracies due to the
relative lack or ineffectiveness of forces for political change driven autonomously from below
against a “ semi-absolutist Prussian military monarchy.” Geoff Eley, in his introduction to From
Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 512, explained his break from the continuity thesis, supported from political and socio-economic
perspectives, respectively, by what he called the Anglo-American liberal school of historians,
represented by Hajo Holborn, Karl Dietrich Bracher and Gordon Craig, and the later West
German critical school inspired by Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler. The Blackbourne/Eley
thesis has since generated studies that debunk the “ unpolitical” German stereotype arising from
the more deterministic approach. See, for example, Margaret L. Anderson, Practicing
Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000); and Jan Christopher Palmowski, “ The Politics of the ‘Unpolitical
German’ : Liberalism in German Local Government, 1860-1880,” Historical Journal 42 (1999) :
675-704.
5

Amidst these shades of the past and future uncertainties, countervailing arguments
played up “ forty years of solid achievement” since “ Zero Hour” (1945), highlighting the westernoriented vision and firm leadership of Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’ s first chancellor, and
Germany’ s evolution toward tolerance and social conscience, exemplified by special ties with
Israel and by the greater political assertiveness of women, labor and especially youth.10 Indeed,
against the backdrop of West Germany’ s record of pro-Zionism, active participation in the
prosecution of Nazi war criminals, and payment of substantial reparations totaling over 17 billion
DM to Israel and families of Jewish victims, the perception of a greater willingness on the part of
Germans since the 1970s to discuss the crimes of the Nazi period, and acknowledge some degree
of national complicity, probably owes as much to the mere endurance of peaceful democracy as
to any other cause.11 Even Miller expressed the near universally held opinion that younger
generations of Germans, while not in denial, neither remember nor understand Nazism, but

10

Craig, “ A New, New Reich?” pp. 28-29, reviewed the arguments for positive change
through prudent government and political dissent, respectively, in Dennis L. Bark and David R.
Gress’ s two-volume A History of West Germany, vol. 1: From Shadow to Substance, 1945-1963;
vol. 2: Democracy and Its Discontents, 1963-1988 (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell,
1989-) and Peter H. Merkl, ed., The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty (New York: New
York University Press, 1989).
11

John Ardagh, Germany and the Germans: An Anatomy of a Society Today (New York:
Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 391-400, included the following milestones in this transition to greater
openness: Chancellor Willy Brandt’ s unabashed homage to Polish Jews killed by Nazis during
his 1970 state visit to the Warsaw ghetto memorial; Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker’ s
1984 speech, on the fortieth anniversary of the German surrender, commemorating Holocaust
victims and urging acceptance of the truth of Nazi horrors; the closer scrutiny of Hitler’ s Third
Reich in schools and media during the 1970s, including broad exposure to Hollywood’ s 1979
Holocaust series; and a greater readiness among youth to speak out and confront lingering denial
in older generations.
6

rather, as Arms of Krupp author William Manchester blithely put it, tend to be “ united by a horror
of the Second and Third Reichs.” 12
Despite such assurances, however, the specter of uncertainty looming over reunification
and the future of Germany’ s western-oriented strategic alliances prompted U.S. President George
H. W. Bush, during a Camp David meeting with Chancellor Kohl, to issue warnings about the
dangers of “ unpredictability” and “ instability” facing a Europe without NATO.13 Shared worries
about NATO’ s future and “ a new unstable world of shifting alliances and multi-polar
uncertainties” resounded across political and international fronts with news of Italian Socialist
foreign minister Gianni de Michelis’ s pessimistic outlook after Italy’ s exclusion from the “ twoplus-four talks.” 14 Perhaps more revealing as to the depth of concern, British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher convoked a meeting of eminent historians at Chequers to discuss German
character and its ramifications for the future of the European Community. References to German
angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality, and

12

Miller, “ Uneasy About the Germans,” p. 85. Manchester quoted in Friedrich, “ Germany
Toward Unity,” p. 68. The issue of Nazi guilt apparently arises only in connection with senior
West Germans because, according to Ardagh, Germany and the Germans, p. 392, denial became
the official policy of the GDR. The East German government distanced itself from Nazi guilt
through propaganda and a more thorough prosecution of former Nazis. Schoolchildren imbibed
the lesson that monopoly capitalism produced Nazism and that “ noble German communists” in
East Germany fought on the side of the Red Army and western allies.
13

Strobe Talbott, “ America Abroad: NATO über Alles,” Time (26 March 1990) : 47.

14

Lally Weymouth, “ Being Beastly to Germany,” National Review 42 (16 April 1990) : 22,
wrote that de Michelis, “ even more than Margaret Thatcher, . . . has come to symbolize European
apprehension about growing German power.” His failed demands for participation in “ two-plusfour,” which drew the curt reply from West Germany’ s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher
that “ You’ re not a player in this game,” only amplified de Michelis’ s opposition to a rush to
reunification that he feared would jeopardize NATO.
7

other negative stereotypes, when exposed to the media in a confidential memorandum of the
meeting written by Thatcher’ s private secretary, naturally aroused considerable resentment in
Germany and unmasked an irrational side to British Conservatives’ opposition to reunification.15
While the extent to which magazine articles of the 1990s nourished or responded to this
revived uncertainty and uneasiness about German character lies beyond the scope of this thesis,
the sudden reassessment, at least in American periodicals, of West German society as something
novel in comparison with post-war years seems remarkable in its capacity to both reassure and
bewilder. Reports of West German affluence and the comforting familiarity of western
capitalism, consumerism, fashion and enjoyment of leisure coexist with outrageous extravagance,
the excesses of shock theater, and quirky laws that appear out of synch with memories of the
“ overgrown work ethic” that created Germany’ s economic miracle.16 Another manifestation of
this climate of uncertainty can be seen in the readiness of journalists to exploit outmoded

15

A. J. Nicholls, Fifty Years of Anglo-German Relations, The 2000 Bithell Memorial Lecture
(London: Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London School of Advanced Study, 2001),
p. 15. A generally positive consensus that German reunification would enhance both European
integration and East European democratization emerged from the meeting, which included
historians Fritz Stern, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Norman Stone and Gordon Craig. The memorandum
noted that Germans historically demonstrated “ insensitivity to the feelings of others . . . their
obsession with themselves, a strong inclination to self-pity, and a longing to be liked . . . a
capacity for excess, to overdo things, . . . a tendency to overestimate their own strengths and
capabilities,” but also stated more optimistically that “ there was a strong school of thought
among those present that today'
s Germans were very different from their predecessors.” See
Craig R. Whitney, “ Sizing Up the Germans: A Thatcher Symposium,” New York Times (16 July
1990) : A6.
16

See William Rademaekers, “ The Oh So Good Life,” Michael Walsh, “ Shopping Hell,” and
William A. Henry III, “ The Power to Shock,” who refers to state-subsidized German theater as “ a
Walpurgisnacht of excess,” in Time (9 July 1990) : 80-82, 84. Walsh reports on the “ souldestroying” Ladenschlussgesetz or trade-union-inspired laws restricting shop hours that make life
miserable for Germans and tourists alike.
8

national stereotypes in order to tantalize readers. Semi-jocular reference to the “ Latinization of
Germany” and “ a distinctly non-Teutonic mañana principle,” used to describe the apparent
sanctity of Freizeit (leisure time), a quote from Tacitus, the first-century Roman historian, about
furor Teutonicus and “ fanatically loyal” Germans, or Friedrich Nietzsche’ s infamous statement
on the inherited European dread of the “ Teutonic blond beast” may make for interesting copy,
but the reliance on older stereotypes also betrays a journalistic tendency to categorize groups and
individuals, whether through the desire to entertain or through the mere necessity of condensing
and simplifying information.17
The above examples prove the potentially dangerous perpetuation of national stereotypes
through mass media to be far from extinct, even though journalists today generally repudiate a
genetic component to national character and avoid didactic discourses such as those which
framed the unabashed speculations of previous eras.18 Even amidst contemporary awareness of
the pitfalls of stereotyping, a source’ s credibility, for example, can enhance the mystique of
national character as a force guiding policy. When German novelist Günter Grass observed that
reunification would only serve to isolate Germany and that “ . . . when Germany feels itself
isolated, we know the often panicky reaction that follows,” the weight of his words relies as
much on his reputation for insight into German character as on historical evidence.19 When

17

The quotations can be found respectively in Rademaekers, “ The Oh So Good Life,” p. 82;
Nelan, “ Anything to Fear?” p. 32; and Friedrich, “ Germany Toward Unity,” p. 66.
18

Nelan, “ Anything to Fear?” p. 34, notes general acknowledgment of the genetic fallacy but
points out the risk of stereotyping cultural traits and historical traditions in attempts to define
national character.
19

Craig, “ A New, New Reich?” p. 33.
9

Arthur Miller referred to a middle-aged, pro-reunification German journalist’ s misgivings that
“ the problem with the German, the one great weakness of his character, is his worship of loyalty.
Loyalty! Loyalty! It’ s the supreme virtue, the chain around his heart,” he illustrated the
subjectively persuasive potential of national character stereotypes in opinion formation.20 Miller
accordingly emphasized the need for Germans to quell the prevailing uneasiness about their
character by somehow reconciling images of past militarism with the peaceful present.
The fact that questions about German national character would accompany a sense of
uncertainty about the future of Europe and the world during a time of transition is, of course,
nothing new. Uncertainty has historically colored the Germans’ own struggle for national
identity and stability—a situation known as les incertitudes allemandes—and it pervades the
larger “ German Question” of national unity and European integration, two goals that until the
twenty-first century have remained mutually exclusive. But on a social and psychological level,
uncertainty has also characterized the general tenor of Anglo-German relations since the
eighteenth century. In 1974 John Mander wrote that an “ ambiguous curse of unpredictability”
has historically distinguished Germans from other nationalities in British eyes, not that the
British have ever been overly fond of foreigners. To show that this “ curse” has engendered an
almost endemic sense of mistrust that spans generations, Mander cited a British opinion poll in
which even the youngest respondents, those who neither imbibed the hun-baiting Vansittartism
of the years surrounding World War II, nor remembered what preceded the positive changes
under Adenauer and succeeding chancellors, ranked Germans their least favorite among

20

Miller, “ Uneasy About the Germans,” p. 85.
10

European peoples.21 The irony that the British view of Germans as unpredictable stood
diametrically opposed to the “ loyalty” upon which Germans prided themselves points to a strange
logic behind this persistent animosity. According to Mander, the mid-Victorian “ loyal German”
stereotype underpinned “ too saccharine” and sentimental images of German romanticism and
liberal Young Germany that dissolved into the bitter realities of German rivalry and Weltpolitik
before World War I.22 From this perspective, the twentieth-century association of German
identity with Prussian militarism, ruthless efficiency and Nazi brutality appears to have provided
a psychological refuge from uncertainty by obliterating the earlier, more benign, yet just as twodimensional “ straw man” of German character. There was good reason to surmise, even in 1965,
that persistent war-time stereotypes of Germany in Britain, which had impeded Anglo-German
reconciliation for twenty years and had galvanized broad opposition to German rearmament,
would only gradually be displaced by new stereotypes during a transitional period fraught with
the potential for reversion to old, familiar images in times of stress.23 The reunification of

21

John Mander, Our German Cousins: Anglo-German Relations in the 19th and 20th
Centuries (London: John Murray, 1974), pp. 3-4. The poll revealed a broad perception of the
Germans as violent, intolerant and unfriendly— qualities that certainly contradict the preBismarckian stereotype of the German Michael, or rustic simpleton. Lord Vansittart, author of
The Black Record: Germans Past and Present, 14th ed., (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1941), pp.
14-16, 33, 38-39, laid out the unforgiving premise that Hitler and Nazism were no aberration, but
the inevitable outcome of ancient blood-lust, a warped military honor code and the reversion to
savagery of a people deeply in need of spiritual regeneration. Mander saw reason for hope in the
prescient views of Vansittart’ s ideological opposite, John Maynard Keynes, who stressed the key
importance of Germany for Europe and civilization, and the need for British participation in a
European Free Trade Union, foreshadowing the European Community (Our German Cousins,
pp. 12, 260-62).
22

Mander, Our German Cousins, pp. 4, 10-11.

23

D. C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany: British Opinion and Policy Towards Germany Since
1945 (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965), pp. 152-56. Watt referred to the “ Bevanbrook axis” of
11

Germany thus may have reasserted old questions about German character and exposed
uncertainties previously quarantined by memories of allied victory and the exigencies of Soviet
containment.
The Nazi stigma, which of course underscores post-Cold War uncertainties about
Germany, has faded little in English-language media despite generational influences and changes
in the international political arena since 1945. It seems only natural, therefore, that present
generations of Germans should feel a bit exasperated at what they consider a disconnect between
pop culture and reality in American and British psyches accustomed to media portrayals of the
Nazi era. As Kent Casper and Susan Linville pointed out in their insightful critique of American
reviews of German films, not only have Nazis been cast as the archetypical villains in a plethora
of World War II films and movies from Casablanca to Raiders of the Lost Ark, Nazi iconography
has also extended into the realms of comedy and science fiction where the “ steely-eyed, coldly
fanatical Nazi” has become a cartoon image— witness Darth Vader and his jack-booted evil
empire storm troopers. American movie and television audiences as well as reviewers, Casper
and Linville argued, have bought into the Nazi metamyth wherein “ good” Germans are shown
only in connection with the struggle, whether external or internal, against fascism. During the
1980s this perspective led to a misinterpretation of contemporary German cinema as
insufficiently repentant about Nazi atrocities. The popularity in the United States of German

anti-rearmament sentiment voiced by Conservative Lord Beaverbrook from the Right and led by
Aneurin Bevan from a divided Left (pp. 123-24).
12

films by directors such as Fassbinder, Herzog, Wenders, Schlöndorff and Syberberg, was further
misconstrued as signifying an American moral decline or, at best, a temporary spirit of nihilism.24
The tenacity and self-image-reinforcing security of Nazi and World War II imagery in
Britain figured prominently during the farcical Anglo-German “ holiday” or mock-territorial
“ beach towel” wars of the 1990s, which evoked derision of German tourists who rose
“ barbarically early” to secure pool-side Lebensraum at hotels and resorts in Morocco or
Tenerife.25 A controversial commercial for Carling Black Label beer depicted a late-rising young
British tourist throwing his towel to skim across a pool, in a manner reminiscent of the world
War II bouncing bomb, only to land on a lounger where it unfurls to reveal the Union Jack to a
group of befuddled German tourists.26 While such comical insinuations should be taken lightly,
the fact that they coincided with serious German-bashing in the nationalist press of Britain
suggests their appeal to a more deep-seated and politically motivated animosity. Unjustified
accusations of German cowardice and malingering during the 1991 Desert Storm operation in

24

“ Nazi Reframes: Negative Stereotyping in American Reviews of German Films,” Literature
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Nicholls, Fifty Years of Anglo-German Relations, p. 18. Harald Husemann, “ We will fight
them on the beaches,” chap. 4 in Rainer Emig, (ed.), Stereotypes in Contemporary AngloGerman Relations (New York: St. Martin’ s Press, 2000), pp. 59-60, 69-71, defines the AngloGerman beach towel controversy and concomitant stereotyping as a consequence of culture shock
and the tendency to rally around national symbols as a way of promoting group identity in
opposition to foreign groups during holidays in unfamiliar territories. Husemann relies on the
theory put forward by social-psychologist Henri Tajfel that conformism and the substitution of
social in-group identity for personal identity can become a vicarious means of establishing a
positive self-image through negation of the other.
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David Head, “ Jürgen Klinsmann, EURO 96 and their impact on British perceptions of
Germany and the Germans,” chap. 6 in Emig, Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German
Relations, p. 106.
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Iraq failed to take account of Germany’ s significant logistical and financial support as well as
NATO restrictions imposed on Bundeswehr activity. From the same quarter came contradictory
warnings about the menacing military potential of an erstwhile “ cowardly” reunited Germany.
A. J. Nicholls recounted that during the 1990s Germany “ had become a whipping boy for the
nationalist British media,” receiving blame for everything from the devaluation of the pound
sterling in 1992 to the European ban on British beef amidst the “ mad cow” disease scare. He
cited a Daily Express cartoon dated 10 May 1996 depicting Helmut Kohl wearing an EU
armband in a war room with other helmeted and Pikelhaubed Germans, plotting invasion and the
extermination of peacefully grazing British cattle. And despite the landslide victory of the
Labour party in the 1997 elections, which ostensibly implied public rejection of the highly
Germanophobic and Europhobic Conservative campaign, opinion polls of the 1990s have
demonstrated some longer-term adverse effects of anti-German propaganda. This persistent
British Germanophobia, even if in a popularized tongue-in-cheek form, has spawned, for
example, a reference to the new German Reichstag as “ the hub of a new European superstate-inwaiting,” and a frank admission appearing in the 11 July 1999 edition of the Sunday Times
Colour Magazine article entitled “ Hunforgiven:” “ We all hate the Germans— come on, it’ s all
right, admit it, we’ re all agreed, we hate them.” 27
While war imagery taken too seriously has backfired in the political arena, it has also
fallen flat in the world of sports as shown by the unsuccessful attempts of the Daily Mirror and
other tabloids to resuscitate German stereotypes and relate war-time scenarios to Anglo-German
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rivalry during the Euro 96 soccer championship.28 Ironically, soccer rivalry has actually
improved the image of Germans in British eyes in at least two ways: first, through respect for
players, in particular the good-humored and easy-going star player Jürgen Klinsmann, who
played out a one-year stint with a British professional team; and second, through British fans’
strenuous objections to Germanophobic hype and statements like “ We have to teach the Hun a
lesson” in the tabloids.29 It may well be the self-conscious and embarrassing absurdity attending
the use of such antiquated stereotypes that offers the most promising hope for their eventual
demise, especially in light of future plans for increased European integration.
To suggest that British soccer fans’ objections to mixing sports with politics indicates a
sea-change in attitudes may be going to far. Taking comfort in the rejection of twentieth-century
war-time stereotypes of Hun and Nazi overlooks the fact that these labels to a great extent simply
confirmed and elaborated older themes. D. C. Watt wrote that Nazi atrocities fit “ preconceived
patterns of thought and attitudes towards things German,” and that post-war mass opinion in
Britain, failing to appreciate, or ignorant of, the realities of life and opposition under totalitarian
rule, assumed the collective guilt of all Germans.30 A similar argument can be applied to the
neglect of German internal political and socio-economic divisions under a swelling tide of
indiscriminate Germanophobia during and immediately following World War I. Even decades
before the Great War, British writers exploited traditional themes differentiating German
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“ barbarism” from “ civilization,” paganism from Christianity, and romanticism from classicism
which, intentionally or not, demonized, idealized or simply defined Germans as different.31
German militarism merely stood as one very important aspect of a whole litany of broadly
stereotyped distinctions extended to politics, morals and culture which could be readily applied
to any current topic or event.

The increased attention to German society and character after the events of 1990, and the
tendency to deal with newer uncertainties by referring to older, nineteenth-century German
stereotypes, such as loyalty and obedience, extravagance and gaudiness, lack of civicmindedness, lack of patriotism, abhorrence of revolution and sensitivity to criticism,
demonstrates a curious continuity with attitudes expressed a century earlier. But whereas recent
uneasiness about German character melodramatically juxtaposes past evils against a relatively
stable present and the promising future of European integration, the nineteenth-century British
image of Germany took shape during an “ era of uncertainty” in relation to sweeping political and
industrial revolutions, nationalist wars and imperial rivalries.32 The consciousness of living in an
age of transition, seen as beginning with the French Revolution and lasting throughout the
nineteenth century, generated a spectrum of emotional opinion ranging from wild optimism to
31

The historical origins of these themes will be discussed in chapter 3.
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The phrase was used by Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968), p. viii. Walter E. Houghton, in his classic work, The Victorian Frame of
Mind, 1830-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 96-97, also argued that the
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emerged as the governing motif in a substantial body of Victorian literary, scientific and religious
thought. These concerns followed upon unresolved spiritual crises generated by the scientific
assault on religion and spread of agnosticism.
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deep, brooding pessimism.33 Even though the nineteenth century brought dramatic British
commercial and imperial expansion, and a corresponding gradual improvement in living
standards, rapid technological and social change spawned a persistent sense of dread which
pervaded much of the commentary and art of the period, as if the pace of progress itself were
leading civilization into the abyss.34 In addition to the internal philosophical concerns that
troubled mid- and late-Victorian writers who sought to revive the tarnished ideals of reason,
progress and morality in reaction to a new culture of materialism, Germany’ s transformation
under Prussian leadership from a collection of weak, relatively backward, agricultural kingdoms
into the dominant military and industrial power on the continent counted as a crucial factor in
this growing angst. Bismarck’ s aggressive diplomacy, which led to successive Prussian military
victories over Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870-1, created a united,
autocratically governed German Empire, whose tariff-protected economy and cartel-driven
industrial expansion, eventually surpassing Britain in steel production and chemicals, presented a
new model of national efficiency that contradicted the cherished Liberal tenets of representative
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Newsome, Victorian World Picture, pp. 37-38, 125, refers to John Martin’ s painting, “ The
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change led by such notables as Matthew Arnold, John Ruskin, William Morris and others.
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government and free trade. Moreover, Germany supplanted France as the new “ Bonapartist”
regime in the center of Europe, minus the political affinities felt to exist between the English
parliamentary system and the democratic republics of the United States and France.35 New
Germany increasingly threatened the Victorian anglocentric world view, a perspective based on
the paradigms of providence and the English model which had been popularized in the historical
and fictional works of Macaulay, Carlyle, Kingsley, Dickens, Thackeray and others.36
Uncertainties related to technological change and imperial rivalry represented only
surface features of yet another underlying moral and philosophical dilemma facing Victorian
Britons. Along with fear of war, bloody revolution and recurring economic cycles of boom and
bust, all of which kept a rein on optimism well into the century, the mid-Victorian decades
marked a disenchantment with Enlightenment humanist ideals, such as the concepts of universal
brotherhood and the perfectibility of man, that brought a hardening of social and racial
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attitudes.37 Several developments at home and abroad have been blamed for this demise of
Liberal idealism. Disenchantment on the domestic front stemmed from the perceived failure of
the Poor Laws and social unrest associated with Chartist agitation. Overseas, the Crimean War
(1853-5) and Indian Mutiny (1857), with their widely publicized horrors and atrocities, shook a
public accustomed to thirty-five years of relatively peaceful diplomacy, colonization and
commercial expansion. In 1865 Governor Eyre’ s brutal suppression of the Jamaican Rebellion
won broad support, but by that time the failure of missionary expeditions and the deflation of
exaggerated commercial expectations had already dispelled earlier Evangelical and Utilitarian
optimism bred on the belief that non-Western cultures would readily adopt European ways, or
that free trade would miraculously lead savages to civilization without the need for annexation
and forceful repression.38 Pessimism regarding the moral foundations and future of the British
empire thus grew not only with doubts about Britain’ s imperial capacity in the face of foreign
competition, which paradoxically produced a more stridently militant imperialism, but also with
perceived discrepancies between the public'
s idealized view and the realities of empire. This
coming to terms with “ reality” in the form of both domestic social inequity and overseas
imperialism strengthened an anti-Enlightenment trend that amplified distinctions based on social,
37

Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, pp. 77-80, 89, 92, cites the Floggings Act (1863), the
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of a tougher attitude toward social problems that undermined previous assumptions of innate
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Darwinian models to human society.
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racial and national stereotypes at the expense of more universal humanitarian doctrines.39 British
imperialists often justified authoritarian rule abroad, ostensibly for strategic purposes, by
resorting to demeaning stereotypes, as evident in propaganda opposed to Home Rule in 1886
which caricatured the Irish as lazy, childish, dirty, mischievous, ignorant, emotional, unstable,
superstitious, lying and vengeful.40
The power of stereotypes to shape and influence public opinion also derived from the fact
that beneath the concerns over moral decline and derailment of the engines of “ progress” — that
is, commercial prosperity, social reform, and imperial preeminence— lay an inward obsession
with social and national identity. Whether this identity crisis affected individuals on a personal
level, as in the pressure to conform to romanticized social and sexual ideals, or disturbed their
status-consciousness as members of a larger group, it also heightened the tendency to draw
distinctions based on class, nationality and race.41 The unique association between Victorian
social, political and economic thought and the ideal of “ character,” with its evaluative
connotations as both cause and desired goal of a model national and imperial system, suggests a
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Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness, pp. 44, 173, states that a “ transvaluation of values” from
slavery abolition to empire building took place between 1833 and 1908.
40

Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, p. 92.

41

Patricia Anderson, When Passion Reigned: Sex and the Victorians (New York: Basic Books,
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shaped by romantic fiction, and the contradiction between the Victorian ideal of sexual
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moral source of anxiety about rapid social change as well as a psychological motive behind
British assertions of superiority over foreigners.42 The prevailing evangelical “ frame of
reference” in pre- and early Victorian England which presumed a connection between morality
and socio-economic success, and which survived in Gladstonian tenets linking providential
reward and retribution with the necessity for a moral public policy, points to the strong religious
component in conceptions of British national character as a pillar of empire.43 Popular
imperialism further provided atavistic and socially regressive, authoritarian themes that served as
a platform for ordering the world according to an elaborate racial and ethnic hierarchy with, of
course, British Anglo-Saxons at the top.44 Imperialism also promoted a sense of national unity
among members of a growing and increasingly striated middle class by subsuming class interests
and status anxieties— what E. J. Hobsbawm has termed the “ uncertainty of the bourgeoisie.”
This nineteenth-century quest for social identity ranged in expression from plutocratic
conspicuous consumption and aristocratization to petty-bourgeois differentiation from the
working class through education, residence, lifestyle and sporting events.45 The cultural
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“ domestication” of imperialism therefore served both to underscore the interdependency of
imperial rule and British character, or selfhood, and to reinforce, partially as a sop to humanist
idealism, the idea of a providentially ordained imperial mission to establish and maintain cultural
hegemony over the realm.46
In an imperialist age of conflicting values, cultural pessimism, pseudoscientific racism,
moral anxiety and doubt, the Victorian national identity crisis left its imprint in ambiguous
stereotypes of Germany and German culture. Carlyle and the mid-century Germanophiles, for
example, looked to “ pious” Germany as a beacon of traditional Christian-feudal ideals in
contradiction to earlier condemnation of Germany as the source of atheistic biblical criticism and
Jacobin sympathies.47 Later, rapidly developing Germany represented both a model of military,
industrial and educational modernization and a menace to British security and imperial preeminence. Such contrasting perceptions of the Germans, most blatantly expressed in the
divergence between Teutonism and more exclusively Anglo-Saxonist racial theories, also defined

reflected in the successful, non-compulsory military recruitment of middle-class youths during
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two British political schools, which Paul M. Kennedy has labeled Germanophile “ idealists” and
Germanophobe “ realists.” 48 These two opposing camps generally espoused anti-imperialist
versus imperialist policies in their approach to international problems: idealists optimistically
sought solutions through goodwill, diplomacy and free trade, whereas realists pessimistically
advocated fortification of the state, defense of national interests and protectionism. They also
disagreed in their expectations as to whether Germany would evolve toward the English political
and economic model or, as a corollary, whether an Anglo-German alliance could be based on
cultural and racial “ affinities.”
While this division generally mirrored the split between Liberal and Conservative, linking
attitudes toward Germany with party affiliation remains problematical. To restate George
Dangerfield’ s famous phrase, the “ strange death of Liberal England” that came in the form of
Liberal imperialism shattered both Little Englander and Germanophilic sentiments from the
Left.49 Dangerfield specifically referred to the British public’ s self-indulgent release of inner
tension through melodramatic scenarios of a German invasion:
. . . what could be more exciting than to gather all the political rages, all the class hatreds,
all the fevers for spending and excitement and speed, which then seemed to hang like a
haunted fog over England— to gather them and condense them into one huge shape and
call it Germany?50
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Nothing illustrates the internal conflict between imperialism and Liberal Germanophilia better
than the political career of Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberlain began as a Radical reformer in the
1870'
s, split with Gladstone as a Liberal Unionist in 1886 over the issue of Irish Home Rule, and
as a champion of imperial-social and tariff reform, became a lay participant in the “ squalid
argument” that galvanized Liberal and Free Trader opposition in 1903.51 As Colonial Secretary
under Salisbury’ s third Conservative ministry Chamberlain advocated an alliance with Germany
in both 1898 and 1899, only to be rebuffed at home and abroad. In 1901-2 he wound up publicly
trading insults with the German Chancellor, Bernard von Bülow, in a bitter exchange concerning
British soldierly conduct during the Boer War that reverberated in the patriotic presses of both
nations.52 The repeated failure of Anglo-German alliance attempts had prompted Chamberlain to
favor, along with many Liberal Imperialists, an understanding with France and Russia rather than
the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy. The Fabian Socialists, as muted imperialists
and anti-Gladstonians, also presented an exception to the internationalist, Germanophile left in
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that they did not join Liberal attempts, such as the futile Haldane Mission in 1912, to improve
Anglo-German relations.53
Even taking into account the anomalies of Liberal and Social Imperialism, discrepancies
in respect to attitudes toward Germany existed within opposing political parties. Long after 1871
Conservatives, in the Germanophilic tradition of Carlyle and Coleridge, found much to admire in
staunch German monarchism, anti-individualism and state corporativism, while Liberal and
Conservative imperialists alike espoused German, or Prussian, models of national efficiency,
state interventionism and military readiness. Many Liberal Germanophiles, on the other hand,
who at first distinguished between a “ good,” scholarly, enterprising, moral Germany, and a
“ bad,” reactionary, Junker-dominated Prussia, became disenchanted with the Prussianization of
German statecraft and culture under Bismarck.54 These intra-party disparities tended to
undermine the “ idealist” position for several reasons: first, calls for emulating Germany, for the
sake of competing with her, betrayed an intrinsic Germanophobia; second, old distinctions
between the “ two Germanies,” between stern, disciplined, autocratic Prussia and cosmopolitan,
romantic, philosophical southern Germany, began to wane with the rise of imperialist and
nationalist sentiments; third, colonial rivalry, events such as the 1896 Kruger Telegram and
increased German armaments all strengthened the Germanophobe argument; and fourth, an
increasing awareness of the breadth of German Anglophobia at the century’ s end weakened
53
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Germanophile attempts to differentiate between the German people and the Hohenzollern
regime.55 Kaiser Wilhelm II’ s confused love/hate relationship with his English mother’ s country
and his indiscretions in the press constituted yet another byway complicating this maze of
ambiguous opinion regarding Germany.56
In his comprehensive work on the subject of Anglo-German relations during the
nineteenth century, Kennedy coined the phrase “ Anglo-German antagonism” to describe the
pervasive cultural and diplomatic antipathy that strained relations between the two countries
from the time of Bismarck to the outbreak of World War I. Kennedy concluded that the
diplomatic contest and cementing of alliances that preceded the war stemmed essentially from a
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Wilhelm’ s volubility, and his unquenchable desire to reconcile his English sympathies with
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1908, p. 11. For a concise explanation of how Wilhelm II’ s lack of self integration and selfesteem affected both his relationship with his parents and his attitude as German Kaiser towards
England, and in particular how the misguided policy of attempting to win an English alliance
through the construction of a rival navy mirrored his youthful attempts to win the empathy of his
disapproving mother, Crown Princess Victoria, through a combination of imitation and rivalry,
see Thomas A. Kohut, “ Kaiser Wilhelm II and his parents: an inquiry into the psychological roots
of German policy towards England before the First world War,” in Kaiser Wilhelm II: New
Interpretations (The Corfu Papers), eds. John G. Röhl and Nicholas Sombart (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 82-87.
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clash of imperial aims: Britain wishing to preserve the status quo and her own imperial
ascendency, Germany wanting to achieve a “ place in the sun” at the expense of it. He pointed
out, however, that although Bismarckian Germany’ s transition from a “ cluster of insignificant
States under insignificant princelings” to a major power cast her into the role of England’ s archrival, especially in view of Germany’ s geographical proximity and the relative weakening of
France and Russia during that period, the description of this developing conflict as an
“ antagonism” depended as well on cultural and ideological factors.57
The interface between public sentiment and government policy looms large in Kennedy’ s
analysis because of the practical impossibility, confronting decision-makers in either country, of
separating diplomatic, colonial and military issues from the impact of popular nationalism and
nationalist pressure groups in the domestic political arena. German chancellors consistently
tapped popular Anglophobia to gain political advantages: Bismarck, for example, when he
launched his program of colonial annexations in 1884, and Bülow when he sought public and
Reichstag support for naval increases fifteen years later. British officials, on the other hand,
encountered scathing media criticism whenever they attempted to cooperate with Germany. The
1902 Venezuelan blockade, for example, which was initiated by Britain in concert with Italy and
Germany— in league with “ the Goth and shameless Hun,” as Rudyard Kipling put it— in an
attempt to exact payment for damages caused during the revolution, had to be quickly abandoned
due to public outrage and fears of American reprisal. Likewise, in 1903 an organized press
campaign thwarted government attempts to arrange financing of the Baghdad Railway project in
57
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cooperation with Germany.58 The elemental contribution to the Anglo-German antagonism of
diplomatic policy decisions that were driven or justified by their nationalistic appeal underscores
the importance of a news media where forms of expression could present an overgeneralized,
distorted picture, lacking subtleties. In the case of the British periodical press, which is the focus
of this study, Germanophobic sentiments could appear as blatant scaremongering, but more often
found expression in stereotypes which could subtly convey an anti-German message without
disturbing journalistic decorum.
By the mid-1890s the monthly and weekly journals had evoked a portrait of Germany that
was the antithesis of Britain in everything from society and the arts to economic, colonial and
diplomatic methods. Beneath the facade of material similarity between two industrialized rival
nations, and the superficial affinities of racial kinship, Protestantism, and royal family ties,
writers exposed glaring cultural and political incongruities that fed the antagonism and deepened
stereotyped divisions. From the British point of view, Germany lacked firmly-held convictions
based on constitutionalism, freedom of speech and religion, individualism, toleration of
dissenters and minorities, pacifism, a sense of “ fair play,” free trade, and policies that can be
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summarized as “ Gladstonism” as opposed to “ Bismarckism.” 59 Writers exploited these perceived
differences in order to discredit German military, governmental or protectionist economic
models, but they also perpetuated stereotypes that exaggerated facile distinctions configured
according to psychological needs and conjoined less rationally with specific temporal
arguments.60
The division between idealist and realist, although it applies to attitudes toward Germany
from a policy perspective, tends to minimize the darker duality of nostalgic delusion versus
national character assassination in the periodical press. For this study, the adjectives “ escapist”
and “ alarmist” more accurately convey the expression of contrasting views which frequently cut
across party lines. Both Conservatives and Liberals indulged in either “ idealistic” wishful
thinking or “ realistic” scaremongering in their assessments of a yet little known and semimythical country. More importantly, stereotypes that accompanied and embodied these opinions
reinforced a xenophobia not evident in statements of policy. In addition, the stereotypic
maintenance of a psychological dichotomy elevating the “ good” self at the expense of the “ bad”
or “ inferior” other ensured that superficially polarized images of Germany did not cancel each

59

Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 152-53 also notes that there were no
British equivalents of an all-powerful Bismarck or threats of a coup d’ état in reaction to liberal
movements from an unrepresentative autocracy; no anti-socialist laws or Kulturkampf, and
nothing resembling the class of East Elbian Junkers or the extreme antisemitism and
anticapitalism of the German peasantry and lower middle classes.
60

Psychological theorists have abandoned the controversial “ kernel of truth” hypothesis that
stereotypes derive from some factual basis, but they note the presence of real cultural differences
as a factor enhancing the significance and credibility of stereotypes. See Shelly E. Taylor, “ A
Categorization Approach to Stereotyping,” chap. 3 in David L. Hamilton, (ed.), Cognitive
Processes in Stereotyping and Intergroup Behavior (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1981), p. 85.
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other out.61 Supposed virtues thus became implied weaknesses: the “ philosophical” and “ honest”
German would be deemed “ impractical” and “ politically naive,” “ thorough” German scholars
decried as “ plodding” and laborious, and disciplined German troops reviled as cowardly, lacking
“ pluck” or initiative. The fact that even sympathetic articles nearly always contained
condescending or contemptuous stereotypes of Germans and German ways indicates the presence
of a powerful psychological dynamic that shaped attitudes regardless of political position.
The links established by contemporary researchers between stereotypy, ethnocentrism,
nationalism and authoritarianism have vindicated earlier concerns about the vulnerability of
minds unversed in the concept of stereotypes.62 Walter Lippmann, who in 1922 first coined the
term “ stereotype” to refer to a psychological image, condemned the “ oceans of loose talk about
collective minds, national souls, and race psychology” prior to World War I that fostered, among
other things, the pseudo-Darwinian assumption of inevitable war between competing nations.63
Stereotypes enabled such delusions, and most Victorian and Edwardian writers, unaware of or
unconcerned about their prejudicial nature, voiced uninhibited opinions without the benefit of

61

Sander L. Gilman, Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 20. Gilman clarifies the common motivational
basis behind both “ negative” and “ positive” stereotypes: “ The former is that which we fear to
become; the latter, that which we fear we cannot achieve.” The myth of the “ dark Continent,”
which exemplified a nineteenth-century transition away from an idealized “ noble savage”
stereotype to the characterization of subject races as merely savage, can be seen as a late phase in
the centuries-long formation of a “ superior” imperial self-image through the denigration of an
“ inferior” other. See Said, Culture and Imperialism, p. 106; Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness, pp.
10-11, 174, 179; and Hyam, Britain’ s Imperial Century, p. 349.
62

The classic studies establishing these connections can be found in T.W. Adorno et al., The
Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950). Later studies have refined but
not refuted these associations and concerns.
63

Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922), p. 93.
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contemporary admonitions to the contrary. Stereotypes flourished in nineteenth-century Britain
because they presented simple and seemingly concrete “ historical” explanations that eliminated
uncertainty. They afforded a temporary respite from anxiety through an escapism which often
cohered with allusion to antiquity, racial myth or faith in providence. In the case of Germany,
however, stereotypes also sounded warnings to alarmists who preferred to project their
insecurities on an arch rival. In either case, the German stereotype became both a target and a
touchstone of British self-worth.64
This study explores the textual evidence of stereotypes in an effort to better understand
the shape of British attitudes toward Germany before World War I. It presents a historical survey
of the evolution of the German stereotype, paying particular attention to stereotypes employed
within the context of Anglo-German comparisons in periodical literature of the late-nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. The monthly and weekly reviews, concerned less with reporting
news than with social commentary or digressions on national character, provide the richest
source of stereotypes and thus constitute the bulk of primary sources used here (see table 1, pp.
32-34).65 Citations of non-fiction books, speeches, cartoons, and newspaper articles, mostly
written between 1890 and 1914 appear largely in connection with specific issues or events.
Because the reviews catered to readers from fairly exclusive social and educational backgrounds,
with well-defined political views, they allow some limited quantification and comparison by
64

Charles Copland Perry in “ Germany as an Object Lesson,” Nineteenth Century 45 (April
1899) : 526, stated as much when he called Germany the “ touchstone of our conduct.”
65

Only essays, commentary and the occasional satire find inclusion here, not the depiction of
Germans in British fiction. This has been masterfully dealt with in Peter E. Firchow'
s book,
The Death of the German Cousin: Variations on a Literary Stereotype, 1890-1920 (Lewisburg,
PA: Bucknell University Press, 1986; London: Associated University Press, 1986).
31

TABLE 1
L = Lower
M = Middle
U = Upper

PERIODICAL SOURCES USED— GREAT BRITAIN UP TO 1914
A. NEWSPAPERS (London):
POLITICAL
ORIENTATION

TITLE

(DATE OF INCEPTION)

PRICE

ANNUAL CIRCULATION
(RELEVANT DATES)

READERSHIP
CLASS

Clarion

(1891)

Socialist

Daily Mail

(1896)

Independent

.5d

600,000

(1896-1907)

L-M

69,000
140,000

(1890-1903)
(1904-1907)

L-UM

300,000

(1888)

LM-M

Daily News

(1846)

Liberal

1d
.5d

Daily Telegraph

(1855)

Liberal

1d

Morning Post

(1772)

Conservative

3d

3,500

(1871)

Pall Mall Gazette

(1865)

Liberal

2d

8,000

(1880-1890)

Standard

(1857)

Conservative

1d

255,300

Times

(1788)

Independent

3d

40,000

(1890-1907)

1.5d

80,000

(peak)

(1893)

EDUCATION

U
M-U

Fair-High

LM-UM
M-U

High

LM-M

Fair

WEEKLY AND SUNDAY
Chamber’s Journal

(1832)

Lloyd’s Illustrated Weekly News

(1843)

Liberal

1d

910,000

(1893)

L-LM

Low

Observer

(1791)

Liberal

3d

3,000

(1868)

UM-U

Fair-High

Reynold’s News

(1850)

Radical

1d

300,000

(1881)

L-LM

Low

Independent

6d

20,000

(1871)

M-U

High

Saturday Review

(1856)

Speaker

(1890)

Spectator

(1828)

Liberal

6d

5,000

(1871)

M-UM

High

Weekly Dispatch

(1801)

Liberal

1d

140,000

(1870)

M

Fair

Sources for newspapers: Alvar Ellegård, The Readership of the Periodical Press in Mid-Victorian Britain, vol. 63, pt. 3 (Goteborg:
Göteborgs Universitets Årsskrift, 1957), pp. 1-39; Alfred Powell Wadsworth, “ Newspaper Circulations, 1800-1954,” Transactions of the
Manchester Statistical Society (9 March 1955), pp. 1-40.
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(TABLE 1 continued)
B. POLITICAL MAGAZINES AND REVIEWS:

TITLE

(DATE OF INCEPTION - CLOSE)

POLITICAL
ORIENTATION

PRICE

*Blackwood’s

(1817)

Conservative

2s6d

ANNUAL CIRCULATION
(RELEVANT DATES)
7,500

(1868)

READERSHIP
CLASS

EDUCATION

UM-U

Good

*Contemporary Review

(1866)

Liberal Reformist

2s6d

4,000

(1870)

M-U

High

*Edinburgh Review (Q)

(1802)

Liberal Unionist

6s

7,000

(1870)

UM-U

Good-High

English Woman’s Review

(1866)

2s6d

2,500

(1872)

M-U

High

1s

7,500

(1868)

M-U

6d
1s

39,000
5,000

(1889)
(1894)

*Fortnightly Review
Free Review
*MacMillan’s

(1865)

Liberal-Radical

(1893-1898)
(1859)

Monthly Review

(1900-1907)

*National Review

(1883)

New Century Review

(1897-1900)

New Review

(1889-1897)

*Nineteenth Century

1s

Liberal

2s6d
Conservative Unionist

2s6d

(1877)

Liberal

2s6d

10,000

(1880)

High

*Quarterly Review (Q)

(1809)

Conservative

6s

8,000

(1890)

UM-U

*Westminster Review (Q)

(1824)

Liberal-Radical

2s6d

4,000

(1870)

M-U

(1900)

Labour
American politics

$.25

Progressive Review

World’s Work (London ed.)

* most influential reviews

High

(Q) = Quarterly

Sources for reviews and magazines: Ellegård, The Readership of the Periodical Press in Mid-Victorian Britain, pp. 1-39; “ Periodicals of
Great Britain and Ireland,” in Index to the Periodicals of the 1890s, 13 vols., (London: Review of Reviews, 1890-1902) 1 : 99-111; Walter
E. Houghton, gen. ed., The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900, 4 vols. (Toronto: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969-87).
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(TABLE 1 continued)
C. POPULAR AND GENERAL PERIODICALS:
TITLE

(DATE OF INCEPTION - CLOSE)

DESCRIPTION

PRICE

ANNUAL CIRCULATION
(RELEVANT DATES)

READERSHIP
CLASS EDUCATION

Ally Sloper’s Half-Holiday

(1884)

Humor (ill.)

Borderland

(1893)

Occult

Cassell’s Family Magazine

(1874)

Short articles (ill.)

6d

250,000

(1865)

LM-M

Low-Fair

Cornhill

(1860)

Fiction and articles

6d

12,000

(1882)

M-U

Good-High

Fiction and articles (ill.)

6d

English Illustrated Magazine

(1883-1913)

1s6d

Gentleman’s Magazine

(1731)

Fiction and articles

1s

10,000

(1870)

M-U

Fair

Good Words

(1860)

Religious magazine (ill.)

6d

80,000

(1870)

LM-UM

Fair

Harmsworth’s

(1898)

Articles and stories (ill.)

3.5d

80,000

(1870)

L-M

Low-Fair

M-U

Idler (Q)
Ladies’ Realm

(1892-1911)

Light literature (ill.)

6d

(1896)

Articles and fiction (ill.)

6d

Leisure Hour

(1852-1905)

Religious magazine (ill.)

6d

Ludgate’s

(1891-1901)

Fiction and articles (ill.)

6d

McClure’s

(1893)

Fiction and articles (ill.)

6d

Pall Mall Magazine

(1893)

General articles (ill.)

1s

Pearson’s Magazine

(1896)

Fiction and articles (ill.)

6d

Punch

(1841)

Humor (ill.)

3d

40,000

(1870)

250,000

(1891)

Strand

(1891)

Light magazine (ill.)

6d

Sunday at Home

(1854)

Religious magazine (ill.)

6d

Temple Bar

(1860)

Fiction and biography

1s

Windsor Magazine

(1895)

Fiction and articles (ill.)

6d

Woman at Home

(1893)

Magazine for women (ill.)

6d

Young Woman

(1892)

Christian magazine (ill.)

3d
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All
8,000

(1896)

M

Fair

PERIODICAL PEAK CIRCULATIONS
British Quarterly Review
Fortnightly Review*
Observer
Morning Post
Westminster Review*
Contemporary Review*
Spectator
Edinburgh Review*
Macmillan’s Magazine*
Blackwood’s Magazine*
Quarterly Review*
Pall Mall Gazette
Gentleman’s Magazine
Cornhill Magazine
Temple Bar
Saturday Review
New Review
Punch
Nineteenth Century*
Times
Leisure Hour
Good Words
Chamber’s Journal
Weekly Dispatch
Standard
Daily News
Review of Reviews
Strand Magazine
Cassell’s Family Magazine
Reynold’s News
Daily Telegraph
Daily Mail
Lloyd’s Ill.Weekly News
* most influential reviews

1,000
Readership Class
Education
2,500
U (3,500)
High (156,500)
3,000
UM-U (25,500)
Good-High (19,000)
M-UM (13,000)
3,500
Good (8,500)
M-U (163,000)
Fair-High (11,000)
4,000
n/a (489,000)
M (154,000)
Fair (323,000)
LM-UM
(80,000)
4,000
5,000
Low-Fair (330,000)
7,000
LM-M (630,000)
7,500
n/a (1,670,000)
7,500
8,000
L-LM (1,210,000)
8,000
10,000
LM (600,000)
12,000
Low (1,210,000)
13,000
L-M (80,000)
L-UM (280,000)
20,000
39,000
40,000
Radical (300,000)
Conservative (222,000)
(L/M/U = Lower/Middle/Upper)
Liberal-Radical (6,500)
50,000
63,000
80,000
n/a (1,004,000)
80,000
80,000
Politics
140,000
Liberal (1,555,500)
140,000
140,000
150,000
250,000
Independent (628,000)
Nonconformist (1,000)
250,000
Liberal Unionist (7,000)
300,000
Liberal Reformist (4,000)
300,000
600,000
910,000
0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

1,000,000

FIGURE 1. These graphs illustrate the circulation figures listed in table 1 (pp. 32-34). The pie charts indicate percentages of a
total peak circulation representing 3,728,000 theoretical readers, according to estimated social class, education and politics.
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political party and social class. This same exclusivity, however, precludes sweeping generalizations
due to the fact that wealthy and well-educated readers of reviews and magazines made up only a
fraction of the whole society, albeit a very influential one. Another methodological problem arises
in the question as to whether a majority of readers agreed with, or merely tolerated, a writer’s
views.66
The problem of exclusivity can be partially addressed by the correspondence between key
themes in the more select journals and those found in mass-circulation newspapers established after
1855. Re-circulation and republication of many of the more expensive “serious” journals
also somewhat mitigates this class imbalance in readership.67 Unfortunately, neither cheap dailies
nor official Labour Party publications can be relied upon for an accurate assessment of working-class
attitudes. A case in point, Robert Blatchford'
s Clarion, the most widely read Socialist journal before
the war, exhibited a strong anti-German bias in contrast to the international, anti-Jingoist and

66

The graph on page 32 shows the sheer proliferation of small-circulation periodicals geared to
middle- and upper-class readers of good education, a reality which tended to overemphasize the
more extreme negative variations of the stereotype. However, there were exceptions, found in
the Daily Mail and elsewhere, to the usually benign and bland fare served up by the large
circulation periodicals.
67

Richard D. Altick, The English Common Reader: A Social History of the Mass Reading
Public 1800-1900 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix edition, 1963), p. 359,
mentions as serious (i.e. not entertainment) journals the Fortnightly Review (1865-1959),
Contemporary Review (1866- ), and Nineteenth Century (1877-1950). Based on information in
the Wellesley Index regarding stature and consistency of subject matter, the list should include the
following titles (inclusive of name changes): Blackwood’s (1817-1980), Edinburgh Review
(1802-1929), Macmillan’s (1859-1907), National Review (1883-1950), Quarterly Review (18091967), and Westminster Review (1824-1914). Many articles from these journals were
republished, critiqued or summarized in W. T. Stead’s Review of Reviews (1890-1936) which
claimed a readership of 150,000 in its first year.
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generally Germanophilic tone adopted by Labour.68 As to the question of consensus, the sheer
frequency and persistence of certain themes and images dispels some uncertainty about what
appealed to readers, whether specific stereotypes recurred within a given periodical or obtained broad
currency in a variety of magazines. Stereotypes themselves constituted a form of language or code
that, regardless of a writer’s position on a particular issue, performed the task of simplifying and
conveying information replete with value judgements and prejudices.
The ubiquity of stereotypes that defined all facets of German life and culture, from politics
and business to society, religion and the arts, allows for their classification under broad contextual
categories derived from the source material in reference to specific issues, rivalries and comparisons
that represented the general body of British opinion (see table 2, p. 38). This arbitrary division,
however, should not obscure the interconnection between integral components making up the
German character as portrayed in British periodicals. A series of stereotypes could serve collectively
to reinforce the argument, for example, that a country of unpolitical Bürghers, impractical theorists
and small-minded shopkeepers had no capacity for administering a great empire (and, therefore, why
should it try?). Similarly, accusations of unscrupulousness or Anglophobic intent crept into surveys
of German commercial, colonial or diplomatic pretensions. Stereotypical traits also overlapped
68

The Clarion, founded in 1892, reached a circulation of 60,000. See William P. Maddox,
Foreign Relations in British Labour Politics: A Study of the Formation of Party Attitudes on
Foreign Affairs, and the Application of Political Pressure Designed to Influence Government
Policy 1900-1924 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 88, 114, 132. Labour Party
leaders themselves apparently suffered from a schizophrenic stereotypical delusion, idealizing the
German Social Democratic Party as a model of organizational efficiency while condemning, or at
least dismissing, Marxist dogmatism and utopian radicalism as a necessary evil under the
Kaiserreich. See Stefan Berger, “Between efficiency and ‘Prussianism’: stereotypes and the
perception of the German Social Democrats by the British Labour Party, 1900-1920,” in Emig,
Stereotypes in Contemporary Anglo-German Relations, pp. 178, 182, who notes the
repercussions of these stereotypes on British Labour Party policy before and during the war.
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TABLE 2
GERMAN STEREOTYPE CONTEXT CATAGORIES
Culture/Race

Diplomacy

Economy

Empire/Colonies

Arts
Comparisons
Culture in General
Philosophy
Race/Ethnicity
Religion
Science

German Aims
Naval Rivalry
Policy
Press Wars
Tactics

Agriculture
Economic Rivalry
Income
Industry
Merchandise
Professions
Taxation
Trade Policies
Trade Practices

Boer War
Colonial Policy
Colonies
Explorers
German Empire
Myths

National Character

National Figures

Politics/Government

Society

General Character
Specific Traits

Literary
Military
Philosophical
Political
Religious
Royalty

Army
German Politics
Government
Labor
Law
Navy
Parties
Press

Domestic Life
Education
Fashion
Food
Gatherings
Habits
Manners
Romance
Rural Life
Sexuality
Social Class
Sports
Urban Life

Percentages of Stereotypes by Context

Culture/Race (7.22)
Diplomacy (13.18)

Society (8.64)
Politics/Government (23.67)

Economy (4.76)
Empire/Colonies (6.75)

National Character (17.67)

National Figures (18.10)

FIGURE 2. A chart based on the incidence of stereotypes counted in the periodical sources
used (magazines only) and sorted by context.
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STEREOTYPES BY CONTEXT OVER TIME

700
100

600

ARTICLE CONTENTS

Image Count

500
400

Number of Articles

80
60
40
20
300
0
1820 1839 1850 1889 1894 1899 1904 1915
Year

200
100
0

1820 1825 1838 1840 1845 1850 1856 1887 1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 1900 1902 1904 1907 1914
YEAR
Culture/Race

Diplomacy

Economy

Empire/Colonies

National Character

National Figures

Politics/Government

Society

FIGURE 3. Contextual shift in stereotypes over time based on the periodical sources used (magazines only). This chart should not be
taken as an exhaustive survey for the entire time period, although it does accurately reflect the 1890s and after.
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CONTEXTUAL SHIFT IN THE GERMAN STEREOTYPE
Percentages Based on a Tabulation of Stereotypes Grouped by Context

BEFORE 1871

1871-1914

Society (10.83)

Society (8.90)

Politics/Government (28.26)

Politics/Government (25.56)

National Figures (0.16)

National Figures (23.15)

National Character (40.82)
Empire/Colonies (0.16)
Economy (0.47)
Diplomacy (0.63)
Culture/Race (18.68)

National Character (12.11)
Empire/Colonies (5.76)
Economy (5.12)
Diplomacy (13.50)
Culture/Race (5.90)

BEFORE 1848

1848-1862

Society (7.54)
Politics/Government (10.49)
National Figures (0.33)

Society (10.38)

Politics/Government (48.44)
National Character (55.74)
Empire/Colonies (0.00)
Economy (0.00)
Diplomacy (0.00)

National Figures (0.00)
National Character (24.91)
Empire/Colonies (0.35)
Economy (1.04)
Diplomacy (1.38)
Culture/Race (13.49)

Culture/Race (25.90)

BISMARCKIAN GERMANY

WILHELMINE GERMANY

Society (9.66)

Society (9.06)
Politics/Government (24.85)

Politics/Government (42.61)
National Figures (23.06)
National Figures (18.18)
National Character (10.80)
Empire/Colonies (3.41)
Economy (0.00)
Diplomacy (14.77)
Culture/Race (0.57)

National Character (12.99)
Empire/Colonies (5.65)
Economy (5.18)
Diplomacy (13.26)
Culture/Race (5.96)

FIGURE 4. These rough tabulations show an increase in political stereotypes after 1848, and an
emphasis on national figures with the elevation of Bismarck to the German Chancellorship.
Likewise, the subjects of colonial expansion, diplomacy and economy became significant
categories for stereotyping after 1871. The charts show the relative incidence of stereotyping
within the designated subject categories in the periodical sources used (magazines only).
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contextual boundaries in the case of separately targeted groups, such as German professors, peasants,
Junkers or clerks, who were represented as possessing undesirable qualities endemic to the entire
German “race.” Certain stereotypical images, like the rustic German Michael, the philosophically
speculative German or the German bully, also transcended narrow definitions to act as powerful
symbols of Anglo-German difference. While contextual emphasis clearly shifted over time in
relation to events, stereotypes remained remarkably consistent, only taking on new forms with the
emergence of “New Germany.” The strong pull of continuity, however, ensured the inevitable
comparison, usually negative, of these newer images with older, time-honored stereotypes.
The printed evidence of stereotypes represents a point at which the investigation of subjective
and objective realities come together, a nexus between psychology and history. Although the two
disciplines seem to pursue opposite ends—psychology looking for subconscious motives using case
histories, history trying to avoid speculation about subconscious motivation by discerning mentalities
from historical records—an understanding of the psychology behind stereotypes can clarify their
historical significance as more than mere sources of amusement.69 A further methodological
difference between psycho-historical research and histories of sociological phenomena lies in the
distinction between individually held and consensual or “cultural” stereotypes.70 The present study
deals with stereotypes in print and visual media and only indirectly with the way individuals adapted
them according to their own personalities. Evaluating the historical significance of the attitudes and
values represented by these mental icons, without attempting to fathom the personal motivations of

69

See Peter Gay, Freud for Historians (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1985), p. 18, on methodological differences and the interdependency of history and psychology.
70

See Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Extending the Stereotype Concept,” chap. 9 in Hamilton,
Cognitive Processes, pp. 312-15.
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a generation of long-deceased writers, therefore requires some reference to the insights of
contemporary psychology. The following chapters will explore some background thematic material,
the canvas upon which late and post-Victorian images of Germany were painted, and discuss
mentalities that encouraged sharp national distinctions and tended to cast Germany as Britain’s
opposite and arch nemesis.
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II. STEREOTYPES, NATIONAL CHARACTER
AND VICTORIAN IMPERIAL MYTH
Conscious Stereotyping in the Nineteenth Century
The term “stereotype,” once strictly
printers’ jargon referring to a metal plate used for
imprinting identical images, appeared occasionally
in either a literary or national context during the
nineteenth century. In 1890 Gladstone referred to
Irish “discontent stereotyped in the experience of
generations and of centuries” as a warning against FIGURE 5. From Review of Reviews 15
(June 1897) : XIII.
the futility of Conservative half-way measures on
the issue of Home Rule.1 In 1893 the writer of an article on English characters in French fiction
mentioned “the Englishman of the French stage who (except he be taken from history) is for the
most part a commonplace and stereotyped figure.”2 Some acknowlegement of stereotypical
distortions entered the public media when British writers explored the parameters of their own
national image through the perceptions of continental observers. An article published in 1890,
entitled “John Bull Abroad,” applauded a shift in French caricature from the typical English
1

Daily Telegraph, 23 January 1890, p. 5.

2

Arthur F. Davidson, “Some English Characters in French Fiction,” Macmillan’s Magazine,
reprinted in Living Age 197 (April-June 1893) : 678.
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“ milord, . . . triste, prudish, and gauche” to a more flattering, cosmopolitan image. But the
author himself portrayed the English tourist as a tweed-suited, pipe-smoking, recklessly spending
rowdy who patronized “ artistic nudities in the Rue de Rivoli” and terrorized waiters, “ whom he
abuses or knocks down, and, with a lordly air, throws them a napoleon wherewith to buy plaster.”
This reflected self-image of a swashbuckling, plucky “ ‘Arry of world-wide fame,” who “ can
seldom divest himself of his English spectacles in looking on foreign habits and customs,” and
who deserved reproach for letting his patriotism overrun the boundary of prejudice, nevertheless
received a favorable comparison with the German:
. . . if his reputation for grand seigneur is on the wane, so also is his reputation for
boorishness, insolence and self-sufficiency. This he has handed on to the German, who
has inherited the reputation, and its consequent unpopularity, with this difference, that
whereas John Bull, if he incurred dislike and ill-feeling, had a golden ointment wherewith
to salve the wounds he inflicted, Herr von Donnerblitzen exaggerates the insolence and
lacks the salve.3
If the general impression existed that the English unfairly saw the French as vain “ fribbles
and fools,” and that the French likewise viewed the British as “ brutes and barbarians” with a
“ reputation for being disagreeable,” a similar revelation occasionally surfaced that images of
Germans might be based more on English expectations and fears than on reality.4 As early as
1864 one writer for Cornhill Magazine suggested that German professors had been unfairly

3

“ John Bull Abroad,” Temple Bar, reprinted in Living Age 187 (October-December 1890), pp.
224, 227-28. The last quotation typifies the conception of Germany as a backward or
undeveloped England (e.g., England’s “ poor relation” ), a semi-sanguine view that presumed
similarity on the basis of racial and cultural kinship but clearly dissociated English from German
character, even if only by a matter of degree.
4

Quotations from Edward C. B. Dicey, “ The Isolation of England,” Fortnightly Review 60
(July-December 1896) : 331, and “ The Present Position of European Politics—Part 1: Germany,”
Fortnightly Review 41 (January 1887) : 17.
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characterized as “ unpractical” when viewed from the vantage point of the “ practical” English
mind.5 During the 1890s a few articles even acknowledged a correspondence between changing
times and changing impressions of Germany. The “ sluggish, phlegmatic, prosaic sort of person,
with few ideas beyond his pipe and his beer” had metamorphosed into a being “ excitable,
impulsive, and quick-tempered, with an abnormally long tongue,” a “ curious mixture of prose
and poetry,” of “ cynical common sense and visionary sentimentality,” who had “ little selfcontrol, no reserve at all.” 6 Famed journalist, E. J. Dillon, noted a similar change in the German
image after the Kruger Telegram episode in 1896. “ Honest, modest, Protestant Germany ,” he
wrote, the “ mainstay of peace and order,” had become “ the only blustering, scheming, and really
dangerous power, on the Continent.” When referring to political freedoms, observed Dillon,” we
are wont to sneer at the Germans as slaves.” Labeling the Germans “ earnest monks of science,”
he then sought to clear up a misconception: “ In spite of all our withering denunciations of the
fair-haired Teuton, in his invidious capacity as underpaid clerk and commercial tactician, he has
no serious rival, all the world over, in the earnest pursuit of ideals and the self-denying
cultivation of science.” 7

5

“ German Professors,” Cornhill 10 (July-December 1864) : 352.

6

“ Cousins German,” Cornhill 17 (September 1891) : 295.

7

E. J. Dillon, “ Germany’s Foreign Policy” Fortnightly Review, reprinted in Living Age, 212
(January-March 1897) : 73. A long-time contributor to the Fortnightly, Dillon won recognition
for his disclosure of Turkish atrocities in Armenia in 1895. A character sketch entitled “ Dr. E. J.
Dillon: Our Premier Journalist,” in the Review of Reviews 24 (July 1901) : 21-26, revealed this
“ knight-errant of journalism” to be fluent in German and an admirer of Kaiser Wilhelm II. As a
measure of the contemporary emphasis placed on the connection between ethnicity, culture and
character, Dillon’s “ essentially combative” nature was attributed to his Irish ancestry and “ the
pessimism which forms the foundation of Dr. Dillon’s character” to his fondness for
Schopenhauer.
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There existed a sense among some journalists that British ignorance, irrationality and
prejudice fed misperceptions of Germany. “ What chiefly deters the English mind from following
German affairs with any interest,” declared Louis Bamberger in 1892,
. . . is the state of tutelage in which, according to their impression, Germans are kept by
their Government. They look down with contemptuous pity on the child-like attitude of
German representative bodies towards their grandmotherly régime, and set little value on
their acts.8
Bamberger, a German liberal, insisted that this “ defective insight” into German political life had
led to a “ distorted and exaggerated estimate” of falsely juxtaposed news reports, leaving the
prevailing impression “ that a Socialist insurrection is impending in Germany, and that the
Emperor is preparing to overcome it by the introduction of a monarchical dictatorship.” 9 Seven
years later, despite a steady increase in coverage of German affairs, Charles Copland Perry, the
same writer who called Germany the “ touchstone of our conduct,” described the attitude of most
Englishmen:
Germany is simply a country which, for reasons best known to itself, keeps a very large
army, possesses a good many autocratic and boorish officials, which has once or twice, in
the person of its Emperor, had the impertinence to interfere with our own affairs and
which persists in flooding our labour-markets with cheap clerks.10
Perry held that the British entertained an irrational view regarding the legacy of Bismarckian
“ unscrupulousness” and “ wicked militarism,” and he argued that German diplomacy and military
power were based on dire necessity, and that the Franco-Prussian War had been inevitable. But

8

Louis Bamberger, “ The German Crisis and the German Emperor,” New Review, 6 (April
1892) : 385.
9

Ibid., p. 386.
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Perry, “ Germany as an Object Lesson,” Nineteenth Century, pp. 526-27.
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even this apologist for Germany and advocate of German educational and industrial models
employed a litany of German stereotypes and managed to convey, in a sardonic reflection on the
image shift from German Michael to menace, a vaguely dreadful warning:
A learned German professor with blue spectacles was in our eyes more a subject of
derision than of disquietude, nor could we conceive that so unornamental a personage
could in any way influence us either for good or evil. It is only recently that the scales
have fallen from our eyes. Like the fellow-citizens of the Greek philosopher, we have
been much surprised to find that the scientific investigations of which we had made so
light could turn out water-wheels. Accustomed as we have been to regard the Germans as
a nation of sentimentalists and unpractical theorists, we have now become painfully
conscious that there are more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in our
philosophy.11
Germany’ s arrival in the world of commerce and industry indeed exposed the inaccuracy of the
“ old-fashioned philosophic German” stereotype, a revelation which generated what seemed to
some writers an overcompensated image of the German arch rival. The world, wrote James H.
Collins in 1911, “ insists that he is a bugaboo, that Providence has endowed him with mysterious
faculties not given to others, that he is irresistible in competition, and that behind his industrial
development he is hiding a tremendous political programme.” 12
The preceding examples show a vague conception among British journalists of the pitfalls
of stereotypy. Some recognized ulterior political motives behind the propagandistic use of the
German “ bogey,” seeing in the nightmarish invasion fantasies of scaremongers a hidden agenda
to garner support for increased armaments.13 The stereotyping process itself, however, as a
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Ibid., pp. 528, 531, 534.
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James H. Collins, “ The German at Home: I—The Orderly German Mind,” World’s Work 17
(February 1911) : 233.
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See P. W. Bunting in “ The Journalistic Tour in Germany,” Contemporary Review 92 (July
1907) : 14.
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psychological mechanism fomenting prejudice, generally remained above suspicion. Awareness
of the mere existence of stereotypes did not necessarily shatter a writer’ s belief in the rationality
of national character, nor did it stifle the proliferation of stereotypes from his own pen. Writers
capitalized on the seductive expediency of stereotypical images. And if they occasionally strove
to avoid the perils of generalization about Germans, they did so as much through fear of
inaccuracy due to German diversity as from any ethical or psychological principle.14 Stereotypes
in nineteenth-century Britain may have provided a source of amusement or represented a sincere
attempt at explanation, but they also encapsulated cultural distinctions in a way that defined
British national character in opposition to alien groups, usually by accentuating a positive selfimage and deprecating the other.
The Illusion of National Character
The use of stereotypes dates from antiquity, but nineteenth-century notions of national
character, introduced through the romantic era historicism of Johannes Herder and later exploited
by social Darwinists and racial theorists, invested national stereotypes with a new historical and
pseudo-scientific significance. Only relatively recently have scholars rejected as invidious
reductionism the belief in some inherent racial or ethnic component of personality, and yet the
enigma of cultural or collective identity still lingers as a subject of speculation.15 French
14

William Harbutt Dawson, Germany and the Germans, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton &
Co., 1894), vol. 1, pp. v-vi, claimed in his introduction to be an unprejudiced observer, clearing
up many English misconceptions and studiously avoiding generalizations about German traits
and peculiarities. He nevertheless discoursed at length on the German character and employed
some familiar stereotyped figures.
15

Maurice J. Farber, “ The Problem of National Character: A Methodological Analysis,”
Journal of Psychology 30 (October 1950) : 307-16, recognized the impossibility of rationalizing
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anthropologist Louis Dumont, referring to cultures as “ living beings,” argued in 1986 that
“ national variants” in religion and philosophy, arising from and refining a sense of collective
identity, led to Germany’ s divergence from Western enlightenment ideals. While he shunned
direct stereotyping, Dumont posed generalizations based on presumed cultural traits, such as the
German’ s “ quasi-proverbial proclivity to obey.” 16 Historians have also proven vulnerable to
type-casting and sweeping generalizations based on national character. The statement, for
example, concerning World War I that “ the very virtue of the German people, as the servants of
their rulers’ ambitions, made the danger of permanent slavery for Europe extreme” not only
glosses over the complexities of pre-war German internal politics and ignores the Social

the irrational concept of national character. He pointed to problems that arise both in
overlooking distinctions between social groups and in confusing nationality with psychological
or other attributes. Only six years earlier, Otto Klineberg in “ A Science of National Character,”
Journal of Social Psychology 19 (February 1944) : 147-62, had stressed the importance of
national character in devising propaganda for psychological warfare and conducting military
operations, even though he had also looked askance at some of the wartime “ psychoanalysis” of
Nazi Germany and theories that posited a plausible reality or “ kernel of truth” behind every
stereotype.
16

“ Are Cultures Living Beings? German Identity in Interaction,” Man, n.s., 21 (December
1986) : 589-90. Dumont described Germany’ s ideological “ acculturation to modernity” as the
manifestation of a duality between individual and collective identity (individualism versus
holism), the former evident in Luther’ s teachings, Pietism and the concept of Bildung, the latter
in pan-Germanism and the idea of universal sovereignty, which underlay both Marxist class and
Prussian state ideologies. In regard to German identity he wrote, “ Externally the undisturbed
permanence of holism (accompanied by a strong bent to subordination) and, internally, the
formative influence of Luther (strengthening Christian individualism but confining it within the
person) are two fundamental features that go far to make understandable the interplay of German
culture with its environment and history.” (Italics added.)
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Democratic Party’ s long-standing opposition to militarism, but also shifts the burden of war guilt
onto the Germans’ ethnic predispositions, as if they could not help themselves.17
Social psychologists since the mid-twentieth century have tried to concentrate on genuine
cultural differences without projecting them onto cultural personae, avoiding what was dubbed
the “ fundamental attribution error,” the tendency to attribute individual actions to personality
traits regardless of situational factors.18 This new perspective discarded conventional
Aristotelian notions of innate character disposition that had been propagated during Victorian
times, particularly in connection with nationality. While more recent socio-psychological studies
aim at rational explanations of cultural differences based on sociological or historical data, nearly
all nineteenth-century literature on national character either assumed the existence of innate
difference or never bothered to distinguish cultural from biological traits. The distinction
between cultural identity and ethnicity remained too weak to ward off the irrational appeal of
national myths and stereotypes that negated anxiety by bolstering a sense of superiority over
17

George Macaulay Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century and After: 17821919 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 468. See also Gay, Freud for Historians, p. 134,
who criticizes Max Weber’ s stereotype of the “ driven tradesman,” the embodiment of the
Protestant ethic, thinking only of business and making money. Firchow, Death of the German
Cousin, p. 202, also cites incidence of stereotypy in Salvador de Madriaga’ s Portrait of Europe
and faults Barbara Tuchman in The Guns of August (1962) for referring to a combination of
arrogance, rigidity and stupidity as a “ natural quality in Germans whose expression so often fails
to endear them to others.”
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Stanley Milgram’ s Stanford study of obedience to authority, conducted in 1963, wherein a
majority of subjects “ shocked” their “ students” to death in a sham learning experiment, revealed
the fallacy of drawing conclusions about character based on experimental results. The
fundamental attribution error seemed to stem partly from a strong Western cultural bias toward
individualism and partly from a sense of denial among observers that one could act in a manner
similar to test subjects in a given situation. L. Ross and R. Nisbett, The Person and the
Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), pp. 56-58,
reexamine the impact of situational factors on Milgram’ s results.
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outside ethnic groups.19 Writers generally supported an ethnocentric hierarchical mentality by
sanctioning national and racial stereotypes, and few recognized the psychological dynamic
underlying nationalistic self-adulation with its reciprocal denigration of other nationalities.
While current research has veered away from national toward racial and gender
stereotypes, the prevalence and persistence of late nineteenth-century notions of national
character has repeatedly surfaced in studies since the 1950s. In 1959 a UNESCO-sponsored
examination of French and German stereotypes held by other Europeans and themselves, found
that participants characterized Germans as hard-working, practical, disciplined, submissive to
authority, and domineering, even brutal, in their relations with other peoples. The French were
perceived as friendly, easygoing, generous, light-hearted, artistic and gregarious, lazy,
temperamental, impulsive and quarrelsome.20 As a rule, respondents denied negative traits in
their own national group and, perhaps more significantly, refused to apply the most popular, and
subjective, self-assigned traits to other nationalities. German subjects considered themselves
hardworking (80%) and brave (60.2%), while only a few conceded these qualities to the French
(3.2% and 9.2% respectively). French subjects touted their generosity compared to the Germans

19

Howard F. Stein, “ Culture and Ethnicity or Group Fantasies: A Psychohistoric Paradigm of
Group Identity,” in From Metaphor to Meaning: Papers in Psychoanalytic Anthropology, Series
in Ethnicity, Medicine, and Pychoanalysis, no. 2, ed. Stein and Maurice Apprey (Charlottesville,
VA: University of Virginia Press, 1987), pp. 122-24, 151. Stein used the term “ maladaptive”
culture to denote the impediment to rational ego or self-development posed by an ethnocentric
orientation. The antidote to “ cultural identification,” according to Stein, lies in critical evaluation
of cultural entanglements, in emotional integration and differentiation of the self from the
cultural ingroup, and in casting out the idea of a demonic “ other.”
20

Erich Reigrotski and Nels Anderson, “ National Stereotypes and Foreign Contacts,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 23 (Winter 1959-60) : 527. Respondents included Belgians (482 Flemish and
597 Walloons), French (2006), Germans (2041), and Dutch (1000).
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(52.9% versus 1.5%), and considered themselves far less domineering (3.6% versus 59.6%) or
cruel (0.6% versus 37.1%).21 Positive assumptions about national identity usually accompanied
the assignment of negative qualities to an outgroup. More recent surveys that concentrate on
some subtler nuances of stereotyping have nevertheless shown an enduring tendency among
respondents to differentiate nationalities on the basis of traditional stereotypes.22 While national
stereotypes are unlikely to be found in twenty-first century didactic treatises, they continue to
pervade fiction, visual media and comedy.23
The Psychology of Stereotyping
Research on stereotypes since the 1920s has followed three basic theoretical approaches:
socio-cultural, psychodynamic and cognitive.24 The first two define stereotypy as a phenomenon
of cultural conditioning and personality, while the third seeks the initial motivation for
stereotyping in the perceptual process itself. According to the socio-cultural definition,
stereotypy precedes the use of reason and imposes its stamp, replete with traditional cultural
values, on the evidence of our senses. Walter Lippmann first stated that culture defines
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For a detailed discussion of these theoretical perspectives on stereotypes see Richard D.
Ashmore and Frances K. Del Boca, “ Conceptual Approaches to Stereotypes and Stereotyping,”
in Hamilton, Cognitive Processes, pp. 2-8.
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perceptions—“ we define first and then see.” He compared the function of the stereotyping mind
to “ the doorkeeper at a costume ball who judges whether the guest has an appropriate
masquerade.” 25 A Princeton University study done in 1933 by Katz and Braly, which tested
similarities between individual prejudices and stereotypes found in popular magazines,
confirmed the idea of a socio-cultural phenomenon.26
The psychodynamic approach came into vogue after 1935 with Gordon Allport’ s
explanation of the link between stereotypes and prejudice, notably in their rationalizing and
justifying functions.27 Researchers subsequently found close associations between stereotypy and
the rigid thinking symptomatic of authoritarianism, which added an even more sinister aspect:
unquestioning, prejudicial acceptance of stereotypes signified a defective personality, a weak
ego, and a mind prone to fascism due to a dependence on external authority rather than
internalized values.28 The authoritarian personality revealed itself through close identification
with an ingroup, the use of double standards, hierarchical thinking, conformism and moralistic
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self-justification through the projection of negative qualities, including the responsibility for
discrimination itself, onto an outgroup.29 Despite their prejudicial nature, however, stereotypes
were also found to involve objective cultural factors and seemed at times to operate on a rational
or pseudorational level.30 This realization inspired the cognitive approach, spearheaded by Henri
Tajfel in 1969, which explained stereotypes as a function of categorization processes linked to
perception but not necessarily prejudice.31 The cognitive school drew inspiration from the
“ economy of effort” hypothesis in Lippmann’ s initial description.
Some definitive conceptions of stereotypes, which appear particularly relevant to the
present study, include the following:
Stereotypes consist of patterns of traits that make up a “ Gestalt attribution,” correlated
with a social or cultural group32

1.

29

Adorno et. al., Authoritarian Personality, pp. 43-44, 173, 191-94, 204. The term, “ antiintraceptiveness, was coined to describe authoritarian lack of commiseration with others and an
inability to “ put oneself in another’ s shoes,” combined with resistance to objective self criticism.
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(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 21, 35, 52, 57-58, 97, 176-77, who contrasts
contemporary authoritarianism with Plato’ s Timocratic society (i.e., Spartan, warlike,
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Hamilton, “ Illusory Correlation,” pp. 122-26, describes the process of matching particular
traits with particular groups, which can become a source of bias through the tendency to associate
undesirable behaviors or traits with lesser-known groups.
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2.

Global stereotypes encompass more specific subtypes, a fact which often leads to
inconsistency and contradiction33

3.

Both cognitive and motivational processes, supported by social convention, make
stereotypes extremely persistent

4.

Stereotypes shape social interaction and contribute to the de-individualization of those
targeted as outgroup members

These universal signatures of stereotyping certainly apply to nineteenth-century British views of
Germany. Stereotypes of Germans from all walks of life combined an assortment of traits to
form a convincingly generalized mental image. The diverse images that constituted the “ German
stereotype” could be tailored to idealized or demonized descriptions of radically different target
groups and yet impose a certain blanket uniformity, notwithstanding efforts to characterize
Germans as lacking a strong national identity compared with the British or French. Perceptions
of historical change also played a role. The global German stereotype could accommodate
temporal inconsistencies, so that a demonized “ New Germany” could be seen as a radical
departure from an idealized past. The late nineteenth-century stigmas of German unscrupulous
trade practices, diplomatic blackmail and inept colonial administration, for example, directly
opposed more traditional stereotypes of German honesty, loyalty and bureaucratic efficiency.
The old stereotypes nevertheless persisted as nostalgic reminders of Germany’ s innocuous past,
even amid perceptions of a changing Germany. The emphasis on national stereotypes in
nineteenth-century Britain represented a vain attempt to come to terms with changing political,
economic and diplomatic realities that only served to de-individualize and superficially
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Allport, Nature of Prejudice, p. 195. The self-contradictory nature of stereotypes proved to
Allport that attitudes, rather than genuine group traits, served as the basis for justifying prejudice
toward a particular group.
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categorize national outgroups. Popular definitions of national character supplanted
Enlightenment concepts of individualism and free will with more generalized, prejudicial and
immutable group traits.
Past and present theories define stereotypy as a tendency to categorize empirical data in
response to a combination of natural mental limits, prejudice and insecurity.34 The cultural
framework from which these categories derive determines, for example, whether a character trait
will be judged healthy or sick, familiar or strange, just or unjust, moral or perverse. Sander L.
Gilman has theorized that such cultural reference points or “ root-metaphors” fulfill a
psychological “ need to structure the world in familiar terms.” 35 The differentiation between self
and the world during infancy, according to Gilman, parallels a split between “ good” and “ bad”
arising from a feeling of control, or the lack of it, over the environment. The projection of
negative aspects of the self onto a “ bad” object provides an escape from contradictions present in
self-integration. Gilman wrote that the act of projection
. . . saves the self from any confrontation with the contradictions present in the necessary
integration of “ bad” and “ good” aspects of the self. The deep structure of our own sense
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of self and the world is built upon the illusionary image of the world divided into two
camps, “ us” and “ them.”
. . . Stereotypes are a crude set of mental representations of the world. They are
palimpsests on which the initial bipolar representations are still vaguely legible. They
perpetuate a needed sense of difference between the “ self” and the “ object,” which
becomes the “ Other.” 36
The self/other dichotomy, which remains constant despite the Protean nature of
stereotypes, provides a conduit for the projection of self-directed negative feelings onto the other
through either deprecatory or idealized images.37 Through the mind’ s natural tendency to
simplify and categorize information, stereotypes provide a psychological defense mechanism
against the assimilation of knowledge that would otherwise refine, and possibly soften, the
distinction between self and other. Even within the context of an ethnic joke stereotypes displace
anxiety by reaffirming the “ self” at the expense of the “ other” and asserting a sense of control
over that which cannot be controlled. An example of this can be seen, according to Christie
Davis, in the “ stupid” Irish and “ stingy” Scottish jokes that gained popularity in England during
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the rise of industrialism in Britain because they delineated the polar extremes of failure in a
capitalist society—namely, incompetence and self-defeating avarice.38
Stereotypy becomes pathological when it involves the denial and projection of one’ s own
fears and weaknesses onto the other, and when the acceptance of blanket generalizations exposes
an inability to perceive significant individual differences among the stereotyped outgroup.39 On a
deeper psychological level the we/they polarity represents the self’ s struggle against annihilation
at the expense of the other, an irrational inner conflict that can reinforce a self-defeating neurosis.
What superficially appears to be a symbiotic relationship within the ingroup, such as one’ s own
culture, race, class, or family, can become a “ reciprocal parasitism,” whereby individuality is
sacrificed implicitly in order to strengthen collective identity in opposition to a third party or
“ triangulated enemy.” 40 In the case of nationalism, stereotypes reinforce a psychologically
negative, propagandistic ingroup mentality by creating a superficial unity among diverse social
groups, so that nationalism becomes self-exultation, or exoneration, while internationalism
implies a loss of national identity and “ self.” The inhabitants of two competing nations, lacking
shared cultural values or common assumptions, will likely see themselves as irreconcilable rivals
on many fronts, locked in a conflict pitting the “ good” self against the “ evil” other.41 This
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phenomenon especially appears in relation to highly sensitive issues that lead to wholesale
condemnation of the outgroup, such as occurred during “ Made in Germany” phase of the AngloGerman trade rivalry that made headlines in 1896. Whether or not it actually challenges the
ingroup’ s way of life, the outgroup is apt to be perceived as malevolent or “ wrong-headed,” and
the sole obstacle in the way of progress.42
Victorian Mentalities, National Myth and Empire
From the preceding discussion it appears remarkable that some of the adjuncts of
stereotyping that encourage prejudice and a pathological differentiation between self and other
correspond very closely with what historians have written about Victorian social conformity,
internalized moralistic authoritarianism and hierarchical ingroup mentality.43 The broader
cultural Western European roots of moral authoritarianism have been explored by Erich Fromm
in his famous book Escape From Freedom, in which he considered the internalized authoritarian
conformism of Reformation Protestantism a psychological substitute for the discarded medieval
Catholic hierarchy. Authoritarian submission, whether to a king, pope or substitute doctrine,
argued Fromm, offered an illusory security that actually destroyed individual freedom along with
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its attendant anxieties.44 Fromm’ s theories may be more directly applicable to the puritanical
authoritarianism of England’ s seventeenth-century Cromwellian protectorate, although it seems
noteworthy that despite the subsequent growth of political and economic individualism, in
accordance with tenets expounded by John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith and others, and nineteenthcentury liberal reforms that set England apart from much of Europe, Victorian authoritarian
conformism and hierarchical thinking in terms of nationality, morality, class and race could still
prevail.45 Victorianism became synonymous with conformism, moralism and, if not prudery, the
pressure to live up to a romantic ideal. If England became a “ country of voluntary obedience” to
a moral authority established within the confluence of Evangelical and Utilitarian movements, it
was an authority all the more powerful and dogmatic because welded to the causes of individual
political freedom and social reform.46 G. M. Young described the early Victorian decades as an
“ age of acquiescence,” of life accompanied by the sense “ of being under a Code” and
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characterized by a uniformity of artistic taste which itself provoked a movement toward
deliberate exoticism.47 Young spoke of a society in which the conflict between professed
religious beliefs, practical ideals and intellect bred a self-righteous, sometimes consciously
hypocritical, conformism that granted undue authority to public opinion and moralistic doctrine.48
The moralistic component of British nationalism, which found expression in the idea of a
providentially ordained mission, served both to justify British commercial and imperial
expansion and, at the same time, to vilify the growth of competing empires. The broader
implications of the Evangelical creed had established a moral basis for British acquisition of
wealth and power, “ that sense of being an Elect People which, set to a more blatant tune, became
a principal element in Late Victorian Imperialism.” 49 This moralistic self-aggrandizement
naturally implied a sense of ethnic superiority that shaped attitudes at the height of British
imperialism. Peter Firchow wrote:
The consciousness of their innate moral superiority was the cause in the British public
mind of the very natural conviction that any foreigner who opposed himself to the British
will was ipso facto opposing the virtues of gentleness, chivalry, honor, sportsmanship,
democracy and, in a word, civilization.50
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The commingling of imperial status with positive perceptions of British national character
reveals a psychological motive underlying Germanophobic opinion in British reactions to
German industrial, trade, colonial and naval rivalries.
Britain’ s transition toward a “ conscious policy of Imperialism” entailed a shift from
expansion through commerce to a policy of annexation during the 1880s.51 Germany’ s bid for
colonial power, which began with the proclamation in 1884 of a protectorate over the region
around Angra Pequeña in Southwest Africa, and which was followed by inroads in East Africa,
the Cameroons and elsewhere, provoked an annexationist response from a British government
formerly reluctant to take on unnecessary burdens of empire.52 Britain, having already annexed
parts of South Africa and occupied Egypt, thus became embroiled in the “ scramble” to draw
lines on maps of Africa favorable to national security and prestige. Germany’ s actions also
stimulated demands from British merchants for more government intervention in favor of British
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markets threatened by native uprisings and the designs of foreign rivals. Anglo-German colonial
rivalry therefore became an important component of the new “ imperialism of free trade” that
gilded the chess game of international strategy, despite the fact that in Africa the commercial
interests of Britain and Germany dovetailed in opposition to French and Portuguese
protectionism.53 Concerns over German colonial aims also gave impetus to the steady growth of
Liberal imperialism and played a crucial role in stirring popular enthusiasm for empire, which
culminated in what James Sturgis has called the “ almost monolithic imperialist stance of the
metropolitan press in 1900.” 54 During Gladstone’ s second ministry fault lines had developed
within the Liberal party between “ Palmerstonians,” anxious to maintain Britain’ s imperial
prestige, and “ Little Englander” non-interventionists. Radical imperialist leaders Joseph
Chamberlain and Sir Charles Dilke supported the former position by urging a more “ forward”
policy against German intrusions in Africa.55 The appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as
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Colonial Secretary in 1895 meant the official endorsement of free trade imperialism and a more
straightforward and ambitious policy of developing tropical colonies and dependencies as both a
source of raw materials and a market for British industrial goods.56
The new imperialism marked a departure from religious and moral considerations, which
had characterized Gladstonian “ reluctant” imperialism, toward a preoccupation with imperial and
national power.57 Social reform in the 1890s acquired an imperialistic motive that superceded
the evangelical zeal of 1830s Benthamite reformism, just as imperial defense superseded fear of
revolution as an impetus for reform legislation.58 This change exacerbated a long-standing moral
dilemma due to a perceived break from the idealism that had previously motivated missionary
expeditions as well as domestic social policy during the reform era. Britain’ s imperial destiny,
once celebrated and endowed with a sense of mission by Carlyle, Kingsley and others, had
become an article of faith to many only despite Liberal pangs of conscience.59 The public
perception of an innocent empire, a “ loose and sometimes accidental association of units,” that
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Hynes, Economics of Empire, pp. 138-42. Chamberlain’ s appointment ironically coincided
with a general improvement in the economy, which undercut commercial imperial motives.
57

Jenkins, The Liberal Ascendency, pp. 162-64, remarks on the “ revivalist” tone of support for
Gladstone prior to 1880 and the popularity of his speeches denouncing the jingoistic excesses of
“ Beaconsfieldism,” or Disraeli’ s imperial policy. The theme of atonement can thus be seen as an
undercurrent moderating, if not totally opposed to, imperialism.
58

See Elie Halevy, History of the English People, vol. 3, The Triumph of Reform, 1830-1841,
pp. 162-63, on Evangelicalism and reform. See Kennedy, Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, p.
343, on Lord Roberts and the issue of imperial defense. Young, Portrait of an Age, pp. 100, 115,
noted the shift from moral to national motives in educational reform with the Education Act of
1870.
59

Young, Portrait of an Age, p. 177, speaks of the “ religious fervour” or “ religious horror”
indicative of opposing Victorian attitudes toward imperialism.
64

characterized the early British Empire had laid the foundation for claims of an empire without
design.60 With the policy shift toward annexation, the need arose to justify Britain’ s “ noble”
experiment in order to satisfy ethical scruples and to counter German criticisms of British
imperialism, such as those leveled by popular historian and lecturer Heinrich von Treitschke.61
The traditional idea of “ innocent” commercial expansionism, consonant with a divine mission to
overcome and displace old, corrupt, decadent and tyrannical empires, was being challenged—an
idea dating back to fifteenth and sixteenth-century anti-Hispanic, anti-Romish propagandistic
appeals to providential favor.62
The rise to imperial preeminence had put Britain in a less defensible position morally visa-vis Germany: was not Germany the new David and England the overgrown, decadent Goliath?
This inversion of the imperial paradigm, which had formerly placed England as the heroic
underdog, now cast England as the “ weary Titan, staggering under the too-vast orb of his fate” or
a “ huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretched in every direction,
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which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.” 63 During the long interval before this
conceptual “ turning of the tables,” however, neo-classicism and romanticism had allowed a
reappraisal of antiquity and folklore that smoothed over associations with paganism offensive to
Christian sensibilities. Thenceforth, the rich repositories of imagery supplied both by national
myth and the classical model of empire would prove serviceable to moralistic perspectives on the
realities of nineteenth-century imperialism.
National Myth
Theories concerning the connection between national identity and stereotyping largely
derive from attempts to explain nineteenth-century popular fascination with national character
and cultural myth. National stereotypes became part of the cultural mythology of modern Europe
through their supporting role as pillars of an obsession with antiquity or what Mircea Eliade
called “ historigraphical anamnesis,” the effort to forge a link with primordial time as if through
the remembrance of a past life.64 The drive to establish a national identity often led to abuses of
historicism that devolved into fantastic speculations about race and ancient origins, false
comparisons with antiquity and suppositious parallels between contemporaneous events and
great historical dramas, such as the rise and fall of Rome and the barbarian invasions. But this
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Western historiography has substituted “ a recollection of all that took place in historical Time” in
place of mythical events that, in more traditional societies, establish a link with primordial time.
In either case the link defines cultural behavior patterns, whether or not believed to be of
supernatural origin.
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European-wide phenomenon also stimulated an interest in national folklore. Romantic literature
and popular folk tales enabled communion with the remote past for a much wider audience, and
probably exercised a subtler and more tenacious influence, than didactic treatises on racial
origins or national character.
The compression of historical time through national myth-making in Britain, which
complemented the “ domestication” of geographical space as one of the constituents of
imperialism, succeeded most convincingly through anglicized versions of the King Arthur legend
and the socially rehabilitated image of the outlaw hero, Robin Hood. Stephanie L. Barczewski
has explained how the resuscitation of these two medieval warrior-heroes furthered cultural
nationalism in their appeal to diverse, ideologically opposed groups.65 The King Arthur legend
lent itself to an imperialistic, muscular Christianity and missionary zeal as well as an aristocratic,
conservative view of social reform, such as that championed by the Christian Socialists, who
from the 1850s stressed community and the neo-feudal idea of mutual obligations and loyalties
between classes in opposition to social equality and democratization through parliamentary
reform. Arthurian heroes also became models for crusading, “ knights-errant” of the realm who
set out to right social injustices both at home and abroad. The chivalric metaphor not only
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Barczewski traces the work of scholars in the divestiture of the Arthurian legend of its Celtic and
French origins in favor of Anglo-Saxon roots, from Malory’ s Morte d’Artur to Tennyson’ s Idylls
of the King (1851). The recasting of Robin Hood from “ Lord of Misrule” to gentleman bandit
began with Shakespeare’ s As You Like It and progressed through the nineteenth century.
Barczewski, pp. 84-86, 97, 103, also points out a continuity between the nineteenth-century
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nationalist revivals in Europe generated by Johann Gottfried von Herder’ s emphasis on the
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invested imperial service with a sense of moral duty, as in the idea of rescuing backward peoples
from slavery, superstition and oppression, but the Arthurian motif of Sir Perceval and Sir
Galahad in quest of the Holy Grail also reinforced Christian themes and added sexual purity to
the gentlemanly virtues of courage, loyalty and compassion.66 By contrast, the isolationist legend
of Robin Hood emphasized social equality, independence, and justice for the oppressed through
the threat of rebellion. Robin Hood became an icon for various working-class groups, including
the extremely popular Friendly Societies. After thematic elements of social class conflict had
been softened through the invention of aristocratic origins and allegiance to Richard I, Robin
Hood became a national symbol of pride in English character and Anglo-Saxon political
institutions that accorded with the Whig interpretation of history.67 Because of the depth of their
appeal to socially diverse groups of men, women and children, both the King Arthur and Robin
Hood legends inculcated a sense of national and racial unity.
Cultural myths contain root-metaphors worthy of consideration for imagological studies
because they reveal stereotypes to be not merely isolated images but part of a world view that
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includes national self-image.68 This fact becomes paramount in avoiding the trap of ascribing to
stereotypes too localized a significance based on “ self-interest,” such as selling newspapers or
scaremongering.69 But the obsession with myth also speaks volumes about the anxieties
associated with a highly moralistic, hierarchical, authoritarian conformist mentality. The
capacity of national myth for allowing a vicarious sense of self-worth, self-glorification or selfjustification through mere identification with a larger group explains its success as both a
propaganda medium and a means of establishing a moral basis for the perception of an orderly
world. Whether by virtue of the struggle against evil or the dispensation of Providence, the entire
British or Anglo-Saxon race and its imperial or national aims, or those of a particular subset
class, could be exonerated in comparison with rivals. The Arthurian legend, the myth of the
gentleman, and references to antiquity and race all supported an internal as well as external
hierarchy that represented one of the sinews of empire.
The Lure of Antiquity
Appreciation of the splendors of ancient Greece and Rome in an age of imperialism often
led to identification with those ancient models of empire, a vantage point which placed Germany
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historically in opposition to “ civilization.” 70 In 1854 Kingsley’ s Westward Ho! likened the
exploits of the sixteenth-century English sea dogs to those of the Greek heroes at Troy, Marathon
and Salamis.71 The tendency to draw comparisons with the classical world led one anonymous
writer to reason that hilly, coastal England spawned an active, Athenian-like race of busy traders
while flat, dull, inland Germany produced conservative, Spartan agriculturalists. The analogy
inferred British cultural superiority and portended inevitable conflict.72 Although patriotic
writers extolled a British affiliation with Greek heroism and commercial acumen, the
Roman/British capacity for empire building and administration became a more significant point
of resemblance.73 In some cases neo-Romanism implied a repudiation of the Greek ideal which,
in the realm of intellectual cultivation, befit the Germans only too well. Frederic Harrison wrote
in 1871:
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In their later ages the Greeks, with their matchless mental gifts, were of almost no
account as a nation; whilst the Romans, in cultivation far their inferiors, were foremost by
the ascendancy of their national genius. The real strength of a nation, especially in these
days, consists not in its achievements in science or art, but in the degree to which its
national will can command the sympathies and give shape to the wants of the age.74
Placed in the midst of an alarmist polemic for an interventionist policy against Germany
during the siege of Paris at the close of the Franco-Prussian war, Harrison’ s paean to Rome deftly
assuaged British imperial pride while paying tribute to the undeniable achievements of German
scholarship. However, statements like “ scratch the Junker, and you will find the lanzknecht
[sic]” and “ the fact that every German is a soldier, is itself a proof of a lower type of civilization”
conveyed the gist of Harrison’ s message: namely, that England’ s “ duty” lay with the cause of
civilization against purportedly barbaric Germany.75 Identification of Germany with Rome, when
it occurred, tended to be negative. At least one writer found “ something of the temper of ancient
Rome about the German Empire” in its fondness of “ massiveness,” dramatic effect and
pugnacity—elements which smacked of paganism.76 Most comparisons with antiquity, however,
accorded with Harrison’ s view and the idea of German reversion to ancestral pagan beliefs.77
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prophecy that Germans were “ reverting to type” and abandoning Christianity, and he remarks on
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This impression cropped up in various contexts, from criticism of Goethe to ridicule of German
superstition and comments about “ a pagan congregation of devout enthusiasts of the Wagnerian
cult,” or “ a considerable touch of paganism” in the Kaiser’ s “ ardent ancestor-worship.” 78
Imperialist identification with Rome continued throughout the latter nineteenth century
from the Don Pacifico affair of 1850, when Palmerston had echoed a popular sentiment by
declaring that, just as Rome protected any Roman citizen who could say civis Romanus sum, “ the
watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect a British subject in whatever land he
may be.” 79 In 1895 Chamberlain exhorted the British people to “ build railroads [in Africa] as the
Romans built roads,” and voiced the conviction that “ the only dominion which can in any way
compare with the British dominion is, of course, the old empire of the Romans.” 80 Lord
Rosebery posed the rhetorical question in 1900, “ Are we, like the Romans, not merely a brave,
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but also a persistent, business-like, alert, governing people?” 81 Even those who debunked British
affinities with Rome sought out differences in order to show that Britain would prevail where its
ancient counterpart failed. “ If Imperial Rome had held at her disposal a small fraction of that
mental vigour which is at the disposal of England now,” wrote J. B. Bury in 1896, “ her Empire
would never have succumbed, as it did, to the Germans.” 82
It would be inaccurate to say that all admirers of Rome despised Germany or that all
Germanophiles necessarily detested Rome and its Latin “ derivative,” France, but references to
Rome versus Germany did attain a new historical significance in the minds of many nineteenthcentury British writers and readers, usually to the detriment of Germany after 1871.83
Germanophobes constantly hammered home the theme of an archetypal conflict between
civilization and barbarism. Written at the high point of post Boer War Anglo-German hostility,
Kipling’ s inflammatory poem, “ The Rowers,” with its use of the epithets “ Goth” and “ Hun” for
Italy and Germany, implied Britain’ s abrogation of imperial responsibility as the torchbearer of
classical civilization:
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And ye tell us now of a secret vow
Ye have made with an open foe!
The dead they mocked are scarcely cold,
Our wounded are bleeding yet And ye tell us now that our strength is sold
To help them press for a debt!
In sight of peace - from the Narrow Seas
O’ er half the world to run With a cheated crew, to league anew
With the Goth and the shameless Hun!84
The classical metaphor provided a venerable framework upon which to hang distinctions
and reaffirm traditional racial and national stereotypes, but it also served to admonish as well as
bolster imperial pride. Only two months before Rosebery’ s empire speech George Bernard Shaw
had warned his compatriots against the dangers of following in the footsteps of ill-fated Rome.85
This pessimistic note sounded the ambivalence that darkened late-Victorian attitudes behind a
facade of imperial self-assurance. The theme of imperial decline ran counter to early Victorian
optimism about success through laissez-faire economics and the mirage of what later came to be
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called “ splendid isolation.” 86 The new strain of pessimism developed not only in response to
Bismarckian Germany’ s successful defiance of English political and economic models, but also
in view of the need to chart a favorable diplomatic course through the steadily concretizing ice
field of European alliances.
The rise of both America and Germany complicated the future of British world leadership
and infused the issue of social reform with a new sense of urgency. Joseph Chamberlain and the
Tariff Reform League emphasized the maintenance of empire for the welfare of the working
class, while the Liberal Imperialists and Fabians argued for the improvement of working class
conditions in order to breed a healthy, vigorous, imperial race. In either case, imperialists
rejected free trade, “ scoffed at Cobdenite or socialist proclamations of international friendship”
and urged preparation against the “ inevitable challenge of German power.” 87 Fear of Britain’ s
“ inevitable” decline, along the lines of Gibbon’ s Rome, became a constant source of anxiety
which peaked during the Boer War with its supposed revelations of “ racial degeneration” in
anaemic combat troops.88 Moreover, the promise of imperial greatness seemed to depend upon
technical education, military efficiency, and solving the inequities facing an expanded industrial
working class, problems for which the German model offered a number of possible solutions.89
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The German Realschulen, the General Staff, and Bismarck’ s State Socialism (i.e., worker’ s
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While it provoked interminable sermonizing and opprobrium, the German example left no doubt
as to the necessity of action, but the idea of a federated empire resting on state protection of
industry and labor represented an imperialist holy grail nestled amidst the horrors of
Germanization.90
The Racial Argument
The twin specters of imperial decline and racial or moral degeneration sustained the
romantic myth of Teutonic purity in opposition to classical models in general and decadent Rome
in particular. The myth of German racial and moral purity, one of the earliest themes making up
the German stereotype, can be traced in modern times to the late-renaissance rediscovery of
Tacitus’ s Germania. Written in 98 A.D., this polemical ancient ethnography idealized German
valor, love of freedom, simplicity and marital fidelity in contrast to decadent Rome.91 The lasting
power of the Tacitean stereotype derived from the simplified Roman reference to unconquered
regions east of the Rhine and north of the Danube and to its depiction of the myriad tribes
subsumed under the name Germani as a unique, indigenous people with essentially homogenous
and surprisingly admirable features, character, customs and religious beliefs.92 Exaggerated by
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sixteenth-century German humanists and co-opted by Anglo-Saxonists, the idealized portrait of
Tacitus furnished a legacy of Germanic racial and moral superiority that, once connected with the
idea of Anglo-German racial kinship, would prolong the death of Germanophilia in England.93
Germanicism as a component of Anglo-Saxonism, which had begun to rival the earlier
myth of British Trojan origins in the late Elizabethan era, would reach its most exuberant
expression during the mid-nineteenth century. Historians and writers including Lord Macaulay,
Sharon Turner, Thomas Carlyle, John Kemble, Goldwyn Smith, John R. Green, William Stubbs,
James Anthony Froude, Charles Kingsley, Edward Freeman, and Lord Acton waxed eloquent on
the greatness of the Anglo-Saxon race and its Germanic racial and political heritage.94 Kingsley,
probably the most exuberant proponent of this school, believed devoutly in the Teutonic origin of
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English law and constitutionalism and saw in the English working man a descendant of the
ancient Germanic tribesman:
The nearest type which we can see now is, I fancy, the English sailor, or the English
navvy. A great, simple, honest, baby—full of power and fun, very coarse and plain
spoken at times: but if treated like a human being, most affectionate, susceptible, even
sentimental and superstitious; fond of gambling, brute excitement, childish amusements
in the intervals of enormous exertion; quarrelsome among themselves, as boys are, and
with a spirit of wild independence which seems to be strength; but which, till it be
disciplined into loyal obedience and self-sacrifice, is mere weakness; and beneath all a
deep practical shrewdness, an indomitable perseverance, when once roused by need. 95
Citing Tacitus, Kingsley deemed stereotypical chaste self-restraint the source of Teutonic virility
and moral strength that defeated the supposedly corrupt and degenerate Romans.96 As a warning
to his contemporaries he cast England in the role of decadent Rome, quoting an absurdly
ethnocentric analogy on the subject of moral decay: “ No tongue may tell the orgies enacted, with
the aid of French cooks, Italian singers, and foreign artistes of all sorts.” 97 That Kingsley really
intended a special distinction for Anglo-Saxons becomes clear in his saga of the struggle between
the Germanic “ Forest Children” and the Roman “ Trolls,” where he took pains to separate “ false,
vain, capricious” Franks (French), “ lazy” Goths (Italians), and “ cruel” but proud Visigoths
(Spanish) from the allegedly cruel but “ most pure” Saxons. Imagining a sequel to the
Niebelungenlied in the Teutonic quarrel over the spoils of Rome, Kingsley considered the
English ancestors fortunate to have left the continent, and to have preserved “ unstained the old
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Teutonic faith and virtue” by avoiding such a demoralizing conflict.98 Thus, even at its height
Teutophilia contained the seeds of its own destruction through racial hair-splitting that would
acquire even greater political and moral significance to British observers of post-Bismarckian,
expansionist Germany.
The racial component of the Tacitean stereotype gained credibility during the nineteenth
century through the desire to equate contemporary political or cultural entities, and national
character, with preconceived over-simplifications of the distant past. British racialists depended
upon Tacitus, for example, when asserting the superiority of “ pure” northern Teutonic peoples
over “ mongrel” , decadent southern Latin races or, conversely, comparing the deficits of German
racial homogeneity unfavorably with more heterogenous Anglo-Saxons. Nineteenth-century
ethnologists supported the stereotypical polarity between Northern “ industrial” and Southern
“ sensual” Europeans by claiming for Anglo-Saxons and Teutons the successful qualities of the
former (i.e., reason, industry, thrift, morality) and disowning traits associated with the imperial
and moral decline of the latter (i.e., emotionality, laziness, extravagance, eroticism).99 Such
arguments served to prognosticate or rationalize the imperial or economic predominance of
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In an 1898 review of two books on racial/national character, Edmond Demolins’ À quoi tient
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Anglo-Saxon and Germanic Europeans according to a deterministic racial hierarchy, often based
on pseudo-scientific assumptions about cranial capacity or skull shape.100 The further assertion
of British superiority over Germans and Scandinavians was justified by emphasizing the unique
heritage of the British racial mixture. The more “ plastic” character resulting from a happy
confluence of Teutonic (Nordic), Iberian (Mediterranean) and Mongolian (Alpine) qualities, so
one argument ran, set Anglo-Saxons apart from their racially “ pure” Germanic cousins (see table
3, p. 81).101 Innate flexibility and adaptability resulting from this racial fusion supposedly
enabled the British to avoid religious and socio-political extremism and to “ bend to dynastic and
political storms in a manner which it is to be feared the pure Teuton may find difficult to achieve
under similar circumstances.” 102
The Tacitean stereotype of racial distinctiveness lost cogency not only because the
argument for racial purity cut both ways, but also because the false sense of racial and cultural
unity ascribed to the Germans was controverted by observations of German racial and political
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Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), pp. 189, 229.
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TABLE 3
MACNAMARA’ S RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EUROPEANS,
TYPICAL OF LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY VIEWS

THE RACES OF EUROPE
IBERIAN

MONGOLOID

TEUTONIC

chivalrous
courteous
patriotic
impulsive
ostentatious
proud
musical
cruel
passionate
revengeful
unreliable

religious
peace-loving
imaginative
sensitive
artistic
hospitable
indolent
unstable
lacking individuality

self-reliant
self-respecting
reliable
patriotic
orderly
freedom-loving
laborious
slow
persevering
courageous
warlike
enterprising
domineering

Source: Nottige Charles Macnamara, Origin and Character of the British People
(London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1900) pp. 215-16.
diversity. The “ network of boundaries” and mixture of races that defined the small states of
“ middle” Germany seemed symptomatic of a national defect supposed to be the outgrowth of
political particularism.103 Even the larger states of Prussia and Bavaria, which embodied the
stereotypical opposites of North and South Germany, represented a racial and cultural antithesis.
Prussians were considered to be infused with Slavic blood and caricatured as aloof, warlike,
orderly and domineering in contrast to gregarious, artistic and effusive Bavarians, who more
103

Quoted from William Howitt, Life in Germany (London: G. Routledge & Co., 1849, first
edition published as The Student Life of Germany (London, 1841), p. 178. See also “ Peasant
Life in Germany,” Westminster Review 66 (July-October 1856) : 57-58, on how German peasants
had substituted race and allegiance to province for individualism and thus lacked
“ individualization in features and expression.”
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resembled the French and Italians. Although the critique of pure Teutonism proved more acerbic
than the counter-theme of German racial and cultural heterogeneity, the prevalence of both views
allowed condemnation of German national character as either in-bred and obnoxious or
polymorphous and lacking distinction.104
As older Germanophilic notions of racial kinship gave way to a clarification of AngloGerman differences, the very proximity of Anglo-Saxons and Teutons in the Anglocentric racial
hierarchy, taken together with the old saw about Anglo-German religious and cultural affinities,
ironically provoked a kind of national one-upmanship waged through the relentless pursuit of
distinctions. British conceptions of racial character during the nineteenth century generally
imbued Anglo-Saxons with all of the Teutonic, or German, virtues and none of the vices.
Britons, for example, had supposedly inherited mechanical ability, deliberation, ethics and sexual
morality without the plodding stolidity, inflexibility, gloominess and pugnacity of the Germans.
Imperial rivalry exacerbated the obsession with Anglo-German racial and cultural distinctions on
both sides of the North Sea. Treitschke, for one, played a major part in converting the
sentimental myth of Anglo-German affinity to one of perpetual rivalry when he began to
formulate a contrast between competing “ Anglo-Saxon” and “ Teutonic” cultures, a theme that
resonated with Pan-Germanists.105 On the British side, one author voiced a typical late
104
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nineteenth-century attitude: that England, since the time of the Norman Conquest, had become
the home of “ that heterogenous but most distinctive race, to whom the Germans were and have
ever since been foreigners, whatever their share in a common ancestry.” 106
British assertions of racial superiority produced other absurdities, such as the contention
that Frederick the Great owed his greatness to English genes, but they also exposed a firm belief
in the inherent moral ascendency of British racial character which accompanied an equally strong
distrust and dislike of Germany on many fronts.107 Righteous indignation over German trade
practices, for example, stemmed from the contention that superior breeding and morals prevented
British tradesmen and merchants from producing and selling inferior goods, and thus from
competing effectively in foreign markets against cheaper German products.108 In diplomatic
relations, an air of condescension and suspicion towards the German character accompanied the
assumption that a non-aggression pact with Germany would simply become a licence for German

to the emphasis placed on Anglo-German distinctions in the early writings of Moeller van der
Bruck and other Pan-Germanists.
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W.H. Wilkins, “ The First Queen of Prussia,” Nineteenth Century 49 (April 1901) : 678.
Sophie Charlotte, sister to George I and maternal grandmother of Frederick the Great, married
Prussia’ s Frederick III, who was described as deformed and “ of anything but an amiable
reputation.” She, on the other hand, had English blood and possessed, “ in no small degree, the
beauty, dignity, and personal charm characteristic of the race, which even the infusion of sluggish
German blood could not mar” (p. 667).
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bullying.109 The hardening of racial attitudes during the Victorian Era became an indispensable
component of imperialism to which comparative craniologies and evangelical missions lent an
air of scientific and moral validity. The “ romantic racism” that defined an intra-European
hierarchy based on national character merely represented the upper tier of a broader prejudice
against “ primitive” non-Europeans who lacked any claim to a “ civilized” past and thus became
the hapless victims of imperial “ philanthropy.” 110 Placement of British Anglo-Saxons at the top
of this racial hierarchy, whether by virtue of “ pure” Aryan lineage or a wholesome European
racial synthesis, provided an organic rationale for imperial hegemony to which the United States,
not Germany, could logically be seen as Britain’ s Anglo-Saxon heir apparent.
While stereotypes served as building blocks for a hierarchical world view, which
temporarily reduced anxiety and increased “ self-esteem” through the denigration of other
nationalities, they also embodied categorical “ truths” which ultimately supported a pseudobiological, “ Darwinian” interpretation of world history.111 Well before the publication of
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Darwin’ s Origin of Species in 1859, theories about social evolution, lacking any scientific basis,
maintained contemporary conservative racist and sexist ideologies.112 Blunt statements about the
extermination of weak races and the inevitability of mass suffering, however, not only provided
ammunition for virulent racists and militant imperialists, but in the process also stigmatized
social Darwinism itself as an anti-Enlightenment, anti-Utopian, and “ un-Christian” excuse for
social and imperial exploitation.113 Neo-Darwinist geneticism of the 1890s disturbed the dream
of evolutionary progress through environmental means. It also provoked a moralistic reaction
from neo-Lamarckian social reformers who targeted the influence of German biologists August
Weissmann and Ernst Haeckel and the so-called “ tough” school of Darwinistic Nietzscheans.114
The equation of Nietzsche with barbarism, Machtpolitik and Prussian militarism constituted an
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experimental work. Haeckel synthesized folkish and racist romanticism with social Darwinist
ideology into a monistic view of man as totally subject to natural forces, a view that spurned the
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important facet of the negative Social Darwinian (originally anti-Spencerian) stereotype.115
Despite the fact that Nietzsche ridiculed Darwin’ s theory, and despite the existence of a contrary
or “ tender” view of Nietzsche, the common attitude prevailed that Nietzsche, as H. L. Mencken
expressed it, was to Darwin, Spencer and Huxley “ what Beelzebub is to a trio of bad boys.” 116
Even if “ Darwinism was a convenient brush with which to tar racists, and vice versa,” the moral
and scientific controversy surrounding the “ survival of the fittest” doctrine involved questions of
attitude and policy that rarely challenged the paradigm of a racial hierarchy.117 Social
imperialists and social Darwinist reformers employed the same prejudices as the more extreme
polygeneticists and militant imperialists, but toward opposite ends. The fact that both adherents
and critics of social Darwinism could find common ground in vilifying the Germans typifies the
double-edged nature of late nineteenth-century British Germanophobia and its logical absurdity.
Social Darwinism, eugenics and the fixation on racial distinctiveness reflected concerns
over racial degeneration and the belief that evolution somehow entailed a diminution of racial
vigor. Paradoxically, these fears and social imperialist angst stimulated calls for emulating the
German model, particularly in education. It is nevertheless interesting that War Secretary, Lord
Haldane, felt it necessary in 1901 to qualify his pitch for educational reform according to the
German example with praise for the allegedly superior courage and doggedness of Anglo-Saxons
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in order to dispel the idea of a “ decaying race.” 118 Despite reluctant acknowledgment of
superior training methods, resistance to the German educational model and a refuge for vanity
could be found in ethnocentric arguments and the shadowy realm of national character. Midcentury distinctions between the German methodical “ creature of form” and the self-educated,
adaptable Englishman resonated fifty years later in charges that German higher education
cultivated the head at the expense of character.119 The publication of Edwin Earnest William’ s
Made in Germany in 1896, a troubling discourse on Britain’ s eroded industrial base, rekindled
advocacy for educational reform along German lines, but resistance to the “ tyrannical” Prussian
model continued to reflect hostility toward the alleged evils of state control, deleterious effects
on character, and the basic incompatibility of national temperaments.120
Belief in race as the primary determinant of character implied that reversion to ancestral
type was inevitable and that social and national policy should be formulated on a racial basis.121
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Despite the mirage of diplomatic security based on Anglo-German racial affinity, the biological
view of imperial rivalry as a competition between races pitted England against Germany as
“ natural rivals” rather than friendly cousins.122 Years before Joseph Chamberlain’ s failed efforts
to promote an Anglo-Saxon/Teutonic alliance with Germany, the advocacy for imperial
federation and preparation for inevitable war with Germany had acquired a racial basis, one
derived from the pseudo-Darwinian idea of nations as “ species in the making.” 123 Ford Maddox
Ford mockingly described the inevitable outcome of a future determined according to the dictates
of national character with a warning about the peril of English slackness:
We are the people who will win terrific victories against enormous odds—in the game of
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end, some Prussian, some Jew, or some Radical politician will sleeplessly get the best of
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III. EARLY AND RECURRING THEMES
The German reputation in Europe, since the time of Julius Caesar up to the twentieth
century, evolved from barbarian anonymity to the pinnacle of artistic, scholarly and scientific
achievement, but at each stage the German stereotype always reincorporated some remnants of
the past. In the case of Germany, the good/bad, competent/incompetent, normal/abnormal
dualism intrinsic to stereotypes accrued a sense of historical verity that colored contemporary
images in the eyes of foreigners. This may be partly attributable to a long-standing uncertainty
regarding German political and national identity in comparison with Britain, France or Spain, for
example, which had become established nation-states centuries before German unification in
1871. From the perspective of many late nineteenth-century British writers, Germany remained
an ambiguous ethnic and diplomatic entity, even though the larger states of Prussia, Bavaria,
Saxony and Hanover, had been well defined through either diplomatic alliances, cultural or
dynastic connections. Attempts to delineate German national character consequently relied on a
mass of contradictory stereotypes that contained both geographical and temporal discrepancies.
North Germany, South Germany, “Old Germany” and “New Germany” all carried their own
subset of characteristics and character traits. Some powerful motifs persisted throughout the
centuries, however, to form a tradition of influential, if conflicting, themes.
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The Moral Barbarian
Just as the Tacitean stereotype had conferred status on the German image through the
ancient imprimatur of racial distinctiveness, and controverted in its own day the implied
inferiority of the generic name, Germanii, as well as many negative assumptions about halfanimal barbarians hostile to civilization, it would also present early modern Germans a worthy
pedigree that offered redemption from hitherto ignominious origins.1 This presumed identity,
resurrected in the fifteenth century, would sustain yearnings for a political and ethnic unity that
centuries of tribal warfare and imperial aspirations had failed to provide. It also furnished the
historical basis for an evolving cult of Germanicism, paradoxically opposed to and yet entwined
with the Roman imperial legacy, that traced a tortuous continuity from the time of the Gothic
migrations to the Nazi era.2 German humanists cited Tacitus to refute derogatory images of
Germans disseminated by foreigners, and the Tacitean stereotype of moral and martial superiority
served as a cornerstone of the national mythology built around the defeat of invading Roman
legions in 9 A.D. by Germanic warriors under the leadership of Arminius. Ulrich von Hutten’s
Latin dialogue of the same name, published in 1528, revived this ancient heroic figure to
1

Julius Caesar considered the Germans more savage and less amenable to civilization than the
defeated Gauls, from whom he learned the name in 53 B.C. See Herwig Wolfram, The Roman
Empire and Its Germanic Peoples, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1997), pp. 3-7, 12.
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neunzehnten Jahrhunderts,” Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel: 282 ff. Veroffentlichungen des
Max Planck-Instituts fur Geschichte 36, 1, (Gottingen, 1971), who wrote of “ a multifarious
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criminal application by the Nazis, in the twentieth.
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symbolize Reformation Germany’s defiance of Rome.3 Tacitus thus became the primary source
for the earliest outpourings of German “ nationalism” as well as subsequent theories of German
racial and cultural superiority.4 The venerable stereotype even translated into nineteenth-century
British affirmations about the Germans’ character and social customs, such as their
“ unsuspecting openness of heart,” good nature and hospitality, or their “ strict and severe”
matrimonial bond and “ superior sexual morality.” 5
This idealized portrait contained blemishes, however, which also possessed staying
power. Tacitus, after all, did consider the Germans to be barbarians, albeit uniquely moral ones,
and he described them as violent, slothful and prone to gambling and drunkenness. Moreover,
some “ positive” aspects of the stereotype implied certain character deficiencies. “ A race without
either natural or acquired cunning,” for example, seemed both morally innocuous and politically
defective.6 These contradictions reemerged nearly two millennia later as British writers seemed
to borrow from the Tacitean stereotype an attitude of nostalgic idealization mixed with
condescension, or moral condemnation, that reverberated with the inherent good/bad duality of
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the stereotype itself. The derivative strains of this duality can be seen in Romantic antimodernist images of chivalrous German nobles, honest craftsmen and naive peasants that arose
and endured even amidst accusations of artistic mediocrity and virulent moralistic reactions
against German literature and biblical and aesthetic criticism. The ancient stereotype also
embodied contradictory traits later used to differentiate northern from southern
Germans—disciplined, warlike, sober Prussians from lazy, beer-drinking, hospitable Bavarians.
Another Renaissance document, Machiavelli’ s Description of German Affairs, written in
1512, reinforced the image of German military valor and added the traits of industry and thrift,
characterizations that gained prominence much later in connection with the German economic
model and Anglo-German trade rivalry of the late nineteenth century.7 Machiavelli’ s remarks on
the Spartan simplicity of German domestic life echoed those of Tacitus, and his admiration for
German military and social virtues generated an idealized image.8 Again, however, serious
weaknesses flawed this prototype of the German military model. Machiavelli observed that,
because political divisions undermined the military strength of the Emperor and princes,
Germany could not accomplish great things. He also noted a lack of independence and initiative
on the battlefield stating, “ They are excellent in a field-fight, but for the storming of a town, they
7
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are good for nothing; and but little to defend one: and generally where the men cannot keep their
old orders, and manage themselves with room enough, they are worth but little.” 9 These
perceived flaws anticipated nineteenth-century “ unpolitical” and “ methodical” German
stereotypes that presumed German mediocrity and inflexibility, traits contrasted to the British
self-stereotype of innate capacity to govern and “ pluck.” In 1893, for example, prognosticators
of an imaginary European “ Great War” envisioned “ Teutonic courage and discipline” in the heat
of battle, as well as the precision of movement and perfect “ mechanism” of German troops and
supply lines, but also the fatal absurdities of German regimentation:
And how bravely those Germans fought! And now, looking back in cold blood, how
needlessly were they butchered! Exactly opposite where I stood, their infantry moved
forward with even more than the precision of a parade; in little squads, but shoulder to
shoulder, with all the rigidity of a birthday review. I could even see the officers halting
and actually correcting the alignment. Needless to say, these living targets were riddled
through and through in the very moment of their pedantic folly.10
Mockery of “ pipeclayed” Germans and their military maneuvers—“ the run after a running
foe is the cream of German tactics” —accompanied a serious hope that German “ dependence and
docility,” lack of adaptability and staying power would ameliorate the threat of what the world
considered a model army.11 An article in Cornhill Magazine shortly after the outbreak of World
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War I hypothesized that German soldiers, being accustomed to “ thinking in grooves” and
incapable of acting as individuals, had grown dependent on closed-order maneuvers. English
readers could take comfort in the belief that German mental inflexibility would be no match for
British initiative and pluck on the battlefield. The writer further extrapolated from this
“ unpliability” of the German mind, which “ unfits him for dealing with alien or inferior races,” an
incapacity for empire that would not (and should not) challenge British imperial ascendency.12
The German military reputation, which had acquired a dark side in association with
images of barbarians opposed to Rome, received a fillip with the exploits of German mercenaries
or Landesknechten who, along with Spanish troops under Charles V, carried out the brutal Sack
of Rome in 1527.13 Even though the most threatening aspects of German militarism did not gain
prominence until the expansion of Germany in the nineteenth and the rise of Nazism in the
twentieth centuries, the affiliation of the Germanic warrior with Goth, Vandal and Hun remained
a persistent theme. As one post-World War II translator remarked, the Germania, “ a detailed
account of a great people that had already begun to be a European problem in the first century of
our era, should still have a message for us in the twentieth.” 14
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The Tacitean stereotype greatly influenced nineteenth-century British commentary on
German character, as did the Roman/barbarian duality and Machiavelli’ s images of virtuous, yet
oddly self-compromised, Germans. These ideas found a reflection in the writings of French
authoress Madame de Staël, who implanted, or at least encouraged, in English minds the notion
that modern German culture betrayed intrinsic national and racial characteristics peculiar to
Germany. German romanticism and philosophical idealism could be seen as a divergence from
mainstream European culture, classicism, French realism and British empiricism— a divergence
which intimated the transmogrification of ancient inherent differences stemming from Germany’ s
barbarian, non-Roman past. De Staël also stamped the German predilection for romanticism,
mysticism and chivalry as an indigenous quality wholly separate from classical Greek or Roman
influence.15 Although de Staël’ s popular work, translated and published in 1813 as Germany,
furnished a much-needed antidote for the triple dose of bad translations, scathing ridicule and
venomous criticism that had poisoned early appreciation of German literature in Britain, readers
imbibed much more than a mere treatise on literature in her sweeping commentary on German
politics, history, geography, religion and social life. De Staël restored and updated the moral
barbarian stereotype in many respects, substituting for the demarcation between primitive tribal
societies and the superior culture, technical proficiency and civic organization of imperial Rome
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the contrast between socio-economically backward, politically medieval Germany and postEnlightenment, culturally sophisticated, post-revolutionary, but also repressive France under
Napoleon. Nevertheless, the affinities between her idealized portrait of Germany and the work of
her ancient predecessor did not escape the attention of the German poet and wit Heinrich Heine:
. . . by her praise of the intellectual life and idealism of Germany she really intends to
censure the contemporary realism of the French and the material pomp of the imperial
epoch. Her book De l’Allemagne resembles in this respect the Germania of Tacitus, who
perhaps by his apology of the Germans intended to write an indirect satire against his
countrymen.16
De Staël lauded the prevalence of Christian virtues, charity and morality in Germany,
calling it a land of “ poets and thinkers,” artistically original and intellectually honest, yet
politically naive. Just as she echoed Tacitus in her admiration for German simplicity, honesty
and marital fidelity, however, she also nurtured the convictions of her predecessors that inherent
weaknesses negated any threat that Germany might pose to the security and prestige of other
nations. Whereas Tacitus believed that Germans could be easily overcome by indulging their
vice for drink, and whereas Machiavelli noted the disunity and political particularism of
Germany that persisted in her own time, de Staël’ s argument rested largely on a stereotype of
German culture and character itself, the ingredients of which comprised a recipe for political
mediocrity: Germans indulged without restraint in abstract metaphysics and, in stark contrast to
the perspicacious French, tended to “ wrap in obscurity what was before clear.” 17 German
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impracticality and clumsiness blended anomalously with a tedious adherence to detail and an
overly serious nature, which added a somber note to the theme of self-defeatism. Even the
independence of spirit and originality that de Staël so admired in German literature seemed
incongruously hemmed in by narrow codes of social conduct and ingrown traditions of chivalry
that had spawned excessive and tiresomely pointless displays of elegant manners. She also
observed an unbridgeable gulf between idealistic men of letters and Machiavellian German
statesmen. Her assessment of Prussia’ s Frederick the Great as more French than German simply
provided the exception that proved the rule of German political incapacity or lack of
integration.18
De Staël’ s admiration for Germany found its limits in the heroic efforts of individuals
who had achieved an intellectual or artistic ascendency over the bleak confines of German social
life and climate. While she praised the high rate of literacy in Germany, and a certain freedom
from French self-adulation and the tyranny of public opinion, she deplored the boredom of
existence, the bland conversation and lack of patriotism that she found there. Despite noting
superficial geographical differences between a cold, contemplative North and a vegetative, more
sociable South, she deemed all of Germany a land of “ repose, indolence and reflection” that
offered wholesome serenity but little in the way of excitement or stimulation. The positive
qualities of sincerity, diligence and the power of reflection which she discerned in the German
character should therefore be considered within the context of her initial impression of German
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life: “ Stoves, beer, and the smoke of tobacco surround all the common people of Germany with a
thick and hot atmosphere, from which they are never inclined to escape.” 19
The German Boor
The revival of Tacitus, which satisfied a longing for historical greatness among sixteenthcentury German nobles and scholars, represented in part a reaction against a much less glorious
portrait of German life that had emerged since the late middle ages. Historian Hajo Holborn
wrote that “ gluttony and drunkenness were, according to native and foreign testimony, much
worse than elsewhere.” 20 This German reputation for excess had caused Aventinus (1477-1534)
to lament
All of the other nations speak evil of us, scolding us as a people who are no good except
in carousing and revelling . . . , and they call us the coarse, senselessly drinking Germans,
always intoxicated, never sober.21
Even though Tacitus had mentioned a German propensity for drunkenness, his revised
idealization of an innate moral sense mollified, as it had done in the first century, this image of
German unbridled revelry, which Sebastian Brandt aptly satirized and canonized in his widely
popular Narrenschiff, or Ship of Fools.22 Even amidst the implied social criticism in Brandt’ s
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work, however, the ancient characterization of innocent artlessness remained unobscured.
British literary scholar Charles H. Herford, writing in 1886, pointed out a telling comparison of
sixteenth-century German and English fool literature. In contrast to the deceitful fool of English
literature, he wrote,
. . . Brandt has his own country in view, and he gives enormous space to the riotous
sensuality for which Germany was then and long afterwards a bye-word, while he has
little to say of the subtle duplicities of which, as the patriots of the next generation
exultingly boasted, the guileless Teuton had never been accused.23
Herford drew a broader distinction when comparing German and English versions of a
derivative genre of fool literature modeled on the exploits of Frederick Dedekind’ s Grobianus,
the quintessential boor featured in a form of satire described as “ an aggressive and militant
grossness, trampling on refinement and glorifying in its own excesses.” 24 A few lines may
illustrate the point:
Both eate and drinke so much, that thou both drunke and filld maist bee,
Till when, nor rest nor quiet must be looked for of thee.
And if of hickets or of sobs thou use to utter store,
They both are signes which future vomites use to goe before.
Let not the newness of the thing seeme beastly in thine eies,
But boldly make all those which hinder thy proceedings rise,
And casting that which thy queasy stomacke not agreeth,
Return unto the table, having slightly washt thy teeth.
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And being set, take care again to fill thy belly straite,
And in the rowme of all thats gone, thrust in another baite.25
Despite being the penultimate expression of excessive behavior and bad taste, Grobianism,
through its sheer unconventionality, nevertheless stimulated nostalgia for naturalness and lost
Arcadian simplicity. From this duality Herford could infer a clear difference between English
and German sensibilities. The English version of Grobianus resembled the cynical fop, the
eccentric scholar or misanthrope who exposes the insincerity of social conventions, a concept
Herford regarded as too subtle for Dedekind’ s Germany in which he found “ a society too
intolerably natural to even affect refinement.” 26
The stereotypical German boor, initially perpetrated by German social satirists, would
adopt various guises throughout the nineteenth century, often in conjunction with figures vastly
different from the aggressively overindulgent dandy depicted in Grobianus. The stigma of obtuse
unmannerliness would be applied to German students as well as their favorite target, the
bourgeois Philister, to swaggering Prussian officers, to know-it-all professors and to German
social customs in general. The effectiveness of these nineteenth-century stereotypes probably
owed something to the freshness of Grobianism as a literary image in the late eighteenth century.
Herford described this abrupt transition:
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Some forty years after the translation of Grobianus, polite England was weeping over the
translated Werther. The typical German figure of the later eighteenth century follows
hard upon the last traces of the typical figure of the sixteenth; the master of callous
brutality and phlegmatic ill-breeding leaves the stage as the classical victim of
sentimental passion enters it.27
The fine line separating appreciation of primitive simplicity from abhorrence of primitive
crudity reveals the paradoxical nature of both the moral barbarian and German boor stereotypes,
their negative aspects featuring images of uncivilized behavior, backwardness, cruelty and a lack
of taste or refinement. Even though de Staël reintroduced into nineteenth-century Britain an
image of naive and austere Germans largely devoid of Grobian vulgarity, the stigma of German
boorishness continued to figure prominently in later national comparisons, and often implied a
laxity of character more fundamental than mere rudeness. A reference to bad manners as
“ German breeding” prompted one writer in 1840 to ponder the hypothetical case of a fly in a
glass of wine: the Italian would call the waiter to take it away, the Frenchman would remove the
fly and drink the wine, the German would drink the wine fly and all, and the English John Bull
would throw the glass against the wall with an indignant “ God-damn.” 28 Some seventy years
later Ford Maddox Ford would relate a similar tale of German gross negligence. An “ immense
drayman,” having drunk “ at one draught” a pot of ale into which some malicious pranksters had
dropped a dead mouse, wiped his mouth on his sleeve and then remarked, “ ‘A hop or a Cork!’ to
the wonder and admiration of all beholders.” 29
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Nineteenth-century British criticism of German slovenliness, gluttony, drunkenness, bad
manners, and indifference to the suffering of others seemed to extend the Grobian tradition to
society at large. “ Villages are said to be always distinguished by an extraordinary degree of dirt
and slovenliness,” wrote William Howitt in 1842, during one of his German tours. He described
the rural homes as “ often pestiferous with unsavory smells, of which the inhabitants appear
totally unconscious.” 30 The stigma of uncleanliness applied even to Berlin where “ along every
street, and before every house, even in the finest parts of the city and the neighborhood of the
king’ s palace, is a stagnant sink, which fills the whole air with its rank odor.” Howitt then
related a tale of callous indifference that exposed a sinister core of insensitivity masked by mere
surface grossness. A little boy of five or six, having been pushed into one of those fetid sinks,
began to “ cry most piteously.” Howitt continued,
It was in a crowded part of town but nobody seemed to take much notice; we therefore
asked the boy where he lived, and he showed us a little girl near his own age, who was
standing by and knitting most composedly. This he said was his sister, and he would get
her to go home with him and say how he became so dirtied, or he should be beaten; but
she kept knitting on. . . . it was not till one good man seized her sternly by the arm and
forced her along, that the little stoic would move a foot, or anything but her knitting
needles.31
Howitt remarked that this “ apathy” seemed perplexing in a people “ who in their domestic
relations and in their literature exhibited so much feeling.” Similarly, physical manifestations of
slovenliness or gluttony to some writers could betray more serious philosophical or ethical
deficiencies. German students, or Burschenschaften, for example, were considered “ a race to be
eschewed by all who had a wholesome reverence for soap and a horror for Kantian philosophy.”
30
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An obese, “ triple-chinned” German professor, whose “ small, pig-eyes peered out from under
their pent-house above a mass of pendulous and quivering cheek,” expounded a theory of racial
territorialism according to which, strictly speaking, England belonged to Germany.32
A more innocuous, if no less deplorable, image of German gluttony, laziness and
drunkenness continued to be a favorite topic into the 1890s. One anonymous writer scorned the
German Mittagessen, or midday meal, saying “ no highly-civilized nation dines heavily in the
middle of the day,” and opined that “ the Germans hold, with certain of the ancient philosophers,
that their souls are situated in their stomachs.” 33 A more detailed treatise on the German
penchant for a leisurely existence of eating, drinking and smoking graced the pages of
Gentleman’s Magazine in 1895. Some excerpts follow:
The German out-of-doors spends most of his time walking from one restaurant to
another, and always smokes: a cigar is as invariable a feature on his face as the carefullycultivated moustache; . . . Even the German workman smokes them during the many
moments of leisure which occur in his work, for he does not hurry or overtire himself; . . .
. . . The end and aim of every German expedition is the restaurant; after seeing
twenty of these establishments in two hundred yards of street, one realizes how
extensively they must be patronized. . . .
. . . The Germans have a habit of taking all their courses on one plate, which is not
very inviting, and, like Dr. Johnson, have been known to snort over their food. . . .
. . . Beer is, with the love of music, the great national characteristic, and the
methods employed in the beer-clubs, to drink as much as possible, suggest the orgies of
some of the Roman emperors. Perhaps it is due to this excessive drinking, and the smoky
atmosphere of the restaurants, that so many of the Germans have eyes which look as if
they had been boiled, and wear spectacles so much more generally than the English.34
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The gluttony of German theatre patrons became legendary. A commentator for Cassell’s
Family Magazine in 1898 described the ritual gorging between acts:
As these worthy citizens with their wives emerge from the theatre, they call loudly for
beer and various eatables, and, sitting down, commence to devour their food with
astonishing rapidity. The interval lasts but ten minutes, and they intend to make the best
use of their time. Presently a bell rings loudly, and back to our seats we all hurry, the
supper consumers finishing the last fragments of their meal en route. Several, we notice,
are still furtively munching when actually back in their stalls. After each
act— astonishing though it may seem— there is a repetition of the process I have
described. Their appetites seem positively to increase rather than diminish after each
attack upon the eatables.35
Another source commented:
A sine quâ non of every German theatre is a large foyer, flanked by cold buffets which are
piled with heaps of greasy-looking “ doorsteps” of bread and sausage amid innumerable
glasses of beer and lemonade. Every German theatrical performance is interrupted for a
twenty minutes’ interval in the middle, when the entire audience storms the buffets,
satisfies its appetite, and then solemnly defiles in procession round the foyer. It is a truly
extraordinary sight to see a smart audiance at the Opera gathered about these sandwich
counters, wolfing down “ Butterbrödchen” as if they had not had a meal for a week.36
The image of the slovenly boor complimented the concept of backward or agricultural
Germany. Berlin, often labeled a dull and uninspiring city, a “ sprawling commercial town in the
middle of a sandy plain,” and a “ provincial town” in comparison to the great capitals of Europe,
seemed an appropriate environment for the dull, indolent, self-indulgent Prussian:
Fortunately, the Prussian is an optimist who looks on his immediate surroundings
with a superb indifference. He needs little in this life and seems to expect less in the next.
So long as he can sit in a tree-shaded garden, smoke tobacco, drink lager-beer, and listen
to a band, he is perfectly happy. The stern joy of violent physical exercise he cannot
understand, preferring rather to cultivate philosophy and a portly figure. Occasionally he
is considerate, frequently he is kind. But now and again the English visitor finds himself
35
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recalling with satisfaction the answer of the schoolboy who, when asked to describe the
manners and customs of a certain tribe, laconically replied, “ These people have no
manners, and their customs are beastly.” 37
The Pious/Godless German
Superceding the legacies of ancient, mediaeval and renaissance sources, developments in
the sixteenth century would add an entirely new dimension to the image of Germany in English
minds. Before the Henrician Reformation and Protestant sectarianism established theological
boundaries, the Lutheran Reformation exerted a profound, albeit “ heretical,” influence in
England through doors opened by the Lollards, book merchants, and Cambridge scholars who
gathered at the White Horse tavern “ Little Germany” to discuss Lutheran doctrines.38 The image
of Lutheran piety and a Protestantism which “ sprang from the heart of the German race and from
that indestructible love of freedom of mind” would survive as a positive virtue of Old Germany
even at the height of the Anglo-German antagonism.39 But within the span of a single generation
following the Anglican split from Rome in 1534, the birthplace of the Protestant Reformation
became known more as a land of sorcery and diabolism. This shift in viewpoint depended a great
deal on religious fanaticism and superstition in Germany itself, amplified not a little by sectarian
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rivalry, anti-Catholicism and its reaction, and by Luther’ s own writings about portents and the
omnipresence of the devil in various guises. The worst abuses of this pathological obsession
with the occult culminated in the “ collective insanity” and debasement of law that extended
witchcraft persecutions throughout Germany into parts of Europe and beyond.40
Drawing upon the fame of Paracelsus and the Faustian legend, Germany’ s notoriety as a
place of witchcraft and demonic possession had received great impetus from the publication by
two German Dominicans of the Malleus Maleficarum or “ Witches’ Hammer,” in 1486.41 This
inquisitors “ bible,” sanctioned by a papal Bull declaring witchcraft heretical, laid the foundation
for the classical conception of the stereotypical witch found in the dramatis personae of early
English witch stories and plays.42 Herford attributed the negative shift in Germany’ s reputation
partly to a comparative loss of literary and civic prestige as England made advances in
commerce, politics and literature, even supplanting Germany as the stronghold of Protestantism.
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Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 567, mentions the marked
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He also blamed English indifference to German political history and preoccupation with a
“ literature of marvels,” prodigy collections and cheap leaflets advertizing “ Wonderful strange
Newes from Germany” full of portents, curiosities and bizarre tales of the supernatural.43 The
elements of grim reality and fantasy interwoven in tales of German diabolism that drifted into
England on a tide of frenzied Protestant piety left their mark in English minds. In the devolution
of German witch stories one could see, “ a sort of hideous travesty of the Faust motive;— the
diabolic intercourse in a more repulsive form, the supernatural powers put to a baser use.” 44
If superstition held less sway three centuries later, the association of horror and the
supernatural with Germany survived in the enormously popular neo-Gothic novel, which featured
“ dungeons of sinister castles hidden in German forests, or convents where nuns found recreation
in flogging screaming novices.” 45 Gottfried A. Bürger’ s romantic poem, Lenore, a widely read
and reviewed example of German horror and macabre imagery, went through six translations,
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one by Walter Scott, and numerous editions between 1796 and 1846.46 The story revolved
around a young girl who blames providence for the disappearance of her soldier-lover. The
lover’ s phantom appears at midnight, on horseback, to carry his unsuspecting mistress to the final
completion of their union— in the grave. De Staël remarked on the play’ s macabre imagery and
spoke of German terror as “ a relic of the northern mythology— a disposition naturally inspired by
the long nights of a northern climate.” She explained the relatively rapid decline of terror in
English poetry by comparing English with German character:
Imagination in England is almost always inspired by sensibility; the imaginations of the
Germans is sometimes rude and wild: the religion of England is more austere, that of
Germany more vague: and the poetry of the two nations must necessarily bear the
impression of their religious sentiments.47
Despite its popularity the macabre aspect of German literature also drew protests. An early
attack on German drama complained of “ the strange and preposterous partiality for the Gothic
productions of the German school; the distempered rage for the gloomy, the horrible, the
disconnected, the disproportioned, and the improbable.” 48 Nevertheless, critical objections to
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Routledge & Sons, 1929), p. 7. See also Morgan, German Literature in British Magazines, pp.
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William Preston, Edinburgh Magazine, 1802, quoted in Morgan, German Literature in
British Magazines, pp. 46-47. Preston’ s distinction between Gothic and classical literature also
weighed heavily against the Germans, “ its ponderous masses, its elaborate littleness, and
capricious profusion of ornament” standing in abject humility beside “ the sublime simplicity, the
chaste symmetry, the harmonious integrity of the Greek and Roman models . . . to which the best
modern writers have formed themselves.”
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German horror, mysticism, extravagance, sentimentality and indecency only temporarily quelled
the influx of Märchen or tales, translated “ from the German,” into England.49
By the 1890s images of witch Sabbaths at the “ haunted” Brocken served better as inspiration for English literary “ tourists” than as fodder for moralistic literary critics. Good Words
referred to this infamous peak in the Hartz mountain range as:
. . . since time immemorial the Pandemonium of Europe and the only spot which
persecuting incredulity has left to the adepts in the black art, where all the witches and
wizards of the civilised world still assemble, on May morning, to commune with their
horned Master and to celebrate under his guidance their unholy orgies.” 50
German horror, and English appreciation of it, confirmed the sixteenth-century literary tradition
of monstrosities, marvels, superstition and witchcraft persecutions associated with Germany,
which provided, as in the case of Tacitus’ s Germania, a ready reference when needed.
Given the so-called Protestant “ affinities” between England and the land of Luther, one
might search for reasons, besides literary mass appeal, why the diabolical image of Germany
persisted along with its obverse, German piety. In 1732 the idea of racial kinship, Protestant
gratitude for the German Reformation and the feeling that Germany had surpassed England in the
arts and sciences supported the argument that the English could not “ depreciate” Germans
without “ defaming themselves.” 51 This sanguine view, however, encountered resistance not only
because it went against the grain of isolationist British nationalism but also because it overlooked
some very real differences involving theological doctrine and the role of religion in the political
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histories of both nations. The importance of doctrinal distinctions, such as the strength of
Erasmian or Calvinist, as opposed to Lutheran, influences in England lie beyond the scope of this
paper.52 However, England’ s evolution from Protestant prince-worship to “ civil courage”
through martyrdom, exile and Puritan parliamentary opposition indicates a historical basis for
British antipathy to German religious institutions.53 Even thirty years before Bismarck’ s
Kulturkampf of 1870, British writers opposed to state interference with religious liberties
criticized the Prussian Evangelical Church as a “ foul blot upon the mild and paternal character”
of the Prussian government.54 Apart from such institutional and political criticisms, however,
other aspects of German religious thought and practice both fascinated and repelled English
minds.
German religious influence in England was plagued by delay, ambivalence and neglect in
a way that would later characterize the halting acknowledgment of German literature in England.
German hymns, which helped inspire English spiritual poetry, appeared in translation as early as
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The influence of Erasmus on early English humanism and the split with Luther over the
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1539, but restrictions on congregational hymn-singing delayed publication of major collections
until the eighteenth century.55 Anton Wilhelm Boehme, court chaplain of the first two
Hanoverian Georges, translated several devotional works that stimulated a brief flurry of interest
between 1706 and 1716, but a more significant religious link between England and Germany
took shape in the Wesleyan/Moravian connection. John Wesley and his brother Charles first
encountered the German Moravians in 1735 while aboard a ship bound from England to the
American colony of Georgia. Wesley admired the Morravians’ “ servile” humility, meekness and
courage, and he recorded in his journal of 25 October the reactions of his shipmates during a
storm at sea:
In the midst of the psalm wherewith their service began, the sea broke over, split the main
sail in pieces, covered the ship, and poured in between the decks, as if the great deep had
already swallowed us up. A terrible screaming began among the English. The Germans
calmly sung on. I asked one of them afterwards, “ Were you not afraid?” He answered, “ I
thank God, No.” I asked, “ But were not your women and children afraid?” He replied
mildly, “ No; our women and children are not afraid to die.” From them I went to their
crying trembling neighbours, and pointed out to them the difference, in the hour of trial,
between him that feareth God, and him that feareth him not.56
On returning to England Wesley pursued his connections with the Moravians and, with
his brother, translated and published several volumes of hymns from the German. Wesley’ s
spiritual transformation, the driving force behind the “ Great Awakening” in England, apparently
drew inspiration from the German Pietist doctrine of personal salvation by faith as preached by
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the German Moravians.57 His infatuation with the Moravians, and the religious emotionalism of
both Pietism and Wesleyanism, encouraged the acceptance in England of German literature that
possessed a “ sentimental, moralizing, didactic tendency” which appealed to the middle-classes of
both countries during the eighteenth century.58
But the Methodist/Moravian connection proved to be a mixed blessing for the image of
Germany in England. Widespread opposition to Methodism in England resulted in attacks on the
Moravians, and Wesley himself eventually split from the Moravians largely due to personal
differences with Count Zinzendorf, the sect’ s leader in England.59 In 1740 he wrote, “ Is not the
Count all in all? Are not the rest mere shadows; calling him Rabbi; almost implicitly both
believing and obeying him?” 60 Despite Zinzendorf’ s popularity among the upper classes in
London and Oxford, many objected to Moravian doctrines and practices, such as the reference to
Jesus as the “ bridegroom of the soul” in the Count’ s hymns. In Hymns extracted from the
Brethren’ s Book (1749) Wesley ridiculed repulsive imagery emphasizing the wounds of Christ,
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the so-called “ blood and wounds hymns.” 61 His rejection of the grotesque element seems to
foreshadow a British repulsion from, and grim fascination with, associations of the macabre with
German religion, as with literature, during the nineteenth century.62 William Howitt in 1842
described a German graveyard where newly made graves revealed fragments of bone, teeth and
even “ sculls [sic] nearly whole” on the surface. “ We observed at the base of the church,” he
continued, “ a large hole, descending into a vault, which had a strange appearance.” 63
Complaining that “ the love of the people for bloody imagery is here again peculiarly
conspicuous,” he described one of the wayside shrines in Germany:
In a side chapel is a red sepulchre, with all its solemn apparatus and deathly figures. In
the chapel hang various paintings, but the people flock with eager zeal to one— that of
Christ just taken down from the cross, with copious streams of blood running from hands,
feet and side. You see the people touching this blood and then kissing their hand. Not
one wound, nor one stream of gore, that they do not greedily rub their fingers on again
and again, and as often kiss them, as if they could never be satisfied.64
German mysticism and works of biblical criticism, although widely available in
translation during the eighteenth century, met with general distrust amongst the English clergy.
Many English theologians condemned Earnst Moritz Arndt’ s conception of the “ kingdom of God
[within]” as heretical, and even Wesley found distasteful William Law’ s translation and
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exposition of the works of Jacob Boehme.65 German biblical criticism, which began filtering into
England in the 1820s and 30s, brought an overwhelming negative reaction that dwarfed any
interest shown by Broad Church liberals in Strauss’ s Leben Jesu and other translations of
German theology and rationalism. The publication of Essays and Reviews (1860), a scholarly
excursus on literal historical and scientific explanations of the Bible, compiled by a group of
English theologians, triggered a firestorm of opposition that resulted in the suspension from
benefices of two contributing clerics and a declaration of protest signed by 11,000 English
clergymen. The work also met with disfavor from some prominent political figures, including
abolitionist William Wilberforce, and future Prime Ministers Gladstone and Salisbury.66 Against
the onslaught of liberal theology and “ Higher Criticism” from Germany, the Catholic Church
offered a refuge to the Tractarians of the Oxford movement led by Cardinal Newman, who
decried the dangers of “ continental infection” upon hearing that Lutheran bishops from Prussia
sought Anglican ordination. The fact that distrust of German influences coincided with a revival
of orthodox Christianity made the reaction against German theology all the more powerful and
vehement.67
Despite a long history of theological divergence, disputation and distrust, the argument
for Protestant solidarity reappeared consistently in regard to nineteenth-century Anglo-German
relations. Queen Victoria expressed her willingness to declare England sympathetic to Protestant
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Germany in the event of an unprovoked attack by Catholic France, and many, including a
majority of the English press, supported Bismarck’ s Kulturkampf against the Ultramontanes and
the doctrine of papal infallibility, at least in purpose if not in method. British ardor cooled
quickly, however, upon consideration of Bismarck’ s tyrannical tactics, fears of German
aggression against France and Belgium and, not least, pro-Irish and Catholic sentiments in
Britain.68
The mirage of Anglo-German religious affinity would ultimately shatter in an eruption of
religious chauvinism during the decades prior to World War I. The apocalyptic sense of fighting
a cosmic war between good and evil became a predominant theme in the writings and sermons of
British theologians and would result in a thorough revision of German history built on the worst
aspects of the German stereotype. Opinion held that critical rationalism had diverted Germany
from true religious faith toward a barbaric reverence for the State and an unholy glorification of
Machtpolitik, a supposition which implied a degeneracy or inherent weakness in Germans, a
childish, mechanical susceptibility to the teachings of evil philosophers (Nietzsche) and the
whims of megalomaniac rulers (the Kaiser).69 Positive aspects of the German character, such as
chivalry, piety and morality had supposedly been abandoned or corrupted in the reversion to
neopaganism.70 Such streams of invective only broadened the ideological gulf opened with
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British rejection of German devotional works, biblical criticism and metaphysical speculation on
the nature of God.
British Reactions to German Literature
Although the scope of this study does not warrant a comprehensive review of British
receptivity to German literature, historians of the subject tend to agree that recognition of
German literary achievement met with some unusual resistance in England. John Mander wrote:
“ The evolution of German intellectual life— Deutscher Geist— was seriously out of phase with
English appreciation of it, with the result that the picture remained always a little cloudy, and at
times very seriously distorted” 71 The reception of German literature in England suffered from
what Mander called “ a fatal compound of ignorance and ambivalence . . . . German piety might
be ridiculed at one moment; German ‘immorality’ the next.” This “ embryonic English reaction
to things German” revealed itself in the reaction to two popular, but diametrically opposed,
genres: works of religious piety or pastoral works, the so-called “ sentimental and moral” tale
“ from the German,” and the violently emotional Sturm und Drang creations of the Romantic
writers.72 Early enthusiasm for both types withered under the satirical blasts and ridicule of
British reviewers, and a revival of interest in Germany’ s literary renaissance had to wait at least a
decade for a reappraisal by Madame de Staël, and longer for the advocacy of Thomas Carlyle.
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Timing presented a major obstacle to the appreciation of German literature in Britain
because reasonably good translations of Märchen, or German tales, and works by Gessner,
Wieland, Lessing, Goethe and Schiller became widely available only after 1790 amidst news of
revolution in France. Moreover, a reversal of early sympathies with the revolution, as expressed
in the writings of Coleridge, Wordsworth, and political essayist William Godwin, led to a
conservative reaction, stoked by invasion fears, which associated German literature with extreme
liberalism and the questioning of authority. This incipient trend, marked by virulent attacks on
German works by British critics, contradicted the longer term reality of a Francophobic motive
for the appreciation of German literature discussed by Elie Halevy:
The French Revolution placed an abyss between the literature of England and France.
Meanwhile German literature was coming to birth, a literature of sentiment, romance and
unbridled fancy. To put the imagination to school in Germany and to compose Gothic
romances was to collaborate with the anti-Gallican and anti-Jacobin movement.73
While Francophobia did encourage receptivity to German literature during the Napoleonic Wars,
turn-of-the-century literary critics, aligned with the conservative anti-Jacobin movement in
Britain, placed the German literati squarely in the camp of the enemy. In 1799 the Anti-Jacobin
Review and Magazine launched a vicious and highly politicized crusade against the initial
popularity of German works, deploring:
. . . a glaring depravity of taste, as displayed in the extreme eagerness for foreign productions, and a systematic design to extend such depravity by a regular importation of exotic
poison from the envenomed crucibles of the literary and political alchemists of the new
German school. . . . Even an act of despotism when exercised for the purpose of rescuing
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mankind from the worse species of oppression— the subjugation of the mind to the
degrading tyranny of Philosophism— would be entitled to applause . . .74
Such extreme reactions from ultra-conservative journals wrought a noticeable change even in
some mainstream periodicals previously friendly to German literature.75 The tenor of the times
proved so unfavorable that one early Germanophile’ s literary venture, James Bereford’ s German
Museum, begun in 1800, folded after the third volume amid a barrage of scathing attacks from
the Anti-Jacobin Review.76
British receptivity to German literature followed a generally predictable pattern, with the
lion’ s share of attention and acclaim eventually going to the works of Goethe and Schiller. This
broad perspective, however, minimizes some dramatic and curious anomalies that delayed a
widespread appreciation of Germany’ s late eighteenth-century literary renaissance until
Victoria’ s reign.77 German traveler, C. A. G. Goede, after debunking the idea that English
readers were well-versed in German literature, aptly summarized the situation in England at the
beginning of the nineteenth century: “ Many English consider German literature immoral and
dangerous, but they have formed this hasty opinion on some trifling German novels, which too
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easily find their way from circulating libraries to the toilet of beauty.” 78 The lapse in appreciation
depended on more than just scanty knowledge of German and bad translations; it was also a
function of popular tastes and sentiments. Hysterical reactions followed translations of Goethe’ s
novel, The Sorrows of Werther, and Schiller’ s play, The Robbers, the chief objections to these
works revolving around questions of moral character and fears of their effect on society. Werther
drew blame as an apology for suicide, its baleful influence suspected in an often-repeated account
of the self-inflicted death of a woman under whose pillow a copy of the novel had been found.79
Schiller, like Goethe deemed a revolutionary, was denounced for making criminals heroes and
advocating overthrow of the social order.80 In 1798 the Anti-Jacobin Review published The
Rovers, an extremely popular parody of The Robbers and Goethe’ s Stella which caricatured some
of the worst tendencies in German drama and successfully initiated a wave of ridicule that
stunted early enthusiasm for German literature.81 The Rovers dealt as much with the character of
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Germans and German writers as with any specific literary abuses, and it precipitated a wholesale
condemnation of German society, the literati themselves being labeled “ men of profligate lives
and abandoned characters.” 82 English writer and moralist, Hannah More, promoting the
nineteenth-century stereotype of women as the guardians of public virtue, called “ loudly” upon
the women of Germany to oppose
the irruption [sic] of those swarms of publications now daily issuing from the banks of
the Danube, which, like their ravaging predecessors of the darker ages, though with far
other and more fatal arms, are overrunning civil society.83
But even attempts to vindicate Germany’ s greatest writers by excusing romantic excess as an
expression of German character succeeded rather in distorting the image of Germans in general:
What would be with us extravagance is with them but nature. Characters not very
dissimilar to those of Moor and Werter [sic] are not unfreqent in Germany. It is from the
state of human society in that country that the wild, terrific pathos and sublimity of the
German works of genius take their origin.84
The unfortunate fact that conservative English tastes ran to the sentimental melodramas
of August von Kotzebue must be considered yet another consequence and cause of the negative
first impression of German literature in England.85 This intense, but relatively short-lived,
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obsession with mediocrity not only deflected interest away from more substantial works, but also
served to legitimize the wave of anti-German reaction and ridicule that had quelled initial
enthusiasm. Germnaophile critic Henry Crabb Robinson scolded the editors of the Monthly
Register in a series of letters published in 1802: “ You know nothing about German
literature. . . . Kotzebue’ s and Iffland’ s plays and Lafontaine’ s novels are not German
literature.” 86 Nevertheless, a typical review of German literature at the close of the eighteenth
century expressed, at best, a polite condescension:
The German works which have faintly aspired to the name of genius have not yet been
tried by the voice of time; and such are the remaining marks of barbarism and prolixity (the
latter a most unclassical defect), that it will probably be long before Germany shall produce
a classical author, admitted like those of England, France, Spain, and Italy, into universal
fame. In short, we admire the Germans merely as disciples, but cannot venerate them as
masters; nor can candour abstain from a smile, when a German critic pronounces the
dictates of his own imperfect taste upon the works of more enlightened nations.87
Such lofty contempt for things German anticipated similar attitudes found in later articles on
national character and other subjects far removed from literature.

audiences and widespread German objections to Kotzebue’ s sentimental excesses and their effect
on the portrayal of German national character abroad. While it became generally acknowledged
that Sand acted alone, his fellow Burschen worshiped him as a “ misguided martyr” after his
execution in 1916 by the Prussian government.
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Because the admirers of German letters seem to have been much less outspoken than the
critics, caution must be exercised in judging the reception of German literature solely on the
basis of the reviews. If Crabb Robinson seems like a lone voice, however, it may reflect the fact
that some of the major writers of his generation influenced by German literature— Coleridge,
Wordsworth, Scott, Southey and Lamb— defy definition as a Germanophilic “ school.” They may
have admired Germany, as did many of their contemporaries, in reaction to France and
Jacobinism, but their German influences often proved to be superficial and their Germanophilia
only lukewarm.88 Coleridge’ s interest in German philosophy, especially Kantian, led him to live
and study for several months in Germany during the winter of 1798-9. He nonetheless found
Kant’ s moral teaching “ stoical and loveless” and rejected what he considered Goethe’ s “ blasphemous” paganism and immorality.89 While Coleridge’ s praises of German literature caught the
attention of his contemporaries, his generalizations and comments seem to anticipate much of the
criticism of the following century. “ There is a nimiety, a too-muchness in all Germans,” he
wrote in his Table Talk, “ it is the national fault.” He imputed to the Germans a moral ambiguity
and considered them not poets but “ good metaphysicians and critics: they criticized on principles
previously laid down.” According to Coleridge, German literary style was “ merely a method
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acquired by them as we have acquired a style.” 90 Such were the faint praises of one of the era’ s
foremost literary figures.
Madame de Staël’ s Germany redeemed to some extent the blackened reputations of
Goethe and Schiller and generated much popular interest in German literature. Her explanation
of the English prejudice against German literature rested principally on a difference in national
character: the Germans “ take pleasure in the ideal” while the English love “ their laws, their
manners, and their forms of worship.” “ The Germans,” she wrote, “ are to the human mind what
pioneers are to an army,” while the English have “ a dread of new systems.” 91 De Staël’ s work
inspired Thomas Carlyle, Britain’ s greatest champion of German culture during the nineteenth
century, who improved receptivity to German literature through his literary, historical and critical
writings.92 But the attraction exerted by Carlyle over his fellow Victorians partook more of a
search for religion, which he found in an eclectic conception of “ German Idealism,” than in any
deep understanding of his mentors: Goethe, Kant, Fichte and Novalis.93 Carlyle’ s hero worship
and his glorification of the Christian-feudal past appealed to the Victorian desire for salvation
from atheism, loneliness and isolation, the by-products of a modern, democratic-industrial
society.94 The fact that Carlyle had never met Goethe, his “ messiah,” and only at the age of sixty
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visited Germany, where he complained about the beds, noisy hotels and food, reveals Carlyle’ s
Germany to have been largely a product of his imagination.95 The decline of his influence, which
began long before his death in 1881, indicates not only that a Victorian appetite for eccentric, and
often bombastic, soul-searching had abated, but also possibly that the real Germany was not
living up to the ideal he had created.
Later nineteenth-century commentary on the German language and literature repeated
many of the earlier criticisms, although with less vehemence. Literary reviews and even general
articles on Germany harped on the “ awful” German language with its “ unreadable,” “ crabbed
letters,” “ plumping phrases” and “ cyclopean sentences,” or its “ clumsy” and “ antediluvian”
styles.96 But gradual acceptance of German literarature brought more benign appraisals of
German literary “ nobility,” “ purity,” “ dignity,” “ inward truth,” and “ psychological depth,” of
“ sincere,” “ free, lofty and joyful” style and “ good, true, beautiful and important” content.97
Earlier dismissal of Goethe as “ absurd, puerile, incongruous, vulgar and affected,” of German
authors as “ pathetic,” or of German literary taste as the “ vulgarity of pacific, comfortable
Burghers, occupied with stuffing, cooking, and providing for their coarse personal
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accommodations,” faded with the advent of more balanced and differentiated criticisms of a
wider array of authors.98 German writers had also gained a reputation for originality and
inventiveness, and had benefitted from a popular conception of romanticism, the “ romance that
lurks in every German heart.” 99 But resistance to crediting Germans with literary ability lingered
on into the 1890s with absurd claims such as the insistence on the Semitic origin of all talented
German writers, an assessment reminiscent of the allowance made in 1856 for the Gallic wit of
half-Jewish Heinrich Heine: “ he is as much German as a phesant [sic] is an English bird, or a
potato an Irish vegetable.” 100 A genuine appreciation of German literature did take root in
Britain, but only against a persistent reaction that had less to do with lack of appreciation than
with national prejudice. No sooner had Germany “ arrived” than the charge was leveled that all
her greatness lay in the past, and that an “ abundance of mediocrity” in the “ land of Goethe” had
brought about the “ falling off of genuine literary productions.” 101
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If the foregoing synopsis of British reactions to German letters seems overly negative, it
nevertheless exposes the critical voice that played continuously in the reviews and magazines.
Whether or not a reader of Kant or Goethe, or some popular translation, ever paused to consider
the author’ s Germanness seems less relevant than the negative summation of German national
character that gained momentum in the press. This early negativity underscores the fact that
British Germanophobia before World War I did not spring spontaneously from the soil of
diplomatic and political antagonism alone. British contempt for things German covered all
aspects of German culture from literature, religion and philosophy to social customs, education,
business and politics, each of which came under the lens of British scrutiny during the nineteenth
century. Germany’ s evolution within two decades of Bismarck’ s accession to power from
England’ s “ poor relation” into a formidable competitor for world power and market share only
increased the intensity and shifted the direction of the antagonism. Writers after 1871 began to
examine the meteoric rise of Germany closely and, according to contemporary social theory, to
conceive of the British and German Empires locked in a Darwinian struggle for supremacy, a
theme kept alive in the public imagination through popular invasion scare literature. A
remarkable continuity nevertheless existed in the opinions of writers separated by more than two
generations. The same patronizing air of grudging admiration mixed with contempt, ridicule and
moral condemnation remained, only with this major difference: the new alarmism shifted its
focus away from the deleterious effects of German “ speculative” philosophy and “ immoral”
literature onto the more “ concrete” phantoms of military invasion and economic sabotage.
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Backward Germany
The theme of backwardness permeated nearly all stereotypes of Old Germany— that is,
Germany prior to widespread recognition of literary and scholarly achievement, nineteenthcentury military victories, political unification and economic expansion. The history of witch
persecutions, the devastation and horrors of the Thirty Years War, from 1618 to 1648, as well as
the decline of the once prosperous Hanse towns, furnished a dismal picture of petty feudal tyrants
lording it over servile bürghers and backward, superstitious peasants. Economic relations
between England and Germany declined and remained depressed during the seventeenth century.
High tariffs on books, the lack of translators and the vogue of French literature, combined with a
dearth of literary output in Germany itself, conspired to stifle any great knowledge or
appreciation of German literature in England, even at a time when English writers, particularly
Shakespeare, exerted an important influence in Germany. The Hanoverian Georges did little to
remedy this situation and “ their bad manners and personal insignificance tended to develop in the
English aristocracy a certain feeling of superiority and even contempt.” 102
Longstanding indifference to German political affairs continued until 1755, when the
statesmanship and military exploits of Frederick the Great won broad English admiration and
sympathy. But British receptivity to a Germany of rising intellectual and political significance
confronted some devastating obstacles after a century of relative neglect. B. Q. Morgan has
observed:
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Reliable knowledge of the German people’ s language, culture, and ideals came slowly. It
is not surprising, therefore, that when sporadic interest in some phase of German culture
did develop, it should take the form of extravagant praise or bitter denunciation. There
was no broad, comprehensive view of German conditions, no fair standard for a
comparison or correlation of values.103
On the eve of Germany’ s late eighteenth-century literary and cultural renaissance British
knowledge of Germany remained paltry and affected by earlier stereotypical themes: the moral,
yet unrefined barbarians of Tacitus, German piety versus Faustian diabolism, the simplistic,
natural fool versus the slovenly boor, the industrious yet politically inept bürgher. These
conflicting images reflected an ambivalence toward the Germans that found expression in British
reactions to German culture.
As events in Europe during the nineteenth century turned more attention to German
politics, the unpolitical German became the dominant theme of another stereotypical duality,
especially during the revolutionary period of 1848 when fanatical students, know-it-all professors
and reactionary aristocrats posed familiar figures. The Old German image of the politically and
socially naive, rustic “ German Michael,” the antithesis of political fanaticism, would survive
even amidst the harsh glare of Bismarckian era nationalism and fears of Germany’ s growing
economic and military power. Declared as late as the 1890s to be “ typical of the views still held
by the vast majority of Englishmen on the Kaiser’ s subjects,” this embodiment of England’ s
“ poor relation” has been described as follows:
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He is a shaggy-looking scamp, this fellow, wearing an English railway-porter’ s cap, a kind
of bunchy Norfolk jacket and trousers stuffed into Russian peasant top-boots; he smokes a
long porcelain pipe, and, of course, wears blue glasses.104
During the nineteenth century the image
of “ New Germany” emerged with stereotypes of
automaton soldiers, cruel officers, meddlesome
officials, unscrupulous merchants, plodding
clerks, inept colonists, servile workers and
peasants, politically retrograde women and
degenerate children. These negative images
would serve as self-satisfying foils to notions of
British superiority and would provide
ammunition against proponents of the German
model in education, trade practices and military
FIGURE 6. The German Michael. From
Ally Sloper’ s Half-Holiday (January 18
1896), p. 19.

discipline during an era of accelerating
economic, colonial and diplomatic rivalry.

Additionally, the stigma of diplomatic duplicity and blackmail would arise from the policies of
Bismarck and his successors under Wilhelm II. These two national figures personified different
aspects of a modern yet strangely feudal New Germany, an image that, in some respects, would
be built upon the ruins of the old. By destroying the idealistic Old German image of morality,
honesty and heroism, under the pretense of revealing some horrible truth lurking within,
104
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Germanophobes could indulge in a kind of reactionary iconoclasm. Indeed, both old and new
images tended to be negative because the Old German “ virtues” always bore a taint of inferiority,
while even the most positive assessments of New Germany carried an implicit warning to either
emulate or fall prey to the new menace.
The dualistic nature of stereotypes allowed their connection with either positive or
negative imagery. Wishful thinkers entertained the moral stereotype of Tacitus and the themes
of racial and Protestant affinities despite charges of German reversion to barbarism. And while
some ridiculed German political naivete, many still stuck to a belief in Germany’ s eventual
evolution toward the English constitutional model. Some ultra-escapists simply denied the
capacity of the Germans to become a serious rival and dwelt on images of a quaint, picturesque
and backward Germany. Alarmists tended to adopt the more Machiavellian imagery of Germans
as capable and industrious but immoral or amoral. They frequently coupled these stereotypes
with the themes of inevitable war and German opposition to civilization and Christianity.
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IV. NEW GERMANY: STEREOTYPES AND CHANGING
PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANY DURING THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
Despite harsh criticism still being meted out to German writers and philosophers during
pre-Victorian decades, interest in the land and people of Goethe and Schiller did survive the
earlier onslaught of anti-Jacobin Germanophobia in Britain. In fact, the German stereotype
retained many, if not all, of the positive characteristics inherited from Tacitus which became
incorporated in the image of Old Germany, a combination of Madame de Staël’s cultivated land
of chivalric ideals, honesty and moral uprightness with the conception of Germany as England’s
poor relation, striving to be like England herself. Blackwood’s, for example, approved of this
blend of wholesome mediocrity, portraying Hanoverian soldiers as honest, sober, music-loving,
scientifically knowledgeable, and, if “ adapted . . . not for great public distinction,” leading wellmannered, pure and simple lives.1 Such conditional admiration included an admission that
Germans displayed the “ Protestant” virtues of humility, modesty, thrift and industry, combined
with more originality, less status consciousness, and a greater capacity for enjoying life than the
English.2 By the 1890s, however, even German Gemüthlichkeit, a word signifying inward as
1

“The King’s German Legion,” vol. 43 (June 1838) : 741, 743.
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“Cousins German,” Cornhill, pp. 297-98. Self-criticism centering on the English
incapacity for enjoying life compared with, for example, French joie de vivre did not impinge
upon the overriding assumption of British cultural superiority, but represented rather a price to be
paid for imperial greatness. See Gwynn, “Success of the Anglo-Saxons,” p. 354, on English
ready acceptance of a monotonous and monogamous existence.
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well as outward “ cheerfulness” or “ comfort,” which described a positive facet of the Old or
South German stereotype opposite in nature to English “ stiffness and reserve,” appeared to be
threatened with extinction under modern Germany’ s “ consciousness of new-born dignity” .3 How
this transition came about, and how German political developments gave rise to stereotypes of
German political ineptitude as a means of both preserving an air of British superiority and
projecting the worst aspects of nationalism and imperialism onto the Germans, is the subject of
this chapter.
Even before imperial rivalries developed between Britain and Germany during the mid1880s, a psychological rivalry had been played out on cultural grounds, as seen in negative
British reactions to German literature and theology. This game of national one-up-man-ship also
extended to political and social commentary as German nationalism, reform and revolutionary
movements became items of interest in British periodicals. Defining German national character
often served as a vicarious means of predicting future outcomes, particularly during the
revolutionary year of 1848 and, later, in coming to terms with Bismarckian Germany’ s transition
from the innocuous and cultured land once admired by Prince Albert and Queen Victoria toward
the Prussian model of militaristic diplomacy and efficient, but reactionary, government.
Throughout the century British writers produced a significant body of literature aimed at
exposing the “ German Mind” or “ German Character,” seen either as an inherent cause or result
of socio-economic, political and cultural realities. These excursions into “ things German”
included general descriptions of Germany as well as more specialized social commentary about
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various facets of German life. “ Touring” articles, written more in the narrative tradition of de
Staël than functional guides such as Baedeker’ s, continued to highlight the quaint and curious
features of pastoral Old Germany, but did not hesitate to register complaints about modern
developments or point out lingering areas of German backwardness amidst rapid modernization.
More specialized articles that targeted New Germany usually dealt with particular issues,
institutions or groups, either for purposes of comparison with English equivalents or to argue a
case for or against the German model. Many of the statements about German character,
however, exude a timeless quality, as if the Germans would always be of a singular nature, the
boundaries of which extended to encompass contradictions born of changed circumstances.
Biographical articles also provided a window on German character by endeavoring to discover
how famous, or infamous, individuals fit or departed from the stereotypical mold.
A new strain of Germanophobia followed political developments in Germany from the
end of the Napoleonic Wars, through German unification and the foundation of Empire in 1871,
up to the advent of World War I propaganda. Perception of Old German political incapacity and
subservience to authority receded before apprehensions about fanatical nationalism, socialism,
Bismarckian Machtpolitik and, eventually, imperial ambition. It would be misleading, however,
to present this shift from old to new as a linear progression from good to bad, or from innocuous
to menacing, concomitant with Germany’ s rise to great power status. Many demeaning traits
which constituted a mark of inferiority in the Old German stereotype remained in place. While
Germany’ s expansion in the latter nineteenth century generated new concerns and appraisals,
sometimes positive as in the case of the German educational or industrial models, the emergence
of new, disturbing stereotypical elements also evoked an idealized portrait of Germany’ s past as a
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hopeful reminder of the Germans’ “ true” nature. This persistent belief in the comfortable,
innocuous, older stereotype found expression, for example, in images of a pastoral, romantic
South versus an aggrandizing Prussian North, or a liberal Anglophilic versus a conservative
Anglophobic Germany. Such wishful thinking furnished, in a frustratingly vague way, continual
hope for Germany’ s transition toward an English-style constitutional monarchy, much as the
notion of racial kinship was touted as the basis for an Anglo-German diplomatic alliance.
However, the idealized image of pacific, pure, wholesome, Anglophile, impractical, unpolitical,
agricultural Old Germany also became the proverbial straw man behind which everything
objectionable about New Germany could be revealed and lambasted. The perceived
Prussianization of German politics, German militarism, imperial rivalry and diplomatic
blackmail presented both Liberals and Conservatives multiple rationales for alarmist
Germanophobia, which news of growing German Anglophobia at the century’ s end, and the
outrageous statements of Kaiser Wilhelm II, only served to exacerbate. To a great extent,
therefore, the idealized or innocuous aspects of the Old German stereotype represented what
British writers and readers wished to see, and the threatening or deplorable aspects of New
Germany what they feared.
The Unpolitical German
Political affiliation in Britain, while it had virtually no bearing on the use or non-use of
stereotypes, naturally gave rise to a significant disparity of opinion on Germany. British Liberals
generally entertained optimism about gradual German political evolution toward an English-style
parliamentary system, and to this end supported and praised German progressives and socialists.
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In contrast, British Conservatives usually remained skeptical of German statesmanship and
political maturity, especially in light of a rising socialist movement, and thus emphasized the
appropriateness and importance of maintaining the authoritarian Prussian monarchical system for
the Germans’ own sake. To backward-looking Conservatives Germany presented a living
tableau of a glorified feudal past, whereas most Liberals sympathized with the struggle for
freedom of England’ s “ continental cousin” against formidable obstacles born of unfavorable
historical circumstances. Germanophiles on both sides thus nurtured idealized images: the
Liberal ideal originating in a vague notion of a historical German, or Saxon, “ love of freedom” ;
the Conservative counterpart exemplified by the Prussian model of enlightened and efficient
monarchy. Despite this division, both Liberals and Conservatives could mock German political
ineptitude in the struggle against, or acquiescence to, autocratic rule, and consider Germany a
hopelessly backward conglomeration of largely anachronistic feudal states. It seems nonetheless
remarkable that conservative Blackwood’s estimations of German disunity, lack of patriotism,
political ineptitude and degradation during the 1830s and 40s would resound in the LiberalRadical Westminster and Fortnightly reviews during the 1890s and 1900s. British readers
learned once again that Germans are “ particularists by nature,” that they “ are neither by nature or
habit a political people,” that they lacked “ sound political instinct.” 4
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Early Nationalism, German Students and Dueling
Notwithstanding late eighteenth-century British anti-Jacobin Germanophobia, which
remained circumscribed within the purview of literary criticism, the first cracks in the broader
paradigm of Old German passivity and patience appeared with reports of the rise of German
nationalism after Napoleon’ s defeat. Blackwood’s review of “ Hodgskin’ s Travels in Germany”
(1820) reported that the “ ancient temper of calmness and mildness” of the German people had
given way to a “ diseased state of the public mind,” indicated by the accolades heaped on political
writers whose “ wild theories and visionary doctrines,” promulgated “ with a rashness and
wickedness,” had unexpectedly found favor “ among a nation whose habits are in general those of
good sense and moderation.” This dangerous “ fermentation” of popular discontent had arisen
from the effect of “ narrow-minded” government policy on a people “ degraded to the most perfect
indifference” to death and suffering.5 While the more Conservative, Germanophilic reviewer
generally agreed with Hodgskin as to this state of affairs in Germany, he objected to the writer’ s
denigration of the tombs of sovereigns, his unflattering opinions of German literature and
philosophy, his attack on George IV’ s Hanover policy, and what he perceived as an attempt to
portray all governments as an “ artful contrivance of tyrants” to be swept away and supplanted
with “ pure reason.” Indicative of the emotional controversy excited by divergent opinions on
Germany, which had become a laboratory for political speculation, he also blasted Hodgskin as a
“ literary esquire . . . radical traveler and Cockney philosopher,” whose limited knowledge did not
justify the “ extravagant arrogance” of his pronouncements on German life and society.6
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Liberals and Conservatives could agree, however, in their disapproval of the activities of
German student unions, or Burschenschaften, the most literal symbol of “ Young” Germany,
whose strange blend of quasi-religious, neo-feudal, revolutionary, radical nationalism certainly
appeared at odds with the idealized English model of a more secular, utilitarian evolution toward
parliamentary government.7 The liberal nationalist student movement had been suppressed under
the 1819 Carlsbad Decrees, which implemented the “ Metternich system” of strict censorship,
espionage and university supervision after the murder of reactionary writer and journalist August
von Kotzebue.8 Whether or not the murder of this once enormously popular writer prejudiced
English minds against the Burschenschaft, a significant body of opinion likely held that the
suppression of the universal Burschenschaft movement allowed German nature to return to its
“ inherent” morality and propriety.9 Descriptions of fanaticism and rowdy behavior
overwhelmed any admiration for the student corps’ patriotic spirit or defense of academic
freedom. In fact, the superficial aspects of the Burschen phenomenon as a departure from more
benign circumstances remained the focus of criticism without regard to philosophical
complexities or socio-political realities prompting Burschenschaft ideology.10 In 1824 the
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Liberal Edinburgh Review characterized the typical German student as arrogant, holding
“ ludicrously erroneous ideas of honour,” and defending only the supposed “ academic” freedoms
to act and dress contrary to custom and to “ besot himself with beer and tobacco.” Such
“ disorderly Teutonic youths” treated outsiders with contempt, lacked humility and discipline in
comparison with “ sober” British students or their own fellow German citizens, and wasted their
academic years indulging in scandalous behavior before graduating to Burghertum and
Philistinism.11 But, more importantly, from a political perspective German student activism
stood in stark contrast to the idealized image of a “ patient,” “ educated” and “ enlightened” people
deserving, but denied, constitutional concessions from an autocratic government—an image
more aptly suited to the intellectual and Anglophile Young Germany movement of the 1830s.
True to his Liberal stance, the writer for the Edinburgh scorned any “ partiality for Prussian
despotism” and denounced arguments that Germans were content to live under arbitrary
government or that they would thus be better prepared for a real constitution, seeing in delay,
rather, a cause of contention, bitterness and a spur to radical groups.12
From the 1820s onward student exemplars of Gothic barbarism were deemed excitable,
crazy, medieval and murderous and, although conceded to be “ leaders of the mobs, or the heroes
of the barricades” during the revolutionary period of 1848, were also considered “ vapouring,”
“ hot-headed,” “ fancied enthusiasts,” and the Burschenshaften regarded as “ pretty safety valves
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enough to let off the exuberance of studentic steam.” 13 This somewhat contradictory image of
German students as posturing, yet potentially harmful, juveniles survived into the 1890s, not only
in descriptions of a “ truly dangerous class” of “ superficially book-learned” individuals who had
obtained a “ sufficient smattering of letters, philosophy, economics, and science enough to make
them the readiest tools of the agitator,” but also in accounts of student dueling, where the shamcomical and threatening elements of the stereotype came together.14 Despite an early notion that
student societies, with their staunch devotion to patriotism and honor, promoted the Alt Deutsche
virtues of sincerity and strict chastity, German dueling, especially student dueling, posed a source
of frustration for German liberals and a disappointment for British Germanophiles who sought
similarities with England in the emergence of New Germany.15 From the mid-1820s, when the
Edinburgh Review and Blackwood’s reported on the commonplace occurrence of student duels
provoked on the slightest pretext, until the outbreak of World War I, a perverse fascination kept
alive in the British press what became a traditional antipathy for this curious and ominous relic of
feudal times.16
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The German student stereotype retained its suggestive power, especially when it
resurfaced during the 1890s after the youthful Kaiser Wilhelm II’ s accession to power. It offered
a convenient symbol of unbridled, irresponsible nationalism mixed with immature politics and
neo-feudal militarism, all of which seemed to prognosticate Germany’ s ominous future
direction.17 In 1893 Ludgate’s Magazine published a luridly illustrated narrative entitled
“ Student Duelling [sic] in Germany” in which the author recounted his firsthand experience
witnessing the Mensur, or ritualized sword-fight, between students. He wrote from the
perspective of an English tourist encountering the strange appearance of the many students whose
“ square, good-humored faces, . . . were so seamed across and across with sword-cuts that it was
hard to tell where the smile ended and the scars began.” 18 On the way to the dueling grounds he
recalled a conversation with one of the participants: “ ‘Lot’ s of blood let this morning,’ said a
warlike Teuton as he stuffed his mouth full of sausage. I shuddered, and took another sip of
cognac.” When he asked this “ murderous youth” his reason for fighting and discovered the
provocation to be nothing more than the rude stare of a stranger, he remarked to himself, “ What a
curious thing this sense of honour is!” and vainly tried to “ deprecate” the youth’ s “ politely
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disguised contempt” at hearing that an Oxford undergraduate in a similar situation “ would not
thirst for the stranger’ s blood.” 19 The comical elements of this grisly tale stand out in the
“ sleepy-eyed policeman,” who “ knows . . . what is afoot” (“ Boys will be boys, and if the Kaiser
and Prince Bismarck don’ t mind, why should a poor, simple Schutzmann trouble his head about
the matter?” ) and the “ inevitable and omnipresent glass of beer,” but the ghastly results of this
“ ‘quiet and gentle passage of arms’ ” reveal the barbarity of the custom. In one duel the defeated
loses “ a piece of the scalp about two inches long and one broad,” in another “ his cheek is laid
open from the upper lip to the ear, and two teeth are cut clean asunder” before the injured are
patched up by the attending doctor (“ How like a butcher he looked!” ).20
The reference to the indulgent policeman would have reminded many readers of Wilhelm
II’ s defense of the Mensuren to a meeting of German students in Bonn, May 1891, when he
stated his hope that “ the spirit which is fostered in their Corps, and which is steeled by strength
and courage, will be preserved, and that you will always take delight in handling the rapier.” 21
Referring to this imperial faux päs, Charles Lowe, Wilhelm’ s English biographer and frequent
apologist, commented euphemistically in the conservative National Review at the time that “ the
young Emperor is apt to let himself be carried away by the enthusiasm of the moment.” 22 But the
Kaiser’ s pronouncements, as well as reports of dueling deaths in Germany, received enough
publicity in the British press well into the twentieth century to reinforce the seeming ubiquity of
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what had long been seen as uncivilized, ungentlemanly behavior.23 In March of 1890, for
example, the Pall Mall Gazette reported some details of the kaiser’ s dueling edict which made an
encounter between officers permissible when personal violence had been offered without
apology, or an insult had been proffered to a lady relative or betrothed of the challenging
officer.24 In the New Review of June 1896 Karl Blind accused the German government of
impeding the reform of this “ hideous face-slashing” practice.25 The Free Review in 1897 bluntly
paraphrased the kaiser’ s military code of honor, “ ‘that the civilian has no honour to speak of, and
that it is the duty of every soldier to kill or maim that contemptible creature who dares to offend
him.’ ” 26 And while the Mensur rarely ended in a fatality as compared with duels using sabers or
pistols, which was more likely in an encounter between army officers, the fact that authority
figures, such as professors and government officials, condoned or encouraged the technically
illegal practice as a form of institutionalized violence accentuated a very clear distinction
between English and German societies.27
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Old German Passivity and Servility: 1830-48
Dueling and dueling scars among German students and army officers presented a glaring
refutation of modernity, but the apparent toleration of this “ warrior code” of conduct posed an
even greater obstacle to hopes for Germany’ s development toward an acceptable civilian
parliamentary government. Fear of the consequences of dueling on German society, both from
injustices perpetrated with impunity and from its general acceptance, which implied an inherent
civic weakness on the part of the Bürghertum, gave psychological leverage to the stereotype of
“ inbred” militarism. Despite civilian antipathy to army duels expressed by German liberals in
1848 and during the 1850s, the survival of the practice only confirmed the nearly ubiquitous
image of German political backwardness in British periodical literature.28 The pervasive notion
of German submissiveness and servility, which formed the counterpart to bullyism carried on by
army officers and students, and which represented one of the most damning consequences of Old
German passivity, affected English evaluations of Germany for most of the century.
By 1840 reviewers from opposite political poles concluded that earlier travel accounts
had yielded only a very superficial and limited knowledge of Germany and that England
remained in a state of ignorance regarding her continental cousin. But these admissions scarcely
impeded stereotyping of Germans by British writers. In a comprehensive critique of
contemporary travel literature the Westminster Review complained about British ignorance of the
“ intricacies of German politics, the state of manners, and domestic life” and yet mocked one
masses for social prestige and a more circumscribed, symbolic freedom from the state’ s
“ monopoly of violence.”
28
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author in particular as naive and deficient in her portrayal of German national character by
writing, “ even the serious Germans cracked an occasional joke at Mrs. T’ s expense . . . phlegm
itself could not resist the temptation.” 29 Blackwood’s blamed the Germans themselves for being
overlooked culturally by the “ vain” French and “ proud” British, and concluded that “ slavish
submission” to Louis XIV during the “ era of Frenchification” had bred a “ self-disowning
character” and a lack of self-respect that forced the German intellect to retire “ behind huge
fortifications of lumbering erudition and thorny metaphysics.” Madame de Staël, who only
“ blew away the mists” , and Thomas Carlyle, “ the great apostle of the Teutonic gospel,” both won
praise for acquainting the British with the merits of German literature, but runaway enthusiasm
for German culture only provoked disparagement:
. . . we will not exchange our classic Edinburgh or our titanic London for any elegant
cabinet city of a Carlsruhe, spread out in courtly elegance like a lady’ s fan, on the
foreground stiffly adorned with long Lombardy poplars, while behind some dark sombre
Schartzwald [sic], instinct with robbers and hobgoblins, frowns. The Goethe-maniac and
Kantian apostles of Germanism, may phrase as mystically as they will; we will not
exchange our British soil, where on we walk erect, for any sublime ballooning, devil
knows wither, in the crescent boat of German metaphysics. We will not admit Goethe
into partnership with Shakespeare.30
In Charles Julius Weber, author of a four-volume “ self-portrait” of his own native
Germany, Blackwood’s had found “ a brain well stored with curious scraps of book learning, such
as every German must have,” and a “ fluent breadth of wit . . . so far as a German can be witty.”
Weber described, “ methodically, as a German will,” a Germany that opened up a rich panoply of
stereotypes. He compared cheerful South Germany with the “ dreary,” “ phlegmatic” and
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melancholy North whose inhabitants, like their “ stepmother Nature” are “ serious, monotonous,
unfriendly, unwieldy, colder, more watery, more sandy . . . not cheerful, merry, and
communicative, like the sons of the southern hills—without wine, without harp and song.”
Weber’ s comments on German national character, which the Blackwood’s reviewer found
“ particularly edifying,” painted the disarming image of a kind-hearted, earnest people who
enjoyed an increased longevity due to purer morals—shades of Tacitus—and described the
typical German as “ earthy” and “ not so nimble, merry and witty as the Frenchman . . . not so
proud, whimsical and dry as the Briton; not so lazy, bigoted, and miserly as the Italian: but a
plain downright honest unpretending specimen of humanity, indefatigable, solid, quiet, sensible
and valiant.” 31
The negative elements of the Old German stereotype in Weber’ s work included “ morbid
sensibility,” superstition, pedantry, rudeness, slowness, “ lumbering heaviness,” phlegm (“ The
North German postilion exemplifies the truly phlegmatic character, . . . nothing discomposes him
so long as his pipe only smokes and his schnapps is paid.” ) and servility, “ pusillanimous
humility,” a “ dull tame submissiveness, which begot our woeful spirit of imitation, our pompous
concern about trifles, and our wonderfully low estimate of our own dignity—a very dog’ s
humility.” Servility tarnished the stereotype of the rustic simpleton or German Michael, who
“ allows himself to be kicked in the rear quietly, and then asks Was beliebt? (What’ s your will?).”
The German use of certain “ respectful” phrases in addressing titled personages allegedly
signified a “ moral debasement,” an observation indicative of the extent to which the stereotype of
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political subservience had undermined evaluations of German culture and character.32 Weber
attempted to soften these national character defects by appealing to the “ historical grandeur” of
the Teutonic race, to Germany’ s medieval prominence and Christian humility, or to her newer
reputation for intellectual superiority, erudition and scientific accuracy. For English writers, and
probably readers, however, the negative qualities of German servility, phlegm, artistic mediocrity
and political ineptitude were not so easily dismissed, because they characterized an older, more
innocuous Germany that entertained no pretense of rivalry with allegedly superior English
culture.
Within the paradigm of German political backwardness and inertia, German heroic
resistance to French domination seemed in retrospect to be an anomaly. Napoleon’ s occupation
therefore supposedly benefitted Germany, not only by breaking up the Holy Roman Empire and
removing an obstacle to national self-determination, but also because loose, dull and heavy
Germans needed bracing, sharpening and spurring— they wanted a soul, something the English
and French already had. Seven years of Napoleonic tyranny since the Battle of Jena in October
1806 had served to “ regenerate national pride in response to French vanity.” By God’ s grace the
“ instinct good in human nature . . . burst the clogs and bandages of hereditary baseness.” “ One
leap brought the Prussian people from the lowest depth of baseness to the proudest pinnacle of
heroism. . . . every vulgar jäger in a green coat was a hero.”
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British reactions to German political developments during the first half of the nineteenth
century appear to have imbibed the spirit of anti-Jacobin hysteria and ridicule that had initially
greeted German literary accomplishment at the close of the eighteenth century. Support for the
“ mild and paternal character” of the Prussian government accompanied distrust of “ subversive”
revolutionary ideas and movements simmering in Germany during the 1830s and 40s.34 This
attitude was based on the idea that German particularism and disunity, despite a developed
cultural and ethnic sense of nationhood, had bred an indifference to “ executive affairs” and
political realities. Social quietism, combined with “ intellectual restlessness,” a peculiar passion
for “ metaphysical and fantastic subjects” and a “ propensity to theorize, not merely beyond, but in
utter neglect and contempt of experience,” had supposedly created a dangerous condition in
Germany.35 An infectious enthusiasm for ideas among Germans steeped in “ immense erudition”
and “ pedagogism,” if invested in revolutionary ideologies and put into practice, could potentially
upset the “ equilibrium of the social and moral order” and disturb the “ uniform course of
progressive improvement and prosperity.” 36 The double irony of German political incapacity
producing unempirical philosophy or literature tainted at its source, which in turn could
propagate political fanaticism, underscores the key importance of the unpolitical German
stereotype in establishing a perspective on political developments in Germany. Due to the
premium placed on national character, uncertainties and misgivings regarding the Germans
seemed to amplify the specter of menacing and portentous political changes in Germany,
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especially when measured in opposition to an idealized English pragmatism and model of
political development.
Unrevolutionary Germany: 1848
The stigma of German political ineptitude, defined so thoroughly by the 1840s with
various pronouncements in Blackwood’s about German political degradation, disunity,
indifference and lack of patriotism, came to full fruition in reports of revolutionary activity and
the convocation of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848. Still the predominant source of information
in the monthly magazines on German political developments, Blackwood’s mockingly lamented
the lost glories of “ old Father Rhine,” who, despite his “ conceitedly-vulgar airs” and “ overrated
allurements,” yet retained a “ spurious halo” of kindly reminiscences for the English tourist, but
who had lately been despoiled by Young Germany in its “ revolutionary frenzy” of the “ charm of
foreign bustle and movement.” The unfortunate fact that Germany had followed France’ s lead
and caught the “ St. Vitus of revolution” created a problem for English tourists:
Since Germany, with its newborn cry for imperial unity, has appeared inclined to turn
back again, in new revolutionary spirit, to old feudal times, the Rhenish hotel-keepers
seem to think that they ought to appear in the characters of the old robber-knights.37
Besides encountering formerly “ active and obsequious” waiters, now growing fat and
“ pale with ill-humour at their diminished trinkgelder,” the English traveler, according to
Blackwood’ s, might well wonder at the “ bombastic and unpractical dreams” of German scholars,
“ children as they may be in political life,” pursuing the “ ill-defined idol . . . of German unity,” or
at the “ general herd of men,” like a “ flock of sheep” — or “ pack of wolves” — taking up the
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insane cry of over-enthusiastic students for a united Germany. The “ long-pretended spirit of
romance” in Germany seemed to be giving way to the pretense of “ symbol-loving” Germans,
fond of “ parading the dress” of revolution and the “ ostentatious display of the new-old imperial,
so-called national cockade, the red, black, and gold colors of the old German Empire.” The
events of 1848 represented, from Blackwood’ s perspective, an aberration or a “ drunken fit” of
revolution and a departure from the old Germany of “ patriarchal” and “ peacefully disposed”
cities— more specifically, from the once contented serenity of conservative South Germany. It
supposedly followed that, despite the “ rude, ready eloquence” of some individual speakers, the
Germans, “ proverbially vague in their philosophical theories, . . . show themselves still more so
in their political views.” 38
In a second article appearing only two months later, Blackwood’ s reconfirmed the
observation that quiet Germany had embraced anarchy. Radicalism was in vogue in Frankfurt
and in Cologne, “ always a nest of rascality and filth, where ” the writer found “ miscreants in
blouses, belching out their unholy hymns of revolution” and the manners of the people, under the
influence of irresponsible demagogues, to have become “ rude and ruffianly in the extreme.” The
article summarized the political situation in Germany: the Rhenish states, swayed by France and
revolutionaries with the help of “ expatriated journalists and crack-brained political poets,” had
granted constitutions by the score, while Prussia, whose policy “ has always been of the most
tortuous and deceptive kind,” had affected liberalism in order to distinguish herself from Austria.
The public address delivered on 18 March 1848 by the Prussian king Frederick Wilhelm IV, who
“ remained true to his original character of charlatan,” stood as a singular testament to “ royal
38
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confidence in public sottishness and credulity.” Germany’ s leading democrats, “ however wild in
their principles,” were credited with seeing through this ruse, but they had become distracted
from their primary goal of establishing democratic freedoms and fixated instead upon the “ dim
phantom of German unity.” 39 The Frankfurt Parliament, described as a “ motley assemblage”
whose countenances “ were generally mean and vulgar, and in some cases absurdly bizarre,” was
filled with “ incapable” politicians with “ wild and crude ideas,” uncomprehending bürghers and
merchant “ fattened on tobacco and beer,” “ crazy students in their medieval garb,” professors and
the stereotypical “ recluse scholar . . . proverbially a man unfit to manage his own affairs.”
Revolutionary excesses, such as the brutal murder of Prince Felix Lichnowsky at the gates of
Frankfurt by a “ cowardly and rascal rout,” were condemned and likened to another atrocity of
that fateful year, namely “ the unexampled abomination of Christian men adopting
cannibalism, . . . as was the case not a month ago at Messina!” As to the Assembly and German
political aspirations: “ Heaven help the idiots! [W]hat would they be at? They have got all
manner of constitutions, liberty of the press— though there is not a man in Germany who could
write a decent leading article— and a great deal more freedom than is good for them already.” 40
While the “ ludicrously tragic” drama of 1848 and its aftermath continued to be attributed
to the intransigence of Frederick William IV and a “ tyranny of professors” acting as state
functionaries, the idea also persisted that the reflective character and passivity of the Germans
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themselves contributed to their own political deficiencies.41 Despite earlier charges that German
speculative philosophy had bred a contempt for sober inquiry and created an un-Christian,
egotistical and godless contempt for authority in a generation of Germans that sought change
through violent revolution, the perception endured that incapacity for political revolution itself
distinguished Germany from France and England.42 An 1898 retrospective in the Review of
Reviews characterized the events of 1848 in Germany as a revolution that “ stood still before
thrones” and reiterated the common theme that the German “ revolution” bore no resemblance to
the great historic revolutions of 1640 and 1688 in England, or those of 1789, 1830 and 1848 in
France.43 The attribution of Germany’ s still-born revolution primarily to the German’ s
unpolitical nature tended to gloss over many real political factors.44 German political retardation
was also considered a result of historical circumstances, such as political disunity, particularism
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and lack of centralization, that impeded the adoption of British-style civil liberties, ministerial
responsibility and parliamentary government. The weak imperial system that preceded attempts
to achieve political liberty had allegedly allowed petty kings and princes, “ neither fearing God
nor regarding man,” to flourish under an amorphous and chaotic regime headed by an impotent
Emperor. These grim realities, plus the depredations of war and foreign invasion, the cowardice
and incompetence of their own rulers, were believed to have left the German people “ destitute till
quite recently of any feeling of nationality.” 45 In 1901 the Spectator blamed the “ utter lack of
German public spirit” during the previous century on “ generations of incoherence” stemming
from centuries of existence as a mere “ geographical expression” and “ shadowy Imperial power”
prior to German unification. New Germany dominated by Prussia and “ hypnotized by the
generations of Hohenzollern influence,” had still not made significant strides politically since the
events of 1848 and 1870.46
New Germany and the Old Stereotype
The Germany that arose within twenty years after the wars of unification to new heights
of military, economic and industrial power caused a realignment of the old stereotype. At midcentury Germans could be pejoratively labeled “ conservative agriculturalists” and accused of
leading dull, unchanging, inland existences which made them non-commercial and impractical,
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given to reflection and intellectual endeavor— qualities that, when combined with the constant
threat of foreign invasion and consequent necessity of a large standing army, were believed to
have bred an “ unresisting obedience” to authority.47 By the 1890s, however, German industrial
advances had largely relegated the “ agricultural” label to descriptions of quaint, rural areas,
forcing the once broadly applied image of “ backwardness” to become more narrowly focused on
German politics and social life. In June of 1897 the Contemporary Review published an article
by a writer under the pseudonym of “ Germanicus” that summed up the British Liberal view of
German political life during the Wilhelmine Era:
The Germans have not yet had their 1688, nor their 1789; and we cannot believe that they
will be spared the experience of England and of France. The literary Golden Age in
Germany also arrived a century later than the similar epochs in the two Western European
countries. Notwithstanding Sadowa and Sedan, notwithstanding their superior chemical
industry and their Röntgen rays, the Germans, as a political body, are a hundred years
behind the English or French nation. They boast of a Constitution, a Parliament, and all
the other paraphernalia of modern government. But the Emperor nevertheless considers
himself the master, just as James II. did.48
Contrast the above quotation with a more Conservative, apologetic view expressed five
years later by Charles Lowe in Pall Mall Magazine, in which he attempted to dispel the notion of
Germany “ Under the Iron Heel” of an autocratic Emperor by distinguishing the Kaiser’ s more
limited powers as “ little more than a figure-head” of the German Empire from his political
powers as King of Prussia. Lowe explained away apprehensions about the “ patriarchal
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opportunities which present themselves for the assertion of his imperious character,” claiming
that the Kaiser’ s authority was checked by the Prussian constitution which “ secures a very large
measure of political power and personal liberty to the people— quite as much as is good for them
in the peculiar circumstances of their geographical and military position as a ‘besieged fortress’
in the centre of Europe.” 49 The conservative, pro-monarchical stance was spelled out by
Blackwood’ s in 1890 when it called the Prussian crown “ one of the best governments and purest
administrations in the world,” and praised Frederick Wilhelm IV, despite his “ mental state
bordering on insanity,” for rejecting the proposals of the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament which would
have made the monarch a “ slave to triumphant democracy.” The monarchical imposition of a
constitution had preserved the German “ conservative character” and “ profound notions of duty,”
which had been imbibed from the philosophy of Kant and the poetry of Schiller. These had
imparted distinct competitive advantages for a German Empire, “ safer in the hands of the
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powerful and prudent administrators.” 50 The Quarterly Review in 1891 advanced a similarly
undemocratic line of political Germanophilia in a eulogy of the Hegelian ideal of state interests
superceding individual rights, which in Britain could have been
. . . nearly represented by the English Court . . . before the authority of the Crown had
been annihilated, the House of Lords reduced to the shadow of a great name, the House of
Commons turned into an auction mart, . . . trading upon passions and prejudice of a
populace incapable of understanding even the rudiments of the questions whereof it has
been constituted the supreme arbiter.51
Germany, that “ noble and puissant nation,” ruled by “ true kings of men” who were instilled with
an “ organic morality,” who commanded a “ patriot army” and who presided over political
institutions that “ offered orderly expression to popular sentiment” and guaranteed “ a rational
amount of individual freedom,” stood as a “ bulwark of law and order” amidst a Europe of
peoples given over to “ anarchy and self-government by the basest.” 52
Conservatives by no means monopolized positive appraisals of the German government
that either admired what was good for the Germans or what made Germany a powerful imperial
rival. In April 1899 the Liberal-Unionist Nineteenth Century published an article by Charles
Copland Perry in which he advised Britons to reassess their antipathy for German political
institutions and modify their attitude of “ lofty superiority” and “ amused contempt” toward
Germany. He summarized the typical British attitude as follows:
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. . . Germany is simply a country which, for reasons best known to itself, keeps a very
large army, possesses a good many autocratic and boorish officials, which has once or
twice, in the person of its Emperor, had the impertinence to interfere with our own affairs
and which persists in flooding our labour-markets with cheap clerks.53
Perry argued that Anglo-German “ differences of conception and character” derived from
historical causes: insular Britain advanced through prosperity, war-ravaged Germany through
adversity. He insisted that the “ paternal” government, which “ moves our pity and contempt,”
originated from a sense of personal responsibility on the part of Germany’ s rulers for the purpose
of implanting “ the conception of obedience, discipline, duty, simplicity of life, and moral
responsibility” in German minds. He considered the British system, in comparison, to be
plagued by “ continually shifting authority that tends to deaden the sense of moral responsibility”
in British leaders. Perry held that paternalism offered distinct practical imperial advantages over
the “ fatalism” of democracy, through which “ humanity and reason are so often sacrificed to the
fetish of individual liberty, that the vital interests of the many are at the mercy of the few.” But
he also regretted the “ transparent hypocrisy of regarding the collective ignorance of the many as
the omniscient voice of Providence.” 54 In the Fortnightly Review of May 1895, William Harbutt
Dawson acknowledged that pre-Bismarckian Prussia, though lacking real civic or political
freedoms, was benevolent despotism or “ patriarchalism in its best form,” with “ tolerable, and
even good” laws and an “ efficient and honest” bureaucracy. Dawson admitted only the remotest
possibility, however, that the antiquated system preserved under Bismarck’ s reactionary
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supervision would ever be overturned by a Liberal majority in the Reichstag or by revolution.55
Tempered praise for Prussia’ s “ incorruptible bureaucracy” sometimes rested on the racial
argument that German “ Caesarism” differed from its endemic Latin counterpart only because it
was antithetical to Teutonic, or German, character.56 Racially-based Germanophilia, however,
often played into the hands of Germanophobes because assumptions about the “ German spirit of
thoroughness,” or the “ immense vitality of the Teutonic stock,” made the observation that
Germany possessed “ the most efficient national directory in the world” more a cause for concern
than a mark of praise.57
British magazines from the mid-1880s through 1914 tended to reduce Germany’ s internal
political struggles and competing economic and social class interests down to a formula pitting
overbearing and burdensome government against civic weakness, an interpretation which made
the German people appear politically indifferent, apathetic or childish. In 1890 the Saturday
Review wrote that Germans “ know perfectly well that their votes will not, in all probability, be
followed by any serious change of government,” and that “ the peculiar relations of the German
parliament and the German Crown enable Germans . . . to play at opposition and fronde.” 58 The
source of the German political malaise was believed to have sprung from blind veneration of the
Hohenzollern dynasty, “ an ecstatic and mystic religion” and a “ species of fanaticism which is
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without a parallel in history.” 59 In 1893 the Fortnightly Review echoed these sentiments, stating
that parliamentary institutions “ are not founded in the hearts of the people” and “ the German
people play at parliaments,” that Bismarck had established the “ kingly principle” in German
public life, and that Wilhelm II was attempting to make the government the arbiter of German
consciences by making the emperor into a pope.60
In contrast to the undisputed, if unscrupulous, political savvy of Bismarck, Wilhelm more
easily fit the unpolitical German stereotype with the added imprimatur that his “ want of real
political capacity is coupled with the most energetic self-confidence known to mankind.” 61
During a brief honeymoon period after the removal of Bismarck in 1890, the Kaiser’ s new
government presented a “ favourable” prospect and hopes ran high for an end to heavy-handed
government and press manipulation. But revelations of Wilhelm’ s “ extremely autocratic” nature
quickly reversed earlier optimism.62 To many, Bismarck’ s dismissal itself and the Kaiser’ s
failure to wean German workers away from socialism through appeals to their patriotism
presented ample proof of his political incompetence. Writers more frequently criticized
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Germany as an “ over-administered” nation, staffed with servile officials and dominated through a
“ Philistine” and “ ridiculous” inspired press, whose fulsome praise of the government “ reeks of
the gutters of ancient Byzantium.” 63 Little hope for change was foreseen by those who
considered German national character to be “ essentially conservative.” Leisure Hour in 1894
concluded that “ in spite of the humane and ideal bias of the German character, there is no country
where there is less hope that any reform will be put into action. The Germans are still, as they
always were, pure theorists.” 64 Germany was described as a land where “ the feudal system still
obtains,” and where the German constitution “ admits of both absolutism and a Parliament, and
public opinion is not strong enough to shake off the old fetters of subservient obedience.” But
regional diversity within Germany itself also hinted at the possibility of “ political surprises” in a
nation where “ party contests are rife.” 65 Despite this apparent contradiction, and muted
admiration for the “ peculiarity of local patriotism” and the alacrity with which Germans
volunteered for unpaid public office or municipal service, the monolithic stereotype of German
political ineptitude and indifference prevailed.66
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The diversity of political parties in Germany did not dissolve the stereotype of political
incapacity. There was “ no Mr. Gladstone” as chief of the opposition in a political system that
seemed “ vague and formless” except for imperial authority.67 German Progressives, although
generally admired, appeared weak and ineffectual against the fanatical obstructionism and
tenacity of the Conservative agrarians, or Junkers, and the protectionist “ tergiversation” of the
National Liberals.68 The German Center Party appeared to consist of backward, bigoted and
small-minded “ enemies of a really free movement” in a system regarded as a “ caricature of
genuine Parliamentary government,” and Social Democrats, despite some acknowledgment of
pragmatic political opportunism, were criticized as doctrinaire Utopians, chasing the “ grandiose
dream of a socialistic paradise.” 69 German women were not spared criticism, despite sympathy
for their plight in a nation where they allegedly endured a status akin to beasts of burden.
Though educated to a “ higher standard of mere book-learning,” than English women, German
women could boast of no Jane Austen, no George Eliot, no Miss Braddons or class of
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fashionable women of the world.70 Neither the image of the domestic haus-frau, for which the
German Empress herself posed as the royal model, nor the stereotypical flaxen-haired, blue-eyed,
angelic Gretchen approached the Englishwoman’ s interest in female suffrage or social work.71
Criticism of the German newspaper press usually emphasized either its lack of political
content or its pro-government and Anglophobic bias. Although praised as well-written, highminded and patriotic, German newspapers contained no letters to the editor— no “ voices from the
crowd” — and therefore could not be relied upon to arouse Germans from the torpor of political
apathy (“ a stone which cannot easily be set rolling” ).72 Many newspapers were counted as ready
tools of a paternal government. The repressive Lèse-Majesté laws, which allowed prosecution of
journalists who criticized the Kaiser or his government, redeemed to a great extent the
reputations of martyred German journalists in British publications normally accustomed to
condemning journalistic toadyism or reacting to German Anglophobia.73 In 1895 the
prosecutions of Social Democrat leader, Wilhelm Liebknect, and Dr. Hans Delbrück, editor of
the Preussische Jahrbücher, were considered “ absurd” and “ childish,” symptomatic of the
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“ young mad cap on the throne.” 74 In 1898 British magazines also mocked the sentencing of Herr
Trojan, editor of the satirical Kladderadatsch, to two months in prison for publication of his
“ Mailed Fist” cartoon ridiculing the Kaiser’ s statement that a good Prussian soldier must also be
a good Christian. The cartoon represented Alexander the Great, Leonidas, Napoleon I and “ that
scoffing Voltairean, Frederic the Great, listening with amused contempt to the Kaiser’ s
dictum.” 75 Despite the fact that the Review of Reviews regularly reproduced cartoons from
German satirical magazines, such as Simplicissimus and Kladderadatsch, a general impression of
the German press as either politically indifferent or subservient persisted.
In June and July of 1907, in the aftermath of a flurry of journalistic hostility referred to as
the Anglo-German paper war, the Contemporary Review reported on the visit of some English
journalists who commented on the state of affairs in Germany. Although united in the hope and
belief that Anglophobia had waned and that Germany sought better relations with England,
writers differed significantly in their assessments of German politics and potential diplomatic
outcomes. The milder appraisal reaffirmed the old stereotype of German blind allegiance to the
whims of an earnest and energetic government; the more worrisome appraisal interpreted
Germany’ s “ domineering ambition” and policy of the “ mailed-fist” as the will of the people.76
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Anglo-German rivalry and the problem of German Anglophobia had made judgements about
German political ability seem like an empty exercise.
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V. IMPERIAL RIVALRY AND DIPLOMATIC ANTAGONISM
The various Anglo-German rivalries which developed during the latter nineteenth century
significantly affected British conceptions of German character because stereotypes often
devolved from, and presented explanations for, Germany’s perceived historical role on the world
stage. During the mid-1880s, as Germany acquired territories in West Africa, British writers
also began to recognize Germany’s challenge to British industrial supremacy. Germany appeared
to be a formidable competitor, poised on the opposite shore of the North Sea with the world’s
largest army. The old stereotype of Germany as Britain’s inferior racial cousin could only
provide weak assurances that the Germans would come to their senses and restore the natural
order of things by relinquishing their aspirations to world power; otherwise, Germany would
upset the balance of power and lead the world to the brink of catastrophe. The answer to the
question of “Who are the Germans?” was largely a moral one which depended upon the
questioner’s point of view. Many writers dealt with the threat of imperial Germany by drawing
national comparisons, such as British versus German colonial administration or trade practices,
and then extrapolating perceived differences toward a broader comparison of British and German
character within the over-arching context of an ethnic/racial hierarchy.
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Anglo-German Colonial Rivalry
The advent of German colonial rivalry, joining Belgian and French, became a thorn in the
side of British imperial pretensions, a development foreseen by Bismarck who had been reluctant
to embark on an expansionist course. German incursions into the hinterlands of East Africa, for
example, and intrigues involving the Sultan of Zanzibar within Britain’ s perceived sphere of
influence, brought forth reactions in the press to the British government’ s apparent complacency
in defending its own interests. With the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 the Germans gave up
claims to Uganda and Witu on the East African coast in exchange for Heligoland, a small island
in the North Sea near the mouth of the Elbe of no strategic importance to Britain. The frontiers
of German and British East Africa were also extended west of Lake Victoria to the Congo State.
The agreement, which actually settled territorial disputes in East Africa to Britain’ s advantage,
was disparaged as a “policy of surrender” and “a melancholy monument erected over the grave of
our lost opportunities.”1 But the perception that Germany worked at cross-purposes to British
interests in Africa came to the fore when German protests cancelled a provision of Britain’ s
Congo Treaty with King Leopold that in 1894 had leased a strip of land adjacent to the German
East African frontier to Britain, thereby frustrating the long-cherished imperialist dream of a
Cape to Cairo railway. This development signified the Wilhelmine government’ s more openly
confrontational policy since Bismarck’ s dismissal in March of 1890.
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V. Lovett Cameron, “England and Germany in Africa,” pt. 2, Fortnightly Review 48 (July
1890) : 129. In a postscript to the article, which was written before the agreement was signed,
the Fortnightly’s editor regretted not having been able to “substitute congratulation for criticism”
of Britain’ s “humiliating capitulation.” (pp. 163-4). See also “Progress of the World: The AngloGerman Agreement,” Review of Reviews 2 (July 1890) : 5.
165

The most revealing facet of British opposition to German colonial expansion in East
Africa appears in its focus on national character. Reviled as an arrogant and acquisitive parvenu,
Germany was taken to task for imitating the “ methods of the cuckoo” and acting like “ a dog who
leaves his own plate of dinner before he has begun, to seize the dinner on another dog’ s plate.” 2
The fear that Germany was bent on “ the humiliation and the spoliation of England,” compounded
by a belief in the German national characteristics of perseverance and patience, actually
galvanized British imperial ambitions.3 Writers condemned German methods and motives and
criticized British complacency:
There is a large unoccupied uncoloured space on the map between Angola, the Zambesi,
and the Congo Free State which she might explore and settle and paint Prussian blue if
she has any stomach for the adventure. But as a rule the work of opening out new country
is not to her taste. It is so much more easy and pleasant to leave that to Englishmen, and
when they have overcome all the difficulties and dangers that await the first explorers and
settlers, to walk in after them and turn them out either by force or by negotiation, the
latter method as a rule being preferred, as it is found by experience to be the less
troublesome and more efficacious of the two.
In surveying the negotiations between England and Germany as a whole, one is
struck by three things: the impudence (it is a strong word, but no milder will serve) of the
claims made by Germany, the humbleness, not to say subserviency of England in the face
of those claims, and the evidence of a feeling, perhaps quite unconsciously betrayed by
Lord Salisbury, that England is unequal to the burden of empire.4
Opposition to the Anglo-German Agreement also focused on the moral consequences of handing
2000 Heligolanders “ over to the tender mercies of German militarism.” 5
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Much of the opposition to German colonial expansion relied on the same moral
arguments used to justify Britain’ s imperialist ventures: only Britain could be trusted to ensure
the abolition of slavery and fulfill “ white man’ s burden,” the responsibility to civilize native
populations. British writers accused Germany of “ plunder” and “ outrage” in dealing with native
populations, and of concluding unscrupulous and “ valueless” treaties with native chiefs. “ Such
are the methods of Dr. Peters for introducing German civilization in British territory,”
commented Blackwood’s on the exploits of German colonial propagandist and explorer, Karl
Peters.6 The German presence in East Africa and Zanzibar, and the “ truculence of German
officials and adventurers” described as “ masterful, domineering, and using the language of
conquest,” drew blame for inciting native uprisings and interfering with British efforts to
suppress Arab slave-trading in the region.7 The Pall Mall Gazette reported on the positive
reaction to the Anglo-German Agreement in Zanzibar:
. . . the foreign residents received the news of the English protectorate with the
greatest satisfaction, as they feel sure commerce will increase. The English are
popular, whereas the Germans frighten the Africans, displease the Europeans, and
terrorize the Arabs. The German residents are greatly disappointed.8
On 15 September 1890, the Daily Telegraph broke the “ startling news” that the German
administrator in Bagamoyo on the German East African coast had published an official notice
allowing open trading of slaves and the recovery of runaways.9 The scandal attracted widespread

6

“ German Aims in East Africa,” Blackwood’s 147 (May 1890) : 702, 700, 705, 690, 693.

7

Harold A. Perry, “ Traditions of German Colonization,” Macmillan’s Magazine 62 (June
1890) :120; Cameron, “ England and Germany in Africa,” p. 140.
8

Pall Mall Gazette, 26 July 1890, p. 5.

9

Daily Telegraph, 15 September 1890, p. 5.
167

condemnation, particularly in the Liberal press, which prompted an unconvincing denial from
the German Foreign Office. German officials sought to palliate the action as merely a sanction of
the status quo and as an assertion of Germany’ s protectorate rights to follow a “ cautious
approach” toward abolition in lieu of the Sultan of Zanzibar’ s emancipation decree, which was
issued under the British protectorate.10 Attempts by the German government to extricate itself
from this public relations morass only fed Germanophobic opinion, even though the German
suppression of Arab slave-trader insurrections received some recognition.11 Germany stood
“ disgraced before the civilized world” for abrogating the anti-slavery provisions of the 1884
Berlin Conference and the 1890 Brussels Act, and, worse yet, for allowing the infidel Sultan to
voice complaints about European hypocrisy.12 In 1890, before the full flowering of AngloGerman antagonism, the Daily Telegraph expressed a mixture of moral outrage and sympathetic
Germanophilia in regard to the slave-trade scandal:
It is deplorable, not only on moral grounds, but because nothing is more eminently
calculated to wound the feelings and ruffle the susceptibilities of Englishmen than any
encouragement of such a vile and infamous trade on the part of a nation for which they
entertain sincere esteem, regard, and admiration.13
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British criticism of German colonial policies persisted and increased in severity during
the 1890s. In 1897 the Saturday Review charged that German importation of arms and
ammunition had “ renewed and re-inspired” the slave trade and imperiled the lives of
missionaries and traders. In addition, German atrocities, such as the flogging of women, and
Germany’ s proneness to tyranny had allegedly stilted German colonial development.14 Kenneth
Mackenzie has remarked on the chorus of dissent against German colonial methods in the British
press and the consensus that Teutonic cruelty was largely to blame.15 Not only was the
humanitarian issue concerning the treatment of native populations a major concern, but also at
stake was the success of European colonialism and imperial enterprise.16 In 1892 Robert Louis
Stevenson committed to print a litany of charges alleging German abuse of Samoan natives and
official attempts to suppress the reporting of native grievances. While Stevenson did not
completely exonerate England’ s record of dealing with native populations, he peppered his
criticism of German methods with comments about German “ touchiness,” secrecy and other
national traits that clearly marked the Germans as intrinsically ill-suited for colonial rule.17
Indeed, the whole concept of German colonialism was deemed suspect, having supposedly grown
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out of a far-fetched, whimsical Hohenzollern tradition of piracy and land-lubbing failure
resurgent in the fantasies of the “ young Caesar,” Kaiser Wilhelm II.18 In a very short time,
however, Germany had evolved from an upstart colonial rival to an imperial menace. German
colonial rivalry, which in 1890 had seemed to be motivated by envy and a policy of harassment,
had became a sinister attempt to “ stab England in the dark,” and a plot to convert South Africa
into a German-Dutch colony.19
Economic Rivalry
Anglo-German trade rivalry in the press followed much the same course as colonial
rivalry. By 1897 Germany became England’ s “ most dangerous rival,” accused of counterfeiting
British commercial marks and flooding England with cheap articles “ Made in Germany.” 20 The
German economic “ peril” to England, an imaginary fear because of mutual trade benefits,
seemed to be rooted in the German capacity for plodding industry and enterprise.21 Every
positive model of German economic success, however, was accompanied by criticism of German
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immoral methods and trading practices which constituted a form of parasitism.22 Germans, who
were labeled “ shopkeepers, always; merchants never,” supposedly produced cheap, inferior
wares to be sold through enterprises that were “ bounty-fed, and existing only by subsidies and
the sweat of mankind.” 23 The caricature of the German clerk as an invaluable commercial
weapon in the Anglo-German trade war carried with it the conviction that his acceptance of a low
salary for an unrewarding job was the result of an oppressive political and economic system.24
The Diplomatic Antagonism
The Anglo-German antagonism cannot be linked to any direct territorial conflict such as
arose between England and France during the colonial and Napoleonic wars, or between England
and Russia during the Crimean War. More often than not, England found itself allied, though not
always formally, with Austria and Prussia against any expansionism that threatened the European
power balance and its own strategic interests. No real cause for Anglo-German antagonism
existed until Bismarck took up the reins of diplomacy in Prussia. In February of 1864, the
sixteen year dispute between Denmark and Germany over the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the
duchies of Schleswig-Holstein culminated in the invasion of Jutland by Prussian forces. Even
though Britain, since the days of Palmerston, had acted as a technically neutral mediator in this
quarrel, the sudden transfer of 300,000 Danes to German rule stung British ambassadors with a
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feeling of diplomatic impotence. Despite Queen Victoria’ s pro-German sympathies, the Danish
Wars set off a public reaction in Britain that revealed an impulsive and irrational anti-Germanism
through displays of animosity which usually exhibited a complete misunderstanding or ignorance
of the complexities of the situation.25 The Schleswig-Holstein issue remained a bone of
contention in the history of Anglo-German diplomatic relations that nationalists on both sides
could exploit.26
The Danish Question also perpetuated the image of the German, or Prussian, bully which
would gain further momentum during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1, especially in later
criticisms of German administration in the annexed territory of Alsace-Lorraine. Indeed, 1871
marks a watershed in the shift of British sympathies away from Germany and toward France after
the demise of Napoleon III.27 Following the declaration of war on July 19, 1870, the Times had
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branded the French a “ vain race,” but by September 2, the day of the French capitulation at
Sedan, the same paper poured out its sympathy for “ Unhappy France” :
. . . we are overborne with sympathy for the unhappy nation. A people of so many
virtues, gifted beyond all other races with vivacity, swiftness of intelligence and
emotional energy— people which has carried into the lowest ranks of life the education of
social civility, threatens to become once more politically bankrupt.28
The military success of Bismarckian Germany did not win unqualified admiration even in an age
fascinated with military accomplishments. As the arrogant Prussian quickly supplanted the
arrogant Frenchman, and Bismarck assumed the role of a new Napoleon, one writer asked, “ can
any success earn complete absolution for the mixture of craft and force which in seven years has
so enlarged the borders of Prussia as to make of a second-rate kingdom the arbiter of Europe, the
possessor of a million armed men?” 29 Images of German militarism and Machiavellian foreign
policy reminiscent of Frederick the Great stayed fresh in the British periodical press through
World War I, recasting old notions of German philosophical idealism and political naivete.
Events such as the Moroccan Crises in 1905 and 1911, and the Zabern Affair in 1913, would
further instil the association between German diplomacy and militarism and would bolster the
image of Germany as an international bully and menace.30
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During the 1890s Anglo-German diplomatic relations took a decidedly negative turn.31
Several factors have contributed to this view, most important being the adoption in both
countries of policies designed to enhance imperial prestige. After Bismarck’ s dismissal in 1890,
Kaiser Wilhelm II’ s embarkation on a new course of Weltpolitik based on colonial and naval
expansion threatened the very foundations of British policy. German foreign policy also became
more stridently anti-British under pressure from nationalist groups like the Pan-German and
Navy Leagues.32 In England, the electoral gains of the Unionist coalition in 1895 reflected
popular imperialism and increasing concerns over Anglo-German colonial and trade rivalries.
The elevation of Joseph Chamberlain to the office of Colonial Secretary indicated the
government’ s resolve to support a more active and vocal imperial policy. Fears of diplomatic
isolation and encirclement, respectively, plagued British and German policy makers.33 Despite
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the German refusal to consider naval reductions, which posed a major obstacle to an alliance,
these fears stimulated various attempts at an Anglo-German understanding 1887 to 1901.34
The question as to why Britain and Germany never entered into any formal agreement
regarding the European power balance defies any simple explanation.35 Economic rivalry and
ideological differences certainly contributed to the Anglo-German antagonism, but their
importance should be weighed carefully in assessing the British position. Germany’ s remarkable
political and economic metamorphosis into a fledgling world power and formidable competitor
would not in itself explain the diplomatic antagonism were it not for Germany’ s geographical
proximity to England—the economic expansion of the United States was equally dramatic.36 Nor
would the ideological gulf separating “ liberal” England from “ reactionary” Prussian-dominated
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symptomatic of a universal, imperialistic short-sightedness.
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Germany have necessarily precluded an entente, like the one signed with Japan in 1902 or Russia
in 1907. Underlying the mutual distrust and suspicion in diplomatic and government circles that
hampered attempts at constructive negotiation, the global strategies of the two nations remained
diametrically opposed: England committed to preserving empire by maintaining the European
status quo and Germany bent on expanding empire by changing it. The antagonism continued as
long as the governments in each country refused to compromise.37 The ill-conceived German
policy of winning British cooperation through humiliation only played into the hands of
Germanophobes in the British press and Foreign Office who advocated a tougher policy toward
Germany.
Historians of the period have not overlooked the power of public opinion and the close
relationship that had developed between the press and the British Foreign Office by the 1890s.38
The makers of British foreign policy, even if they wanted to, could not have insulated themselves
from the effects of peer pressure and public hysteria. Public reactions to the Kruger Telegram,
Daily Telegraph Affair and other such incidents demonstrated the ease with which intense
resentment, aroused by the Kaiser’ s indiscretions and the perception of diplomatic chicanery on
the part of the Germans, could quickly escalate into a storm of outrage. The manifestation of
British mass hysteria over everything from German invasion plots to reports of spies and
Zeppelin attacks also raises questions about the historical causes and effects of delusional
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psychology.39 British writers even reacted hysterically, or reported such reactions, to fears of
diplomatic isolation, perceived German threats to British administrative, industrial and
mercantile superiority and to reports of German Anglophobia.40 The fear of being humiliated by
a stereotyped and demonized rival only confirmed Germanophobic opinion in Britain that had
existed since the early days of Bismarck’ s chancellorship.
Group psychology also may have played a part in policymaking through the presence of a
conformist mentality shared by many prominent members of the British government, clergy,
press and Foreign Office.41 Irving L. Janis applied the Orwellian term “ groupthink” to the
concurrence-seeking that overrules critical or rational thinking in a cohesive ingroup of the kind
that matches descriptions of the Foreign Office prior to World War I, with its cliquish esprit de
corps, charged atmosphere, exclusiveness, secrecy and shared stereotypes of the enemy.42 The
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case of Eyre Crowe, senior clerk at the Foreign Office, deserves special mention. Born in
Leipzig, educated in Germany and France, and having ties to Germany through birth and
marriage, he became the leading German expert at the Foreign Office as well as the most virulent
critic of any attempt at an Anglo-German understanding. Shortly after his promotion to Senior
Clerk he penned the famous Crowe Memorandum of 1907 which expressed his views, and the
views of the senior hierarchy, on German diplomatic blackmail and the inevitability of AngloGerman confrontation.43 Crowe’ s ironic vilification as a German sympathizer in 1915 seems
hardly surprising when one considers the maligning of a scapegoat to be a common product of
the interplay between hysteria and ideological conformism.44
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VI. CONCLUSION
Stereotypical literature defined what it meant to be British, rather than German, through
biased comparisons which, taken as a whole, present a classic example of psychological rivalry
aggravated by a threatened sense of self versus other. The Germans functioned, Peter Firchow
wrote, as the “defective mirror image” of the English through which national self-image could be
differentiated, maintained and reinforced.1 From the foundation of the German Empire in 1871
up to World War I and beyond, the bipolar representation of Anglo-German character
distinctions through stereotypes provided a convenient means of projecting negative aspects of
the British national self-image onto the Germans. Railing against German tacit approval of
Turkish Armenian massacres, German complicity in the East African Arab slave trade or
maltreatment of native populations, to cite a few examples, opened up ample moral high ground
upon which to retreat from national self-criticism. After negative British reactions to German
culture had proven the time-honored notion of Anglo-German racial and cultural affinity to be
illusory, the emergence of Germany as a great power and arch rival destroyed it.
As growing interest in German affairs brought increased press coverage, the strenuous
efforts to dissociate British from German national character in the later decades of the nineteenth
century almost warrant a re-coining of the sixteenth-century proverb: “familiarity breeds
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contempt.”2 Originally intended as a warning against loss of respect through unrestrained
fraternization with social inferiors, and a reminder of the importance of maintaining official
decorum, the adage can be applied to shifting British attitudes toward Germans in at least two
respects. First, it describes the superior attitude of those who reacted with jealousy and ridicule
to what they perceived as German cultural pretensions and imperial ambitions. Second, it can be
construed as a delusional familiarity with German stereotypes which did not involve any real
social interaction but instead promoted false and uncritical assumptions of Anglo-German
affinity based on idealized, sentimental and unthreatening images. New images of German
Anglophobia and imperial rivalry stimulated a reactionary iconoclasm that demonized Germany
as Britain’s polar opposite, arch nemesis or evil twin. In a narrower sense, which nevertheless
resonated in the press, the strained relations between King Edward VII and his nephew Kaiser
Wilhelm II, who personified many of of the worst aspects of New Germany, certainly suffered
from an excess of forced familiarity on the Kaiser’s part.
The suspicious attitude toward Germany and numerous vituperative statements about
German character expressed in nineteenth-century British periodicals seems to indicate some
deep-seated national antipathy or neurosis. When placed within the context of imperial rivalry
and the British conception of national selfhood, the attitudes expressed in stereotypical and
Germanophobic literature take on new importance as one of the psychological “ sinews” of the
British empire.
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